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EASTERN PROBLEMS

AT THE

CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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BY


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EASTERN PROBLEMS

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INTRODUCTION

THE history of the world, in its largest aspect, is the history of the intercourse between East and West. This intercourse has been potent in many important directions; in affairs of race, religion, and trade, the vital relation between Asia and Europe has either created or solved difficult problems in human existence. It has also been continuous, and though there have been years when this interchange has seemed of small effect, the true interpretation of world history can be given only when the struggle between Orient and Occident is recognized as an ever present factor. Then the simplest events of daily life in regions where the forces of two civilizations have joined battle for dominion become significant of great issues. The struggle is, furthermore, a signal example of the unity of history; older than historical chronicles, the contest touches the lives of men and nations to-day as it did when Jason sailed in search of the Golden Fleece, or when the champions of Greece crossed over to Asia in pursuit of Helen.

This conflict between East and West is an essential part of the thought and life of the ancient world. The Homeric epic derives from it; it is embodied in the story of Zeus and Europa, who is shown as the daughter of an Asiatic king; it is the inspiration of Herodotus and Xenophon; Marathon, Salamis, and Platea tell of the antagonism of two continents. The struggle between Hellas and Persia is the first

historic expression of that antagonism; the story of that conflict is the first chapter in the history of the Eastern Question, and the lasting glory of Alexander is that he levelled the ground for Western institutions in the border lands of Asia, and marked the flood-tide of European influence in the Orient. But even in his lifetime and with his consent the forces of the East made known their conservative strength, and in three centuries pushed the focal point of the struggle back even to Epirus. For the place of Actium among the world's great battles is only half realized unless the stake of empire between the opponents is truly estimated. Rome, as the later champion of the West, the shield and sword of Europe, fought in Antony the Asiatic peril and a leader inspired by an Orientalism which would have made Egypt the ruler of both worlds. Virgil and Horace became the poet apostles of a Roman empire which should wage war against a despot about whom were grouped the forces of the East from Arabia, India, and "*ultima Bactria*." The victory of the West, and the epochal day when the entrance of Egypt into the empire transformed the idea of Roman dominion, gave clear title to a high calling in the mind of the Roman people. The feeling of the later republic became conviction of duty in the heart of Augustus, and he dreamed to make of himself an Alexander. Thus the march of the Roman legions along the road of the "Great King" lifted the affairs of Asia Minor, the Armenian Question, the battles against the Parthians on the Euphrates frontier, to a position of world importance in the second phase of the Eastern Question. In the place of Hellas and Persia stood Rome and Parthia. For whatever meaning the expansion and the fall of the Roman Empire held for the people of western Europe, the fate of the eastern imperial frontier was pregnant for all the world. That border line became the defence of a Europe unprepared to meet the threat of Asiatic dominion. The victory of Tours was won against a mere flanking party; the brunt of the battle against Asia was borne by a much maligned

state, which for centuries held in check the forces of a civilization whose power was growing, while that of Byzantium was waning before the double attack of the untiring East and the ungrateful West. The leadership of the Orient was at first given to the rulers of Iran, later to the Semitic tribes of Arabia breathing the inspiration of an unshaken religious faith, and finally to Turanian peoples from the heart of Asia; their attack was the manifestation of forces which governed half the world, and with which modern Europe has not yet fully reckoned.

In the days of Alexander Europe had camped on the Indus; fifteen centuries later she was forced to be content with Acre and parts of Asia Minor; and before two thousand years had passed she was compelled to draw her line of defence against Asiatic conquest under the walls of Vienna. Since that day the decline of Ottoman power and the advance of commercial crusaders from Europe have defined the Eastern Question of modern history in terms familiar to all. In the narrower definition, it is the problem of the succession to the empire at Constantinople, that is, the Balkan peninsula, the Levant, and those provinces of Asia which drain into the Black, *Ægean*, and Mediterranean seas. As such this question is only the application to a specific geographical field, and to particular peoples, of Eastern and Western forces which are in conflict throughout Asia.

In the past the line between Europe and Asia was clearly drawn. Over against the static East, subjective in thought and theocratic in rule, stood the dynamic West, objective in its ideals and democratic in its political tendency; the relation of the two continents, whether in peace or war, was simple. But to-day the West is no longer all Roman: the nationalism of the Occident has found its own hemisphere too small, and is trying to find an answer to its own industrial problems on an alien soil; the battle of Slav and Teuton and Latin is to be fought out in a strange land; and the conditions of these minor

struggles are thus modified. The rulers of Asia are called to readjust the balance of power in a fight essentially local, between one or another of the powers of Europe or America ; and the Armageddon of Orient and Occident is set for an unknown day. The result is that the oldest Eastern Question, that which centres at Constantinople, has companion problems in Egypt, Persia, Central Asia, and China. They are all similar and all go to make the problem of Asia, of which each is at once a phase and a microcosm. The problem of Asia being near the heart of world history, the progress of Western economic and political questions to an Asiatic and Oceanic stage evolves world politics ; and in Asia these politics deal with issues between West and East which block the road to imperial expansion throughout the Orient.

— It is, therefore, as parts of a world-problem that colonial affairs in Asia and the Turkish Question reveal their true meaning ; nor is this a new thing, for the Eastern Question, to use the conventional term for the Turkish Question, is an old force in history. It has been neglected, its influence discounted, and even its existence denied by local historians in the West, who write of the German Reformation with scarce a word about Turkish armies, and who tell of the rise of France to the leadership of Europe, but say little of the alliance of the “ Most Christian King ” and the “ Grand Seignior.” Yet there is no fundamental difference in the Eastern Question of the fifteenth and twentieth centuries ; then as now the Ottoman power profited by the jealousies of Western states, intent upon gaining economic advantage in the trade of the East ; for earlier still, geography, the great constant in politics, had determined the true value of Constantinople as an imperial city, and of Egypt as *forum utrique orbi*. Indeed, one object of this monograph is to insist upon the need of a *History of the Eastern Question*, which will tell the rôle of Asia in the life of our own races and states, and will win recognition for the East, the slighted factor in European history. The colonial

expansion of Europe has been described both as an extension of the history of the home countries and as a movement of inherent importance. The real meaning of its history lies in both aspects, and also in the interacting relation of Asia and Europe through its medium. The influence of an Asiatic domain, which is itself subject to Asiatic tradition and history, upon the life and ideals of its Western parent or governor, cannot be lightly estimated. The plan of our investigation, therefore, is based on these thoughts. It does not include the history of certain Asiatic countries at a given period, nor an account of political events in either hemisphere: it is rather an attempt to discover the conditions which governed colonial affairs and the Eastern Question in the closing years of the eighteenth century, and to measure the influence which these extra-European problems exerted in a period of stress when the storm centre is believed to have been in western Europe, and to observe the evolution of Asiatic questions during that period. The story of the French Revolution and of Napoleon Bonaparte has been told so often that the choice of that period for study may seem a mistake. Yet it gives just the situation with which to test the claim of the importance and significance of Asia. The events are well known, little new material is available, and no startling interpretation is to be dreaded. The view usually taken by students of the Eastern Question is that the Napoleonic period was comparatively barren of results in the evolution of that problem, and that held by some students of Western history is that the colonies occupied a minor place in the great European struggle, and that though Napoleon's dreams might be of the Orient, his politics dealt only with European affairs. If, therefore, the influence of Asia in Europe, and the development of her problems, can be shown to have been appreciable in a period so hostile, those who support the plea for recognition of the East may find encouragement.

Only the preliminary chapters of this investigation appear at present in a pamphlet for use as a dissertation for the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy; the method of presentation and the form of the work are those required of the writer for this purpose. For all that the writer has gained during his course at Columbia University, and for whatever may be found worthy of acceptance in his future work, he desires gratefully to recognize his indebtedness to those who have inspired and directed him, and in particular to Professor William M. Sloane, Professor James Harvey Robinson, and Professor Richard J. H. Gottheil. He wishes also to express his thanks to Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge of Harvard University, and to those who have helped him in the Libraries of the Pennsylvania State Historical Society and of Columbia and Harvard Universities.

CHAPTER I

THE COLONIAL QUESTION AND THE WAR OF 1793

The international Rivalries of the Eighteenth Century as influenced by Asia — The Theory of Colonial Dominion — "The Balance of Trade" — Colonies and Sea Power — The Antagonism of France and Great Britain — French Colonial Policy — French Colonies in the Eighteenth Century: Trade, Size, and Population — Economic influence of the Colonies — Administration — The Colonial Question in France: the *Cahiers* — Colonial Compact — Privileged Companies — Treaty of 1786 — British India — Trade of Great Britain with Asia in the Eighteenth Century — General Condition of British Commerce in 1783 and 1793 — British Power in Asia — Its Progress and its Dangers — The State of India — French Opinion regarding Asiatic Questions — Talleyrand's Plan — The Preparation for the War of 1793 — The Position of Spain — Asia, the Source of British Power — Opinion in Great Britain, 1790-93 — The Importance of the Netherlands — "The War on Sugar Islands" — The Continental and Colonial Policies of France — The Negotiations at Lille — The Colonial Question and the Problem of Asiatic Dominion during the Revolutionary period.

THE eighteenth century, though cosmopolitan in thought, was international in politics. The "inter-colonial wars" were a struggle for commerce and colonial empire, but they reacted with energy upon the institutional and political reformation which focussed in the Revolution; the Eastern Question and its corollary, the Polish Question, then took rank with the French Question in the councils of Europe; and the jealousies they caused blinded the eyes of diplomats to the real meaning of events in Paris, thus gaining for the French chance to organize more fully forces with which to fight Europe. The interest of Europe and more particularly of France in Asiatic matters has been hidden by events at home; it was by no means slight, and in the case of Napoleon Bonaparte became

at one time overpowering. The synthesis of these ideas and the traditional policy of France made easy the preparation for the Egyptian Expedition; and that event, a natural step, marked in turn an important evolution in the problem of Asia. In this chapter the attempt must be made to discuss the colonial question at the time of the French Revolution, and to summarize with special reference to Asiatic affairs the theories and conditions involved in the imperial struggle between France and Great Britain.

Montesquieu, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had written of the English as a people who above all others had known best how to "profit simultaneously by three great forces—religion, commerce, and liberty."¹ Each of these three had been at stake at one time or another during the wars of Great Britain with Spain, Holland, and France; the conflict with Spain, the "monopolist of the New World," was for religious and economic reasons and during this conflict was founded that sea power of Great Britain, which was to support her international prestige and commercial prosperity. The domestic controversies which produced modern England, with the naval combats against the Dutch, and the later alliance of the two nations against France, introduced the long struggle of the eighteenth century for commerce and colonies; and this antagonism between Great Britain and France, which reached a new stage in the wars of the Revolution, was related to Great Britain's rivalry with Spain. It was the threatened increase to French domains by the addition of the trans-oceanic empire of Spain, and the checking of British advance in India and America by the Bourbons, that moved Great Britain to join battle against France in order to protect and enlarge her commerce and colonial domain. Thus the policies of the two rivals grew world-wide in their scope; the political geography of the Antipodes was discussed in the councils of Europe; and the

¹ *Esprit des Lois*, l. xx. c. 7.

question of curbing the ambitions of France at the Pyrenees, the Rhine, or the Scheldt was linked with that of control on the Ganges and the Mississippi. The stories of wealth in the Indies made men speak of the "Grand Mogul" as they would have spoken of Louis XIV.; and new measures of value produced new theories of commerce and politics. Trade itself became political; and it was said: "All the Nations of Europe seem to strive who shall outwit one another in point of Trade, and they concur in this Maxim, That the less they consume of foreign Commodities, the better it is for them."¹ With such an axiom colonial problems were attempted and the principles of commerce and foreign policy demonstrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Overlooking subtler laws of credit and engrossed in the idea that wealth could be measured only in gold and silver, men gauged a nation's prosperity wholly by the difference between its exports and imports. This was supposed to be in bullion and gave the "balance of trade," the economic barometer, which to the mind of governor and merchant marked success or failure, according as exports exceeded imports or were exceeded by them. Whatever judgment, therefore, may be passed on the "Mercantile System" as a whole, or the economic theory on which it rested, this must be remembered: the system was a vital element in the period; the conclusions to which men came in matters of commerce and colonial policy were influenced by it; and the spirit of the time cannot be truly understood if it be disregarded.²

¹ Jansson: *Maxims in Trade* (1713) publ. in Somers: *Fourth Collection of Tracts*, iv. p. 153.

² Mun: *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade* (1664) (Macculloch's edition), p. 125, chap. ii.: "The ordinary means, therefore, to increase our wealth and treasure is by *Forraign Trade*, wherein wee must ever observe this rule: to sell more to strangers yearly than wee consume of theirs in value." Boisliste: *Corr. des controleurs généraux*, ii. p. 477 (*Mém. de M. de Mesnager, député de Rouen, sur l'état du commerce en général*, Dec. 3, 1700): "Si nous fournissons aux étrangers en vin, en eau de vie, sel, toiles et étoffes pour plus de valeur que ce que nous tirons d'eux, alors notre commerce est utile à l'État, parce que le débit que nous faisons de nos marchandises excédant la valeur de celles qu'ils nous envoient, cet

As a natural result of this economic system, the problems of colonial dominion and sea power took front rank among the

excédent nous est toujours payé en argent qui est la richesse et la force de l'État." Child: *Discourse on Trade* (5th ed. 1751), p. 115: "The ballance of trade is commonly understood two ways: 1. Generally: something whereby it may be known whether this kingdom gains or loses by foreign trade. 2. Particularly: something whereby we may know by what trades this kingdom gains, and by what trades it loses. . . . This ballance is to be taken by a strict scrutiny of what proportion the value of the commodities exported out of this kingdom bear to those imported; and if the exports exceed the imports, it is concluded the nation gets by the general course of its trade, it being supposed that the overplus is imported bullion, and so adds to the treasure of the kingdom, gold and silver being taken for the measure and standard of riches." Child criticises this prevailing opinion and shows that when applied to particular branches of trade it fails to consider the relation of that branch to the total trade. He examples the East India Co. on this point (p. 120); he declares his measure of trade is the ratio of increase in the general shipping and trade of a nation (p. 123). On the other hand, he says: "It is to our interest, by example, and other means (not distasteful), above all kinds of commodities, to prevent, as much as may be, the importation of foreign manufactures" (p. 132). Coyer: *La Noblesse commerçante* (1756), p. 93. "Ce n'est pas le Commerce intérieur qui enrichit un État, il établit seulement une circulation de richesses, sans en augmenter la masse; c'est au Commerce extérieur qu'est réservé le grand œuvre. L'Europe nous ouvre ses Ports, l'Afrique nous appelle, l'Asie nous attend, l'Amerique nous sollicite" (p. 151). "L'Argent, ce tyran du monde a bien étendu son empire depuis l'usage de la poudre à canon et des armes à feu. La guerre est devenue une dépense d'argent plutôt qu'une dépense d'hommes" (p. 158). "Le commerce est le nerf de l'État. . . . La balance du commerce et la balance du pouvoir n'en sont plus qu'une." The very urgency with which such statements are made shows the idea of empire founded on trade to be a new and pregnant one to the men of the eighteenth century. *Ibid.* p. 22: "Je pourrois démontrer que la France, dans la position actuelle de l'Europe, ne peut se soutenir que par le commerce, d'où je conclurois que toute la Noblesse se doit s'y porter. . . ." Cf. pp. 54, 179, 214-215. Child: *op. cit.* p. 114: "That the greatness of this kingdom depends upon foreign trade is acknowledged, and therefore the interest of trade not unbecoming persons of the highest rank." Beausobre: *L'Introduction à l'étude de la politique* (ed. of 1791), i. p. 257: "Le commerce est actif lorsque l'État vend à l'étranger beaucoup plus de marchandises et de denrées qu'il ne lui en achete, il est passif si l'État achete plus qu'il ne vend." The author attacks this prevailing definition, and claims the principle upon which commerce must be judged is that "les productions de la terre fournissent le nécessaire, que le produit de circulation fait naître l'abondance et que les trésors de l'étranger donnent le superflu: . . . que tout commerce qui ne fait pas hausser le prix des terres est un commerce destructif et vicieux" (p. 258). Arnould, *Balance du Commerce* (1793), i. p. 64: "Suivent le même sys-

political and commercial questions of the day ; for the corollary to the proposition regarding the balance of trade was that the colonies and foreign establishments of a European state must minister only to the prosperity of the home ports. Such a belief, enforced by prohibitive laws or by war, made the ownership of a colony a necessity to the mother country ; and the Asiatic trading-posts, or " factories," of European companies thus became the scenes of political intrigue or actual hostility between associations of merchants. The readiness of the mother country to support the claims and help the endeavors of her citizens was determined by the supposed value of a new and exclusive market, as well as by the ability shown by the colony or factory to assist the balance of trade between the home country and some other European nation. For often the imports from the foreign possessions were in turn exported to a European market, the profit-taking being for the benefit of home merchants, and the increase of exports credited in calculating the balance of trade for the mother country.¹ The

tème, il falloit beaucoup vendre aux étrangers, et leur acheter peu, afin d'attirer une plus grande masse d'argent dans les canaux de la circulation intérieure de l'empire." The author gives his own definition, viz. (i. p. 132) : " D'après ces définitions, j'entends par *balance du commerce*, la comparaison des différents rapports de l'homme avec la terre. C'est dans ce sens que j'ai intitulé cet ouvrage, de la *balance du commerce*." The matter is thus summarized by Adam Smith : *Wealth of Nations* (ed. of 1796), ii. p. 173 ; Bk. iv. ch. 1. " The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that these metals could be brought into a country which had no mines only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported, it necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation and encouragements to exportation." Cf., for Smith's criticism of this theory, pp. 141, 147, 170 *et seq.* ; 243-250, 485 *et seq.* Cf. also Montesquieu : *Esprit des Lois*, l. xx. c. 4-14 ; and for a general statement regarding mercantilism, Schmoller : *The Mercantile System*, pp. 47 *et seq.*, 58 *et seq.*

¹ Child : *Discourse on Trade*, p. 146 : " That all colonies and foreign plantations do endamage their mother-kingdom, when the trades of such plantations are not confined to their said mother-kingdoms, by good laws, and the severe

result, however, of such endeavors in empire-building might be totally the reverse of that intended; should the contest for colonial domain or commercial privilege prove too expensive to the mother country, the profits of the new market would be more than counterbalanced by an increased national debt and heavy taxation. Especially would this be true when the consumption of colonial produce was confined to the home land, and when no part of the colonial output was re-exported to foreign consumers in Europe. It was this aspect of the problem

execution of those laws." Gomel: *Causes financières de la Révolution française*, ii. pp. 223 *et seq.* In 1784 the chief cities of France protested against the decree of Aug. 30, which permitted foreign ships to trade in certain specified goods with French colonies. The deputies of these cities claimed that "c'est un principe incontesté que les colonies sont créées par et pour la métropole; elles n'ont le droit de s'approvisionner qu'en France, et de même elles ne peuvent vendre qu'en France les produits de leur sol. Le monopole du commerce colonial assuré aux négociants et armateurs de la mère-patrie, est pour celle-ci un dédommagement aux dépenses qu'entraînent la fondation et la garde des colonies; il est pour elle une source de bénéfices, et s'il cesse d'exister, si les vaisseaux étrangers peuvent amener dans les Antilles les produits dont celles-ci ont besoin, ils ne tarderont pas à supplanter nos bâtiments ainsi que nos marchandises, au grand détriment de notre marine et nos manufactures." Cf. Bachaumont: *Mémoires*, xxvii. p. 84; xxviii. pp. 143-145. Beausobre: *Politique*, i. pp. 279, 280: "Il ne faut jamais oublier qu'elles [les colonies] ne sont fondées qu'en faveur du pays de la domination; c'est pourquoi les fabriques et les manufactures y sont déplacées." Uztariz: *Theory and Practice of Commerce* (written in 1724, Eng. ed. 1751), i. p. 6: "... we [Spaniards] principally suffer by having bought of foreigners more merchandize and fruits, than we have sold to them, so as to make a ballance to our disadvantage of millions of dollars yearly." Page 49: "... the Indies are not the thing that enervates and dispeoples Spain, but the commodities by which foreigners have drained us of our money, and destroyed our manufactories, at the same time that our heavy taxes continue." This statement was based on the fact that the exports to Spain from her colonies were chiefly bullion, which, while it increased Spain's purchasing power in Europe, altered the balance of trade to her debit. The dangerous progress of English trading in Asia is treated in Bielfeld: *Institutions politiques*, i. p. 304: "Mais il y a eu, en Asie, des Nations ou trop formidables par elles-mêmes pour être subjuguées, ou que la jalousie mutuelle des Puissances Européennes a laissées en paix, ou qu'on n'a pas crû valoir la peine d'être attaquées. Le Commerce avec ces peuples et la Navigation sur leurs Côtes sont demeurés libres à toutes les Nations Européennes; et c'est aujourd'hui une violence, une injustice affreuse lorsqu'une Puissance, qui domine sur la Mer par ses forces Navales, veut troubler les autres dans cette Navigation."

which appealed to Adam Smith in his well-known chapter on the colonies.¹ The idea that sea power was a deciding factor in history, that the future of nations depended on a flourishing commerce upheld by a profitable colonial empire and defended by a powerful navy, was advanced on both sides of the Channel. The Earl of Shaftesbury had already measured the foundation of British power when he wrote: "The Fleet are the Walls of England"; in France a like thought and hope were heralded; and the realization of the ideal of sea power by Great Britain in her long duel with France was the full expression of a theory by no means novel or mysterious. As Great Britain gained this maritime supremacy a corresponding advance in her manufactures further strengthened her hold on it. Exports to the Antipodes discovered national resources, which in turn became the nation's mainstay in war. The merchant-marine and industrial interests stored the power of the country, while the enlargement of the empire opened new markets and found naval stations the world over. Gentz called it the "Monopoly of Trans-European dominions."²

¹ Smith: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 397, 429, 431, 439, 442, 459-469, 516-517. (Book iv. chap. 7.)

² Gentz: *State of Europe in 1789*, pp. 308 *et seq.* Shaftesbury: *Delenda Carthago*, in Somers: *Second Collection*, iii. pp. 213, 214. "The Fleet are the Walls of England. To command at Sea, not to make conquests by Land, is the true Interest of England . . . What then is the Interest of England as to France? Surely to grow at Sea and command the trade, which is our greatness." Mahan: *Sea-Power (1660-1793)*, pp. i. 73 *et seq.* (Cf. *O'Meara's Talks with Napoleon at St. Helena*, *Century Magazine*, Feb. 1900, p. 631.) Cunningham: *English Industry*, ii. pp. 445, 508, 537-538. Mallet du Pan: *Memoirs and Correspondence*, i. p. 39: "From the Baltic, from Hudson's Bay, from Jamaica, from the Windward Islands and the East Indies, immense and rich cargoes come to minister to the necessities of the State [England], while sustaining the fortunes of individuals. This care in protecting the returns of her merchant marine by the aid of a fleet, ever ready for the purpose, makes no noise in the papers. It occasions no firing of cannons or chanting of Te Deums; but it preserves individuals from the evils of war. So long as this circulation shall last, England will retain life and movement. So long as the capital of her merchant marine shall be circulating at the two ends of the world, an exchange for their treasures, so long as a maritime and commercial power shall lose neither her convoys nor her war-

Power thus gained stimulated the imagination and widened the political horizon of Europe; but the process was slow and often throughout the eighteenth century local reasons were given for policies which, though they seemed European, were destined to work changes in other continents. But the history of the period has no place here, for it is upon the principles of foreign policy that attention must be centred; and the main theme being the rivalry of France and Great Britain in the latter half of the century, the theories entertained by each about the other are connected with colonial and naval policy. Of French writers on the subject no other is as typical as Favier, the diplomat and author of political treatises; his ideas were popular and his influence great. The gist of his doctrine was the annihilation of Great Britain as the only obstacle to French expansion on the continent and over seas. He cited the conflicting and commercial interests of the two states, which had involved them or their allies in war four times within a century; he talked of treaties between them as mere truces, and celebrated the centennial of their mutual hatred. Frenchmen, comparing their struggle with Great Britain to the Punic wars, dreamed of themselves as Romans and shouted, *Delenda est Carthago*. Other writers, of widely differing character, expressed similar ideas. Rousseau in 1760 declared that Great Britain would be ruined within twenty years. An attack at the extremities of the British Empire, a rebellion in Ireland, internal parliamentary dissensions, and a fierce onset by France would make of England an insular Poland.¹ Nor was the animosity only in France; a

ships, she will impose on the imagination by the energy of her efforts." Coyer : *op. cit.* p. 109—quoting a saying attributed by Pompey to Themistocles, "Qui est le Maître de la mer, est le Maître de tout"—the author claims that Louis XIV. was animated by this idea. Page 182: "D'un Vaisseau Marchand on passe sur la Flote Royale pour y disputer l'Empire de la mer."

¹ France and England or their allies had gone to war in 1689, 1702, 1739, 1756, and again later in 1775. Favier, *Conjectures*, in Ségur : *Politiques*, etc. ii. p. 165: "Dans les beaux jours de Louis XIV. la France profita de l'animosité nationale, de la jalousie du commerce entre les Anglais et les Hollandais, pour tenir la balance entre les deux puissances maritimes." Page 167: "On peut donc le dire,

reciprocal feeling in Great Britain spoke of France as a "natural political enemy," and declared that any union with her

nous voici arrivés à l'anniversaire d'un siècle de haine implacable entre les deux nations [France and England.] Depuis cette paix séparée en 1673, elles n'ont point cessé d'être en guerre ouverte, ou en temps de paix, de nourrir les jalousies, les défiances, les craintes réciproques, qui ont ramené quatre fois de nouvelles hostilités" (*et passim* to p. 195). Rousseau: *Extrait du Projet de Paix*, in *Œuvres*, vii. p. 364 (written in 1760): "Il est par exemple très-aisé de prévoir que dans vingt ans d'ici l'Angleterre avec toute sa gloire sera ruinée et de plus aura perdu le reste de sa liberté." Zévort: *d'Argenson*, p. 409, maxim of d'Argenson: "L'Angleterre et la maison d'Autriche sont nos seuls rivaux de puissance par mer et par terre, ce sont deux Carthages contre une Rome." (This was prior to 1756.) Gentz: *op. cit.* pp. 99, 100: [1789] "There was only one among the greater powers whose interests were contrary to those of France, and who at the same time possessed the means of injuring her; and that was England. . . . But with respect to the danger resulting to France from this hostile relation, it appears that . . . the security and integrity of its territory [were] not invaded or materially endangered in any war with England. Colonial and commercial interests, the constant objects of contention between them, though certainly great and important, were only secondary to the above consideration; and the danger that ensued, though serious and afflicting, was only subordinate." Coyer: *op. cit.* pp. 62 *et seq.*, 101, 106, 107. Voltaire: *Siècle de Louis XIV.* ch. 35. Gomel: *op. cit.* i. pp. 5, 230; ii. p. 35. D'Argenson: *Journal et Mém.* iii. p. 170: [Sept. 19, 1740] "Il n'est pas douteux que l'Angleterre n'ait un grand intérêt à écraser notre marine renaissante. Ils la chercheront et se diront en droit de commencer la querelle par nous combattre, puisque tout dessein de notre flotte ne peut être qu'offensif contre eux." Cf. vii. pp. 37, 397; viii. pp. 108, 348. Lânguet: *Annales*, iv. p. 53: "Cinq-cents ans de rivalité ont rendu personnelle à chaque particulier l'émulation qui aiguillonne les deux peuples" [English and French]. (Quoted by Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, i. p. 338, note 4.) Cf. Sorel: *op. cit.* i. pp. 291, 292, 306, 338, 345, 347. Dubroca: *Politique du Gouvernement Anglais*, p. vi: "La nature a placé l'Angleterre et la France dans une situation respective qui doit nécessairement établir entre elles une éternelle rivalité. Rapprochées sous ce rapport, les deux nations offrent sous un autre point de vue des différences qui établissent aussi impérieusement la supériorité de la France sur la Grande-Bretagne." De Witt: *Jefferson and American Democracy*, p. 389. (Paper written in March, 1776, by Gérard de Rayneval, of the French foreign office, entitled, "Reflections on the actual position of the English colonies and the course which France ought to take with respect to them.") "After describing England as the natural enemy of France, and as a greedy, ambitious, unjust, and faithless enemy, the invariable and cherished object of whose policy was, if not the destruction, at all events the impoverishment, humiliation, and ruin of France, he urged as a natural consequence that it was the business of France to take every possible opportunity of weakening the strength and power of England."

would be "disgraceful and degrading to England." The common talk was not so bitter; the road to war was rather paved by suspicion, a readiness to expect French hostility, and by contentment in French discomfort.¹ Such an attitude, how-

¹ Rousset: *Louvois*, ii. p. 309 [1677]: (Report of a French agent in London): "Il a passé tout d'une voix dans la chambre basse que les Anglais vendront jusqu'à leurs chemises (ce sont les termes dont ils se servent) pour faire la guerre à la France pour la conservation des Pays-Bas." Browning: *Leeds — Pol. memoranda*, p. 111 (May 9, 1785): "Austria and France are united for views of mutual aggrandizement. Russia is closely connected with Austria, Spain with France. The Consequences of this formidable League are evident. They would be felt by all Europe in general, but more particularly by England and Prussia. It behooves therefore these two Courts to concert Measures for their reciprocal Safety." Stephens: *Horne Tooke*, i. p. 56: "The Whigs of that day [1765] always beheld France with an invidious eye, and rejoiced at her humiliation and disgrace. Considering the example of successful tyranny as contagious, they vowed eternal enmity and everlasting hatred against a king, who kept more than twenty-five millions of his subjects in slavery; and they would willingly have waged perpetual war with a nation, base and abject enough to hug their chains, and sacrifice themselves at the bidding of an unfeeling despot." *Parl. Hist.* xxvi. 421, 422. Debate on commercial treaty with France in 1787. Mr. Francis: "It has been the deliberate policy, not the passion, of England in all times but those of the House of Stuart, to prefer the friendship of any distant nation to that of France. . . . An intimate union with France must always be disgraceful and degrading to England." Burke, speaking on the subject, said (p. 488): "The designs, then, of France were to allow us some present gain in the sale of our manufactures, for some permanent advantages which she promised to herself in commerce. Through her rivers and canals she intends to pour the commodities of England into other countries. She had already, by her politics, contrived to wrest our share of the Levant trade from us; and it was a part of her present design to divert the remainder from its former channel; and by supplying all the ports in the Mediterranean Sea through the Seine, the Garonne, the canal of Languedoc, and the Rhone, to engross the carrying trade to the Levant, and to ruin our factory at Leghorn and our other establishments in those seas." During the course of this debate Mr. Fox was particularly severe in his attacks on France, declaring her the "natural political enemy" of Great Britain. One of the most distinguished exceptions to the general anti-Gallican sentiment had been Lord Shelburne. Cf. Fitzmaurice: *Shelburne*, iii pp. 166, 167 [1782]. For Fox's change of view in 1789, cf. Russell: *Corr. of Fox*, ii. p. 361. (Fox to Fitzpatrick, July 30, 1789.) *Annual Register*, 1784-85, p. 137. (English sentiment as to the treaty signed Nov. 8, 1785, between Holland and the Empire.) "It could not but be a grievous consideration to Englishmen that, while France, through the happiness of great ministers at home, and their choice of able negotiators

ever, was fatal to peace; given this mutual distrust, the avowed policy of France was to ally herself with every enemy of Great Britain, and that of the British was no less effective in its opposition to French schemes. As in the affairs of the American colonies the French had tried to strike at Great Britain, so in Holland the plans of the Bourbons aimed not only at European success, but at serious opposition to British power in India. The "favorite design" of the French court was said to be "to injure as much as possible the commercial and political interests of England in India;" and as the Revolution drew near, no abatement in this policy is to be seen; Indian princes, by their opposition to British control in the East, were to satisfy the national jealousy of France; French diplomacy delighted to play at intrigue in Eastern affairs, and the gossip of Versailles fed on embassies from Asia. That these hopes were futile does not make them less an index to the mind of France.¹

abroad, was spreading her consequence, and extending her influence through the nations of the earth, Great Britain, through some unaccountable fatality, seemed to be fallen from that high seat in which she had so long and so gloriously presided, and to be no longer considered, or almost remembered in the general politics and system of Europe." Auckland: *Correspondence*, i. p. 127 (Pitt to Eden. June 10, 1786): "... though in the commercial business I think there are reasons for believing the French may be sincere, I cannot listen without suspicion to their professions of political friendship"; ii. p. 215 (Storer to Eden. June 30, 1788): "... we suppose the French are looking out for opportunities of commencing hostilities against us, and the French think that Great Britain is seeking for pretences to begin a war against them." For English pleasure at French disorder, see *Ibid.* i. pp. 195, 205; ii. pp. 233, 377, 458, 462, 484. Cf. also Lecky: *Hist. of England in the Eighteenth Century*, v. pp. 443, 444, 455, 456, 474.

¹ Barral-Montferrat: *Dix ans de paix armée*, i. p. 14 (Lord Carmarthen to Hailes, Jan.-Feb. 1784): "I feel sure that you will take the opportunity to pay closer attention than ever to the plans of the French Court, now that it is free to press the accomplishment of its favorite design, that is to injure as much as possible the commercial and political interests of England in India. These plans must appear as easier of realization now than at any other time previous, in view of the new intimacy which has been established between France and the United Provinces of Holland. The principal, not to say the only object of their alliance is, it appears, to drive the English from the East Indies." Page 95 (Despatch of

The positive side of French policy in colonial affairs and the success of French colonization must not be forgotten. It has

Hailes, Sept. 7, 1786): "As soon as she can France will recommence hostilities. She will advance as she has previously given as her motives for the rupture, the liberties and rights of humanity, and she will use the Indian princes to satisfy her national jealousy still more than her ambition." Cf. pp. 1, 2. Malmesbury: *Diaries and Corresp.* ii. p. 289 (The Hague, April 13, 1787; Harris to Carmarthen): "M. de Vergennes has agents employed at Amsterdam, for no other purpose than to find out persons who had been accustomed to India, who knew that language and habits of the country; and, wherever they could be discovered, they were engaged at almost any price; and I am told that there is scarcely an Indian prince who has not a French emissary at his court." Cf. p. 189. Rose: *Diaries*, i. p. 85 (Pitt to Stafford, Sept. 6, 1788): "Our accounts from India of the Chev^r. de Conway's return from Trincomale, without having done anything, and of all being quiet in that quarter, are very satisfactory. The State of France, whatever else it may produce, seems to promise us more than ever a considerable respite from any dangerous project, and there seems scarce anything for us to regret on our own account in that condition of foreign countries, except the danger that the King of Sweden may suffer too severely for his kindness." Notice must be taken of the embassy of Tipú Tib which reached Paris in 1788. Though it accomplished nothing, it is interesting as showing the temper of the time. Tantet: *Ambassade de Tippoo Sahib à Paris in Revue de Paris* (1899), i. pp. 393-420. A previous attempt had been made by Tipú to communicate with European courts. In 1784 Ghulam 'Ali K^{han} had started from Mysore on a mission to the Porte, France, and England. Owing to lack of funds he only went as far as Constantinople. His instructions and journal are noted by Stewart: *Catalogue of Tippoo's Library*, p. 92. Letters No. xxix. and xxx. But on July 27 Muhammad Darwaish K^{han}, Akbar 'Ali K^{han} and Muhammad Osman K^{han} sailed from Pondicherry on a mission to the court of Versailles from Tipú Sultán of Mysore. They landed at Toulon, June 9, 1788, and were received Aug. 10, by Louis XVI. They returned to Seringapatam in May, 1789, with promises and presents. Politically the mission was a failure, though it alarmed several British diplomats. Cf. Stewart: *op. cit.* p. 54. Lescure: *Corr. secrète*, ii. pp. 193, 273, 278-79, 281. (The ambassadors asked for 6,000 French troops to fight the English.) Malouet: *Mémoires*, i. p. 206. Kirkpatrick: *Select Letters of Tippoo Tib*, p. 13. Auckland: *Corr.* i. p. 169. (Mr. Morton Eden to Mr. William Eden, Jan. 18, 1787.) Mr. Hope of Amsterdam had been speaking of "the power and art of France in Holland, in diverting the Dutch from their real commercial interests to establish in India a military power which must be at their command; and prove probably fatal to our interests in that quarter." Page 342 (Mr. Hugh Elliot to Mr. Eden, Dec. 26, 1783): "Foreigners in general think we are in danger of losing our East India possessions entirely by the intrigues of the French and the strength of their allies in Hindostan." Cf. i. p. 229; ii. pp. 227-228. (The duke of Dorset was inclined to mock at Tipú's embassy.) Barral-

been the habit of some to recall only British victories ; they look on the French colonial domain as a pitiful and unwise attempt to equal the success and enterprise of Englishmen ; and they depreciate the interest of French statesmen and merchants in fostering a foreign dominion. This view is unsupported by facts ; the value of colonies was estimated more highly in France than in England, more money was spent for them, and greater endeavors made to help them. Clear theories regarding the problems of colonial expansion were first formulated in France ; Frenchmen first conceived the idea and applied the system, which, when copied by the English, led to the conquest or absorption of India. Since the sixteenth century France had wished to be a colonial power ; and Francis I., Coligny, Henry IV., Richelieu, Colbert, and Louis XIV. had raised an empire which in 1683 was at its widest limits, including territories and spheres of influence of vast extent in North and South America and India, together with rich islands in the East and West Indies and establishments along the coast of Africa ; only the dominion of Spain exceeded that of France prior to 1700. Even as the Revolution threatened, fashions at home were for things *d'outre-mer* ;

Montferrat: *op. cit.* i. pp. 51, 52. In 1785, the French ambassador in London, the Count d'Adhémar, was full of a plan which Vergennes thought too reckless. He propose to induce Warren Hastings, then returning from India to be tried, to turn traitor in the event of his conviction. France was to cherish his ambition to be a king in India, and was to supply him with means to create of India an independent state, at enmity with Great Britain and useful to France. (The crudeness of this plan, as seriously suggested by one high in the diplomatic service, gives additional reason for French failure in other eastern Affairs.) Masson: *Dépt. Aff. Étrang.* p. 63: "Ainsi Mgr. Pigneau de Béhaine, évêque d'Adran, était venu du fond de l'empire d'Annam, menant avec lui le prince, fils du roi de Cochinchine, proposer à la France un territoire immense. Un traité stipulant une alliance offensive et défensive avait été signé à Versailles le 28 novembre, 1787 ; on le laissa sans exécution. Les ambassadeurs de Tippoo-Sahib étaient arrivés à Versailles le 13 août, 1788 [probably August 10] : ils avaient, en quelque sorte, fait acte de vassalité vis-à-vis de Louis XVI. : on les éconduisit poliment. Cette immense attaque qu'on aurait pu tenter contre l'Angleterre, en Europe par les quatre puissances alliées, en Asie par la Cochinchine et l'Inde, échoua misérablement."

French discoverers were sailing on unknown seas, a vigorous colonial policy was favored by Louis XVI., and that new force in politics, the pamphleteer, was sending out his pages praising colonial power and urging aggressive expansion.¹ A few figures showing the relative condition of colonial trade at the death of Louis XIV. and at the outbreak of the Revolution will put this in a clearer light. In 1716 the export trade of France amounted to about 118,000,000 livres, of which 13,500,000 livres went to her colonies and foreign establishments, and 17,650,000 livres originally came from them, but were exported to the rest of Europe by home merchants; the total imports from the colonies were 23,500,000 livres, in which the above

¹ Beer: *Gesch. des Welthandels*, 2te Abth. pp. 44, 45. Stephens: *The French Revolution*, i. p. 270. Seeley: *The Expansion of England*, p. 35. Lorin: *Bordeaux et la colonisation française* in *Quest. diplo. et colon.*, 1900, p. 385: "Le fait est que la période la plus éclatante de la grandeur bordelaise, le dix-huitième siècle, fut celle des relations les plus actives avec les possessions françaises d'outre-mer, particulièrement les Antilles." Rambaud: *La France coloniale*, p. xxx. Levasseur: *Population française*, iii. p. 446. Dubois: *Systèmes coloniaux*, pp. 259 et seq. Malleon: *History of the French in India*, pp. 1 et seq., and *Final French Struggles in India*, p. 249. Rapson: *Struggle between France and England*, p. 11. Leroy-Beaulieu: *La colonisation*, pp. 139 et seq. 151, 711. Castonnet-Desfosses: *La Révolution et les clubs dans l'Inde française* in *Revue de la Révolution*, i. p. 235. De Lanessan: *Expansion coloniale*, p. xxiii. Bailleu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. pp. ix, x. Voltaire: *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. 29. Hanotaux: *Le Havre et le commerce maritime de la France* in *Quest. diplo. et colon.*, 1900, pp. 667, 668: "Jamais la France, au cours de son histoire, n'eut une activité maritime et coloniale comparable à celle qui marqua cette brillante époque [1763-1789]. . . . Les Antilles notamment étaient en pleine prospérité. Tous les esprits étaient attirés vers cette source de richesse qui paraissait inépuisable. La cour, la ville, la société tout entière étaient prises dans la tourbillon. . . . Ce goût, cette fureur du commerce des Îles pénétrait jusqu' à Paris. Il influait sur les mœurs. Des fortunes rapides se constituaient et s'écroulaient selon les succès ou l'insuccès des entreprises lointaines. Tout ce qui venait des colonies était à la mode. Les filles des traitants étaient recherchées et leurs dots fermaient les yeux sur leurs origines. On portait des coiffures à la *créole*, et la littérature elle-même s'en mêlant, on était tout oreilles aux petits vers des littérateurs venus des Îles, les Parny et les Bertin." The bibliography includes the titles of many books and brochures on colonial subjects. The list might have been largely increased, but preference was given to writers on Asiatic matters. The work of Deschamps, *La question coloniale*, has much to say on this point.

mentioned 17,650,000 is included. In 1789 the total exports amounted to 358,000,000 livres, of which 119,000,000 livres went to the colonies, and about 160,000,000 livres of colonial imports were exported from France to foreign countries; the imports from the colonies were from 226,000,000 to 240,000,000 livres. In 1789 the total import trade of France was about 345,000,000 livres, and in the language of the period a balance of trade of 13,000,000 livres was created in her favor. The rôle of the colonies in thus changing a balance of imports over exports of nearly 150,000,000 livres to one of exports over imports of 13,000,000 livres was evident to every one, and this fact was brought out frequently in the colonial controversy of 1791 as great reason for careful management of the colonial domain. Taking the trade of the colonies as an item in itself, a distinction must be made between the American or West Indian and African colonies on the one hand, and the Asiatic establishments on the other, excluding the Levant and Eastern Asia, which will be treated in the next chapter as an important part of the Mediterranean problem and the Eastern Question. The total colonial trade in 1789 amounted to about 362,000,000 livres, according to Levasseur, and to 432,371,000 francs, according to Deschamps. Even if the lower figure be accepted the volume of commerce was larger than at any subsequent period till 1860. The distribution of this wealth cannot be definitely determined, for in their total figures various writers differ radically; but basing our calculations entirely on contemporary statisticians and official documents it is safe to make an estimate which, though it may not be absolutely correct, is uninfluenced by prejudice either for or against colonial expansion. In the case of the American colonies imports from France for a period prior to 1789 had been 98,000,000 livres annually, but owing to the increase of trade between the French Antilles and countries other than France (a trade which had been authorized by a recent decree and which had been estimated at 37,000,000 livres in

1788), the figures for 1789 were reduced to 78,000,000 livres. The exports to France for a corresponding period had been 190,000,000 livres, and for 1789 they were 218,000,000 livres. Thus, while French trade in general had increased fourfold since 1716, the imports from her American colonies had grown over tenfold, and that despite forty-four years of war since 1689, and a century and a half of exploitation. The contents of these imports were the staple tropical products; the use of coffee and sugar had increased in Europe, and in 1788 the equivalent of 95,000,000 kilograms of sugar was exported to France, supplying the needs of the country and in addition furnishing 63,000,000 francs worth of sugar and syrups to be exported by her to the rest of Europe.¹

¹ FRENCH COMMERCE, 1716-1788. — This table is compiled from Arnould's *Balance du Commerce*, ii. [Table No. 12], and has been given credence by Levas-

	Commerce of France with her American and African Colonies.		Commerce of France with her East Indian establishments.	
	Imports to France.	Exports from France.	Imports to France.	Exports from France.
1716	17.2	9.8	6.3	3.7
1725-32	18.1	16.0	12.8	9.2
1733-35	21.8	15.9	20.0	10.0
1736-39	37.5	21.8	20.1	15.9
1740-48	39.0	26.6	13.8	10.0
1749-55	69.0	37.2	21.4	18.2
1756-63	16.3	12.9	5.7	4.5
1764-76	116.6	39.1	19.0	12.8
1777-83	108.7	50.6	0.8	10.4
1784-88	193.2	93.0	33.7	26.8

seur in his *France et ses colonies* (iii. p. 355); though by no means absolutely correct, he regards it as the best obtainable. In presenting it here, I would call

The trade statistics of French East Indian establishments are not easy to obtain; the subject of Asiatic commerce is

attention to the well-known prejudice of M. Arnould against the East India trade, and would suggest comparison with other figures given by Goudard and cited below. The figures are in millions of livres. A livre Arnould estimated at 54 *au marc* which differs little from the present franc in weight.

The fluctuations of trade are remarkable testimony to the losses of French merchants during the wars with England, and in the East Indian columns the story of the privileged companies is eloquently told. This point will be treated later. Arnould: *Balance du Commerce*, pp. 262, 263: "Les exportations de la France pour les puissances et contrées de l'Europe, s'élevoient à la fin du règne de Louis XIV., à la somme de 105 millions; au moment de la révolution, elles montent à 424 millions, ce qui fait une augmentation dans la proposition d'un à quatre. . . . La troisième classe concerne *Les Denrées Des Îles Françaises De L'Amérique*, réexportées à l'étrangers, formant seulement une valeur de 15 millions à la fin du règne de Louis XIV., et devenues un objet de 152 millions, au moment de la révolution. La quatrième classe, enveloppe *Les Marchandises provenues Du Commerce François Aux Indes orientales*, et réexportées à l'étranger; A la fin du règne de Louis XIV. cet article étoit de 2 millions 650 mille livres, et au moment de la révolution, c'est un objet de 4 millions 160 mille livres." Goudard: *Rapport sur le commerce de la France en 1780* (read Aug. 24, 1791). It is to be found in *Arch. Parl.* xxix. pp. 684 *et seq.*; *Proc. Verb.* No. 745, in vol. lxvii. pp. 1-17. I have used the report in the first edition of 1791 in pamphlet form as it is freer from typographical errors, pp. 4-7. In 1789 the total foreign trade of France was 702,687,000 livres, which was made up of 345,083,000 of imports, and 357,604,000 of exports. Jullian: *Hist. de Bordeaux*, pp. 519 *et seq.* The commerce of Bordeaux developed steadily from the Regency to the Revolution. The first foreign marine postal service established in France (1787) started from Bordeaux. Under Louis XVI. the city was the first port of France, doing a quarter of the national commerce, or about 250 millions annually; the colonial trade amounted to over 150 million livres. Foncin: *Bordeaux et l'esprit colonial* in *Bull. Soc. géogr. comm. de Bordeaux*, 1900, p. 129: "On a dit de la ville de Bordeaux, étalée en un croissant magnifique au bord de son fleuve, qu'elle n'était que la moitié d'une capitale, dont l'autre moitié était aux colonies." Cf. Deschamps: *Les Colonies pendant la Révolution*, pp. 4, 5, 296. (Though this little book is of undoubted value and, when carefully controlled, can be used to great profit, the prejudices of the author and his conclusions upon the general subject of the colonial question in France should materially weaken his influence.) Deschamps: *Question coloniale en France*, p. 235 and note. Levasseur: *France et ses colonies*, iii. pp. 354-355. The seven colonies which remained to France in 1822 did a trade of 96,000,000 livres; in 1810, of 177,000,000, and in 1860, before the new tariff went into effect, of 271,000,000. In general, the author says: "Le commerce des colonies françaises a eu dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle une période brillante de prospé-

involved with the question of the *Compagnie des Indes*. As a problem of colonial policy and economic theory, the affairs of rité." To illustrate the difficulty of securing correct statistics: the statement of M. Leroy-Beaulieu that the total colonial commerce of 1788 reached the figure of 600,000,000 livres is not borne out by the figures of the *Bureau de la Balance du Commerce*, nor do they agree with those of Goudard. Chaptal, *Industrie franç.* i. pp. 132-134, gives still another set of figures and calculates the total commerce of France as follows:—

	Imports.	Exports.
1787 . . .	630,871,700 fr.	444,611,100 fr.
1788 . . .	575,393,400 "	463,156,700 "
1789 . . .	634,365,000 "	438,477,000 "

Of the imports he says 240,000,000 francs came from French colonies, and of the exports 90,000,000 went to them. Thus he is enabled to calculate a balance of trade favorable to France, for he refuses to consider 60,000,000 in gold and silver, which are included in the imports, as affecting the balance. Foville: *Le commerce extérieur de la France depuis 1716*, in *Bull. de statistique et de lég. comp.* xiii. (1883). Moreau de Jonnés: *Le Commerce au XIX siècle*, i. p. 104. Moreau: *Tableau comp. du commerce* and *Tableau statistique des progrès du commerce* in *Bull. de la Soc. franç. de Statistique universelle* (1830). Biollay: *Études économiques sur le XVIII siècle*, i. (L'administration du commerce). Cf. Lohmann: *Handelstatistik Englands und Frankreichs im 18 Jahrhundert*, in *Sitzungsberichte, Berlin. Akad. der Wissensch.*, 1898, pp. 872-886, 891-892. The tables there given differ from those adopted by the author, especially in regard to the figures for 1716, which, according to Lohmann, were only 33 million total imports, and 47 million livres exports. In the matter of the sugar trade the tables of Avalle: *Tableau comparatif des productions des colonies françaises aux Antilles avec celles des colonies anglaises, espagnoles et hollandaises de l'année 1787 à 1788*, will be found very useful. I have not attempted to give an analysis of his figures, as the Antilles are not to be particularly considered in this monograph. Cf. Levasseur: *Population française*, iii. p. 411 (200 million livres are given for 1788), and *France et ses colonies*, iii. p. 355. Chaptal: *op. cit.* ii. p. 179-181. The value of sugar exported from the colonies in 1789 is given at 85,913,405 fr., and of that re-exported from France as 63,878,900 fr. Avalle agrees to the last figure (see Table I.); but he gives 104,938,200 fr. as the total exports of sugar (see Tables II.-V., VIII). Deschamps, *Colonies pendant la Révolution*, pp. 289 *et seq.*, estimates the imports of all sorts from the Antilles at 234 millions, of which, according to Avalle's analysis, fully 65 per cent should be credited as sugar. Cunningham: *English Industry*, ii. p. 517, note. (On the authority of Reinhard: *History of the present state of the Commerce of Great Britain* [ed. of 1805, trans. from German by Savage].) The returns in produce from the French colonies between 1763 and 1778 were of the annual value of about £6,400,000 sterling. Of this one half was consumed in France and the other half exported to other parts of Europe.

The opinion of Frenchmen at the time of the Revolution and particularly

that company will be mentioned later. When by the decree of May, 1719, the old organizations for privileged trade in the East Indies, China, and Louisiana were merged in a new *Compagnie des Indes*, the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* was doing a business of about ten million livres a year. The capital of the new Company was increased by twenty-five million, but its finances were so involved with those of Law's Bank that they suffered in the failure of "Law's system." But during the century trade with Asia increased in volume, and suffered only by war; the average annual imports to France for the decade, 1725-1735, were fourteen million livres and the exports ten million; by 1745 the imports

in the midst of a bitter fight over colonial policy must be carefully received. Though the figures of the following writers have not been implicitly followed, the interest of their testimony requires fuller citations from their arguments. Gouy: *Vues générales sur l'importance du commerce des colonies*, etc., Imp. nat. l'an III. 4to pamphlet, p. 12: "Les Colonies sont donc bien importantes? Oui, bien importantes; car elles seules sont la source et l'aliment de notre commerce qui étoit immense, et qui nous assuroit la suprématie sur toutes les nations. Et, comment cela? [The author claims that the French American colonies supply 220 million francs of produce needed in Europe.] Si les colonies sont détruites, plus de commerce; plus de commerce, plus de manufactures, plus d'agriculture, plus de marine, conséquemment quatre millions de malheureux indigens de plus en France, et à la charge du trésor de la République que nulle portion du souverain, dans une démocratie, ne devait périr de faim et de misère." De Curt: *Motion au nom de colonies réunies*, Paris, 1789, 8vo pamphlet, p. 13: "Ce n'est pas tout, Messieurs; vous avez mis la dette de l'État sous la sauve-garde de la loyauté François: dans mon opinion, les richesses seules des Colonies peuvent garantir l'exécution de ce Décret honorable. En effet, sur 243 millions de denrées que vous en recevez annuellement, vous en consommez à-peu-près 80 millions, qui se décuplent par la circulation intérieure. Le reste passe à l'Étranger; et comme les objets qu'ils vous donnent en échange, ne s'élèvent tout au plus qu'à 88 millions, il vous reste une solde de 75 millions, qui diminue d'autant l'exportation de numéraire à laquelle vous seriez forcés, pour faire honneur aux intérêts énormes de la dette que vous avez déclarée Nationale." De S. Méry: *Opinion sur la motion de M. de Curt*, etc., Paris, 1789, 8vo pamph. pp. 18, 19: "Ces colonies en recevant pour plus de 150 millions d'importations nationales, en fournissant à leur tour pour plus de 240 millions de productions, donnent en définitive un résultat avantageux à la France dans la balance de commerce et mettant dans la circulation une somme énorme." Roussillou: *Opinion sur l'affaire des colonies*, Sept. 25, 1791, pp. 3-7. This is an interesting brochure.

were twenty and the exports were twelve million; and the following decade to 1755 showed a still further increase; but the succeeding years were disastrous; the war which ended with the treaty of Paris in 1763 reduced the trade with Asia to five million in imports and four million in exports. In the next period, 1765-75, a great change took place in the conditions which governed Asiatic trade; the expiration of the Company's privilege in 1769 and the establishment of free trade with India acted as a tonic, and the figures rose to twenty million of imports and thirteen million of exports; again war intervened and by 1784 the annual average was less than one million imports and ten million exports. A privileged company was re-established in that year, and, the general commercial conditions being much better, the increase was beyond all expectation; the imports to France for 1787 were fifty-six million livres and the exports to Asia over twenty-five million; and while this point was not touched again, the annual average for the three years, 1785-88, was over thirty-five million imports and nearly twenty-seven million exports. Thus, from 1775 to 1789 Asiatic imports had risen 75 per cent. The profit to the trader, however, was much less than earlier in the century, for in 1735 the usual gain on Indian goods sold in the French market was about 95 per cent, and on Chinese goods, about 140 per cent; in 1768, the last year of the old Company, these margins were 58 per cent, and 68 per cent; and by 1789 the profit on Asiatic commerce as a whole varied from 35 to 10 per cent, though the most lucrative branch of the trade, the exchange between various Asiatic ports had passed almost entirely into English hands. A supporter of the Company, writing in 1793, thought $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent all that could then be expected. The Company had not prospered, and Asiatic commerce was looked on by many as an unwise venture; expenses had been enormous, the successive wars had cost much, the reckless finances of the period had brought in lax methods, and maladministration was common both in France

and India. The critics pointed out these facts and said that Asia was a hopeless investment for Frenchmen; their opponents and those who believed that France might yet re-establish a great domain in India acknowledged previous mistakes, but maintained that reform and sound policy would make the rapidly increasing trade a source of real profit to France.¹

¹ Bonnassieux: *Grandes compagnies de commerce*, pp. 271, 275 *et seq.* In 1687 the capital of the *Comp. des Indes orient.* was 2,100,000 livres; between 1687 and 1691 it paid a dividend of 30 per cent. According to a *mémoire* written in 1685, the prospect of equalling the Dutch and outdoing English trade in India was brilliant. (*Arch. nat. Mém. coté K 1368, No. 128*, quoted in *op. cit.* p. 272.) Cf. also Castonnet-Desfosses: *François Bernier, documents inédits sur son séjour dans l'Inde*, pp. 11-30. Cordier: *La France en Chine au XVIII^e siècle*, i. p. 42. *Dictionnaire du Commerce (Encyclopédie Méthodique)*, i. p. 584. The lessening profit in Asiatic trade is well shown by the following table. "Comparaison des dividendes de la *Compagnie des Indes*, calculé sur le revenu libre: 1725, 148 livres; 1736, 136 livres; 1743, 135 livres; 1756, 85 livres; 1769, 65 livres." In addition to these dividends there was a fixed interest per share; pp. 609, 610, 614: "État du produit des ventes, faites par la *Compagnie des Indes* depuis 1726 jusqu'en 1756 en marchandises de l'Inde, déduction faite des frais des vente, des marchandises saisies dans le royaume et marchandises achetés chez l'étranger pendant les années 1749, 1750, et 1751."

Feb. 1, 1725-June 30, 1736	90,157,112 livres.	14s. 5d.
Average year	9,014,282 livres.	19s. 5d.
July 1, 1736-June 30, 1743	88,043,523 livres.	15s. 4d.
Average year	12,577,646 livres.	5s. 0d.
July 1, 1743-June 30, 1756	118,046,217 livres.	18s. 5d.
Average year	9,837,184 livres.	16s. 6d.
Total returns from India (not the net profit)	305,246,852 livres.	
Average year, 1725-56	9,846,672 livres.	
Total expense of maintaining the monopoly	376,802,517 livres.	
Normal average yearly	8,586,420 livres.	
Real average yearly owing to war expenses	10,500,000 livres.	

The bias of the writer is clear, as there is obvious juggling with figures, for he includes war expenses on the debit side of the Company's ledger, yet refuses, in striking an average for the returns, to make any allowance for the losses of war, for which the Company was not directly responsible. These statements are given here in full as they have been often cited by other writers, who have accepted them in good faith. More reliable figures are given below. Vuitry: *Désordre des finances*, pp. 237 *et seq.* (on the real value of the livre, see especially note 1, p. 250), 271 *et seq.* (the connection of the Company with Law's System).

Returning to the colonies as a whole, the question of their size and population requires a few words. The area of the

Daubigny: *Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer*, pp. 190 et seq., 202 et seq. Morellet: *Mémoire sur la situation actuelle de la compagnie des Indes* (1769). The views of the writer are given in the *Dict. du Commerce* (cited above); but his figures on the profits of the Company are significant and are given in Appendix I., as compiled by Daubigny: *op. cit.* p. 339; they have been verified. Morellet and Necker had a vigorous pamphlet war in 1769 over the dissolution of the Company. *Vide* the Bibliography; also the notices in Stourm: *Bibliographie hist. des finances de la France au XVIII^e siècle*. Cf. also on this point Grimm et Diderot: *Corr. littéraire*, vi. p. 237, April 15, 1769. Galiani: *Lettres* (ed. by Perey and Maugras). Letters of Aug. 14, 1769; July 6, 1771; June 15, 1776. Bachaumont: *Mémoires* (Oct. 16, 1769). Henry: *Corr. de Condorcet et de Turgot*, p. 8. Doneaud du Plan: *La comp. des Indes*, in *R. maritime et colon.*, June and July, 1889. Another error must be noted in the matter of imports to France in Bonassieux: *op. cit.* p. 313. The yearly average for 1725-69 is there given at 8,276,337 francs (no authority cited); corresponding figures are found in Chaptal: *Industrie française*, i. p. 129 (again no authority given). But a contemporary writer, who in 1786 was bitterly opposed to the re-establishment of the Company's privilege, and who in a brilliant monograph makes a powerful attack on privileged companies in general and the *Comp. des Indes* in particular, sheds some light on the matter. He is the last one to over-estimate the trade of those years when the old Company was supreme. *Mémoire contre la Compagnie des Indes*, p. 29: "Il résulte de ces trois tableaux comparés [two tables are given in App. I.]: —

"1. Que le total des importations de la Compagnie, pendant trente-quatre années, dont vingt-quatre de paix & dix de guerre, a été de 443,796,189 livres. Que le total des importations de commerce libre, pendant douze années, dont six de paix & six de guerre, a été de 140,788,647 livres.

"2. Que l'année commune des trente-quatre de la Compagnie est de 13,052,799 livres, 11s. 9d. $\frac{1}{7}$. Que l'année commune des douze du commerce libre est de 11,732,387 livres.

"3. Qu'à prendre les neuf années de la dernière paix de 1663 [1763], dont trois ont appartenu à la Compagnie, & six au commerce, & où la situation de la France a été la même pour l'une & pour l'autre; la plus forte année de la Compagnie a été de 21,719,354 livres, & la plus forte du commerce de 32,846,226 livres.

"4. Que l'on trouve pour année commune des trois de la Compagnie, environ dix-sept millions, & pour année commune des six du commerce, vingt-deux millions. Ainsi, sous tous les rapports, le commerce libre a eu un grand avantage sur celui de la Compagnie. Cependant le Gouvernement vient d'instituer une nouvelle Compagnie des Indes. Ici, toute la confiance que nous avons montrée dans les faits & les raisonnements qui viennent d'être présentés, se change en une juste défiance sur nos lumières, en une prévention respectueuse pour les vues du Gouvernement. Sans doute il s'est décidé, d'après des considérations assez importantes pour l'emporter sur celles que nous venons d'offrir."

French colonial empire in 1789 may be estimated at 82,000 square miles, with a population of nearly one million, of whom 100,000 were white, about 48,000 were free colored, and 780,000 were slaves. The size of the colonial domain, as well as of the French spheres of influence in India and North America, had greatly lessened during the century, yet the white population had nearly doubled; for in 1700 there were at the highest estimate only 60,000 Frenchmen living in French colonies.¹

This opposition to the Company was almost incessant. Cf. Villars: *Mémoires*, iv. p. 265 (1723); d'Argenson: *Journal*, vii. p. 65. More evidence will be cited in a subsequent paragraph when the question of general policy is treated. The figures for the years directly prior to the Revolution are based partly on Hernoux: *Rapport fait à l'Assemblée Nationale*, March 18, 1790. (The original pamphlet was used, as there are a few mistakes in the official report.) Cf. Chaptal: *op. cit.* i. p. 131 (table); and the table from Arnould: *Balance du Commerce*, given above (footnote to page 22), and also i. pp. 281-87. Deschamps: *Colonies pendant la Révolution*, pp. 6, 28, 101 *et seq.*, 113 *et seq.* The new company was authorized by decrees of April 14, 1785, and of Sept. 21, 1786. Capitalized at 40 millions, its privilege of exclusive commerce was finally given for 15 years. Its shipments from France were (1786-87) 19,560,982 livres; (1787-88) 10,667,750 livres; (1788-89) 14,823,409 livres. These statements do not interfere with those of Arnould, as they refer only to the new Company; they explain the figures of Goudard: *Rapport*, p. 7 (exports to East Indies in 1789, 16 millions as against 19 millions of several years previous); the liabilities of the company for 1792 were 40 millions; assets 50 million livres; for 1793 they were 40 and 48 millions respectively. This on the authority of a *mémoire* (*Arch. Nat. reg. coté F¹² 65943*) which Bonnassieux quotes on pp. 315-319. (There is a typographical mistake on page 318, where the liabilities for 1792 are given at only 14 millions.) Auckland: *Corr.* ii. 451 (Huber to Auckland, Oct. 4, 1792). The French East India Co. is spoken of as "the only safe establishment and investment of one's property in France, because independent of Government, though not of robbers." *Précis pour la Compagnie des Indes* (1793), p. 6. Cf. for this subject the statistical tables given in Appendix I.

¹ Deschamps: *Les Colonies, etc.*, pp. 1-3, 288-296. The figures given in totals are — area, 136,566 sq. kilometres, population 1,030,000. *Ibid.*: *Question coloniale*, p. 188. Avalle: *op. cit.* Cf. the tables, which give slightly different figures for the Antilles. Levasseur: *Population franç.* iii. pp. 281 (note 1), 337 (in 1800 there were nine and one-half million of people of European blood living outside of Europe); pp. 410, 411, 419 (a table giving the area and population of every French colony and protectorate in 1789, 1840, and 1891). *Ibid.*: *La France et ses colonies*, iii. pp. 177 *et seq.*, 191 *et seq.*, 343 (the above table is also given here), 355. According to the *Statesman's Year Book* (1899) the estimated area of

The economic influence of these people upon the inhabitants of France was direct and strong; the capital invested in the colonies in 1789 was then estimated at three milliards of francs, and the dependence of home industries upon colonial produce was reiterated by many writers. This was often overstated, as by La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, who declared in 1791 that the ruin of colonial commerce would affect more than three million people; nevertheless the imports from both East and West were a large item in many trades, as for example the silk manufactories of France, which did an annual export trade of over 21 million livres, got half of their raw silk from the East Indies; the sugar also which came from the French Antilles brought a profit of over 20 million francs to French home merchants before it left their hands. But leaving the strictly commercial results, great and varied as they were, the relation of the colonies to the French merchant marine brings up a large field of political influence as well. The development of a merchant marine was a *sine qua non* in a colonial empire; for the navigation laws of the eighteenth century were still strict, and foreign shipping had no chance in colonial trade. The large increase in that commerce during the latter half of the century had affected the French merchant service; whereas before 1765 there were in the French commerce with the West Indies 200 ships of 100 to 250 tons, within fifteen years the number of ships had doubled, and by 1789 their number was 600. The East Indian exchange was by no means so lively, yet there was an increase of from ten to thirty ships sent annually from France to the East. By 1793 the total figures were 900 ships of 300,000 tons burthen engaged in the direct colonial trade; thus the total advance in this branch of French shipping between 1763

French colonies and protectorates, including Algeria, was 3,630,327 sq. miles, with a population of over 52,000,000. In 1897 France did a colonial trade of 399,321,037 francs, imports; and 358,230,360 francs, exports. Though the colonies were prosperous in 1789, it seems to be an exaggeration for Deschamps to say that they were of greater international value than the colonial domain of France to-day, and equal to it intrinsically.

and 1793 may be reckoned at over 200,000 tons. Moreover, the close relation between the merchant service and sea power, especially in supplying trained sailors for the navy, was a favored theme to those who pleaded for a wise colonial policy or a reform in the French navy; the connection of colonial empire and sea power, which would alone enable France to meet Great Britain with success, brought the entire matter home to the hearts of Frenchmen as perhaps nothing else would have done, and thus made the colonial question a vital one in the midst of revolutionary turmoil.¹

The last aspect of the colonial question in which statistics have a place is that of expense of administration. Our only reliable source of information is the exhaustive report made by Montesquiou on December 8, 1789; as the result of careful investigation the total expenses of French colonial administration were given as 17,647,748 livres. Of this sum 1,106,000 should be classed as general expenses which could not be charged to the account of any special colonies; the remainder is divided between the American establishments, which took 11,247,586 livres; the African colonies, 283,010; and the Île de France, Bourbon, and India, which required the balance, 5,152,744 livres. Dividing the total expenses under the heads of civil adminis-

¹ Mosneron de Launay, in a speech on Feb. 26, 1790, gives the figures for capital invested. Aulard: *Société des Jacobins*, i. p. 9. Chaptal: *op. cit.* i. p. 131, ii. p. 179. Cf. also the tables in Appendix I. Beausobre: *Politique*, i. p. 412. A cargo of a 120-ton ship was worth, in 1765, about 1400 livres. Morellet in *Dict. du Comm.* i. p. 610. Cunningham: *op. cit.* ii. p. 517, note, citing from Reinhard: *op. cit.* Arnould: *op. cit.* ii. p. 35. S. Méry: *Opinion, etc.* p. 19: "Les colonies donnent le mouvement à un grand nombre de vos manufactures, & à des millions de bras; elles soudoyent & font vivre une foule immense d'artisans, d'ouvriers, de journaliers; elles sont une des sources les plus fécondes des richesses de la France, & dans un Siècle où il est reconnu que la prépondérance des États se règle sur leur commerce, les Colonies ont droit d'attendre qu'elles seront appréciées à leur juste valeur." Gouly: *Plan de la régénération de la marine*, p. 5. De Lattre: *Rapport sur l'acte de navigation* (Sept. 22, 1791), in *Arch. parl.* xxxi. pp. 203-235, and Begouen on Sept. 24, p. 290; also La Rochefoucauld. Cf. Deschamps: *Colonies pendant la Révol.* pp. 7, 28. Bonnassieux: *op. cit.* pp. 253 et seq., 315.

tration, army, and navy, the distribution is 7,548,553 livres for the civil budget; 9,195,131 livres for the army; and 907,184 livres for the navy. The bulk of this amount was spent in large salaries for high officials; but the most serious item is that of 3,951,462 livres in 1789 for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses. It was the same in colonial finances as in national; the multiplication of sinecures, official corruption, and lax methods had caused a steady leakage of money, which only vigorous reform and sound economic policy could check. There were, however, certain revenues from the colonies which amounted to 7,173,333 livres in 1789,—6,613,333 from the West, and 560,000 livres from Africa and the East; this made the deficit in the colonial budget 10,484,415 livres. But, as M. Deschamps points out, it is fair to look upon custom duties laid upon colonial produce as an income to the government which should be added to colonial revenue; for the receipts of the state would have been smaller by that amount if no colonial empire had existed. These taxes were two—*du domaine d'Occident*, levied on imports from the colonies, and *de consommation*, on colonial produce which was not exported at all. Montesquiou claimed that these taxes wiped out the deficit in the colonial budget and that consequently the colonial domain was of no expense to the government, but with all its profitable commerce was a means of gain to thousands of Frenchmen.¹

¹ *Rapport de Montesquiou*, in *Arch. parl.* x. pp. 437-51. Viefville des Essars (Jan. 14, 1791), in *Ibid.* xxii. p. 241. *Proc. verb.* No. 142, ix. pp. 1-59. The Bourbon government had employed in the colonies 1,673 officials (1,041 civil and 632 military), exclusive of ungraded assistants, soldiers, and sailors. Cf. Deschamps: *Les colonies, etc.* pp. 8-10, 299 *et seq.* The tables made by M. Deschamps are based on Montesquiou's report and are most useful. Arnould: *op. cit.* i. p. 45. The sum of 17 millions for colonies does not seem large when Necker's budget of 610 million livres for total expenses is recalled. Stourm: *Les finances de l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*, ii. pp. 355 *et seq.* In view of the effort to learn the true economic condition of France prior to the Revolution it is interesting to note, in passing, testimony to official corruption which has rarely been cited, but is worthy of credence. Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, xxix. (1883), p. 69

We have seen that the latter half of the eighteenth century was a period of great prosperity for French colonies. It was also a period in which great interest was taken in them by Frenchmen, still strongly imbued with the old theory of colonial dominion: that colonies were rightly at the beck and call of the mother country, existing primarily for her benefit, and strictly subordinate to all her social theories. This interest in the French colonies has received full and admirable treatment at the hands of M. Deschamps in his book, *Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France*; all that demands notice here is the debate on the larger question of colonial expansion, a debate which engrossed many men at this period. The two sides joined issue sharply; on the one hand some were contemptuous as Voltaire when he referred to "*quelques arpents de neige vers le Canada*," others like Mercier predicted the ruin of the home land by the colonies, much as the city dwelling was apt to suffer because of the attention paid to the country place; and others still, like Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, said the object of their books of travel and description was to prevent Frenchmen from settling in the colonies: on the other side were men like Raynal, who preached of colonies and sea power as the foundation of a people's greatness; Gouy wrote that the European was destined to rule the world, and that France owed her pivotal position in Europe to the commercial

(Pictet to Count A. R. Vorontzov, London, Sept. 20, 1788): "Peut-être, si on l'examinait attentivement, trouverait-on, que sous d'autres formes et par d'autres motifs, il y a autant de dissipation dans les finances de l'Angleterre que dans celles de la France; ce qui fait, que l'individu en France est accablé par un impôt qui n'est cependant qu'à-peu-près le tiers de celui que paye un Anglais sans en être incommodé; c'est cette foule de charges, de places vénables qui arrachent à l'agriculture, à l'industrie et au commerce les capitaux, qui devraient être employés à les faire prospérer. On serait effrayé, si l'on calculait tout le mal que, pour se procurer quelques petites ressources, on a fait par là au royaume. Jusqu'au moment où toutes les charges, toutes les places vénables seront abolies, où par cela même l'argent sera rappelé à sa véritable destination, la France sera bien éloignée de pouvoir prétendre au rôle, auquel la nature semblait l'avoir destinée; . . ."

prosperity of her colonies; Tolosan declared the colonies had placed all Europe in debt to France.¹ Both the theory and practice of "imperialism," of colonial expansion, were thus argued; the majority of the intellectual leaders of France were against colonial domain; but the verdict of the nation as given in the *Cahiers* in 1789 is for expanding commerce and a strong colonial policy. There is not a word to be found in them which reflects blame on the colonies or which attacks the program of trans-oceanic empire; and this is the more remarkable when it is seen what a place the colonial question occupied in the mind of the people. One reason for this was the attention attracted by the successful rebellion of the thirteen British colonies in America. Another cause which brought these questions to the front was the debate on economic theory, an argument that had enlisted the energies of the foremost thinkers in France; the old universal theory of exclusive trade between the colony and the mother country had been boldly attacked by these men, and the example of Turgot had been a powerful factor to their aid. It was natural, therefore, that this subject, as well as that of chartered companies with exclusive trading privileges, should be included among the many topics

¹ Deschamps: *Quest. colon.* pp. 292 et seq., and *Ibid.*: *Les Colonies pendant la Révolution*, p. 321 (an instructive note on the phrase "*périssent les colonies.*") Voltaire: *Siècle de Louis XV.*, ch. 35, and *Candide*: ch. 23. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre: *Voyage à l'Île de France*, preface. Mercier: *L'An 2441*, ch. 40 (p. 322). Raynal: *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*. (For the features of this book and its influence upon Napoleon, vide Chapter III.) Gouy: *Vues générales*, pp. 1-5, 41. De S. Méry: *Opinion*, pp. 18, 19. Tolosan: *Commerce de la France*, p. 116. Levasseur: *Population française*, iii. p. 412, note 3. In the Bibliography there is included a number of titles which have been selected from among many bearing upon the colonial question of 1789. The general "expansion" and "anti-expansion" attitudes are therein illustrated; and also more particularly the economic and political ideas regarding the African and Indian possessions or those domains which France coveted in Asia. No attempt has been made to include any of the anti-slavery literature, nor those books, reports, or pamphlets which dealt especially with the domains of France in other portions of the globe. But very few of the publications dealing with the tariff treaties with England are given, as that literature is so well known.

of which the *Cahiers* treated. Some 323 of these mentioned colonial affairs. The central idea in nearly all of them was that commerce depended on the colonies, and that sea power, a necessity to the state, could exist only with the aid of the merchant marine, whose larger ventures must in turn derive from colonial prosperity. Slavery as the foundation of the colonial system in the tropics received a large share of their attention; but this topic and the action of the *Assemblée* in abolishing slavery cannot be discussed in these pages; though the humanitarian but unpractical decision regarding it was responsible in great measure for the disaster which overtook so many French colonial possessions within a decade. The matter has been treated from every point of view in the past, and to enter the field here would involve a much longer chapter on colonial affairs than is expedient. Turning, therefore, to the questions of the colonial compact, privileged companies and tariff treaties, the economic aspect of each and their international features are the subjects to be noted.¹

The rapid increase in the commercial output of the colonies had not effected the growth of the merchant marine in an equal ratio, and the French colonies were at a disadvantage as compared with those of Great Britain; for the colonial compact for exclusive trade with the home country bound them to depend on the transport offered by ships from her ports, and limited their supplies to those which she could give them. The growing resources of the colonies enforced the inadequacy of the theory and practice as regards France, and these facts, combined with the influence of the new school of economists,

¹ Cunningham: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 510, 511. Stourm: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 1-11. Stephens: *French Revolution*, i. p. 529. Deschamps: *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, pp. 15, 38. I am indebted to this writer for an analysis of 283 *Cahiers* which treated the subjects in the following proportion: privileged companies and monopolies, 154; the arrêt of 1784, 24; colonial administration in general, 4; free ports, 18; slavery, 34; slave trade, 10; debts of the colonists (amounting in 1789 to nearly 500 millions) and colonial produce, 12; the treaty of 1786, 49; colonial representation in the États, 17; participation in colonial trade, 3.

led to an "*Arrêt du Conseil*" of Aug. 30, 1784, which authorized foreign ships to import certain commodities from alien countries to the French Antilles. A storm of protest from the maritime cities of France showed how deeply the old ideas were imbedded in the minds of the people; the deputies of Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux declared that it was "an uncontested principle that the colonies are created by and for the parent-state; they have not the right to buy their provisions, nor can they sell the produce of their soil, save in France." Tolosan, a much cited authority of the period, says in the same vein: "The colonies have been established for the benefit of the mother country; they cannot completely fulfil their destiny save in adding to the product of her lands and of the industry of the nation under whose immediate power they are, and in contributing to the increase of her commerce with other nations. If they could dispense with the mother country and had the means to maintain direct foreign connections for their imports as well as for their exports, they would no longer be of use." This was the view of the French merchant to whom the colonist was in debt; it was also that of the petitioners to the *États généraux* in 1789, for they begged the interdiction to the foreigner of all trade in their colonies. It was the theory of Colbert to the letter.¹

The complicated question of chartered companies, endowed by the state with a monopoly of trade in certain regions, was not a new one; the foundation of the French colonial empire had been in great part through their aid; and the principles which had guided Richelieu and Colbert in their endeavors to make of France the greatest colonial power, could not have

¹ Beausobre: *Politique*, i. pp. 279-280. Gomel: *Causes financières*, ii. pp. 223 *et seq.* Bachaumont: *Mémoires*, xxviii. p. 84; xxviii. pp. 14 *et seq.* Deschamps: *op. cit.* pp. 21 *et seq.*, 32. Tolosan: *op. cit.* pp. 117, 118. *Arch. parl.* ii. p. 472. *Sénéchaussée de Brest. Commerce.* Art. 5: "L'interdiction aux étrangers des ports et de nos colonies françaises;" iii. p. 534, *Tiers État de Lille*; cf. i. p. 213; vi. p. 85, *Tiers État du Baillage de Troyes.* Art. 142; p. 109, *Tiers État de Vannes.* Art. 87; p. 343, *Martignes.* Art. 17; p. 53, *Tours.* Art. 27.

been effective without the commercial company. For commerce was then looked down on in France, and private impulse would not have realized the ideal of colonial empire, had not the state interfered to ensure government support to new ventures. But while these companies were needed at the first, it was possible for their control to become a tyranny and to check the healthy growth of general commerce; this was the idea which prompted the various complaints against them, even during the seventeenth century. The matter was argued in England as well, and, as the contending economists of the following century evolved their theories and pleaded their reforms, the facts to which they could refer, at least in France, gave authority to those who opposed the monopoly of a company. It is not within our province to give the history of any of these corporations; and the statistics for Asiatic trade which have been cited record, as far as is necessary, the influence that the great *Compagnie des Indes* had on East Indian commerce in France prior to the Revolution. Rather it is the company as a factor in the colonial problems in the days of Louis XVI. that demands notice. The old Company had had its critics from the first; its financial condition threatening bankruptcy had strengthened them; and, as has been seen, the expiration of its monopoly in 1769 was well received. The private traders between 1769 and 1785 sent annually to India twenty-one ships of 9,309 total tonnage, as compared with seven, of 4,258, sent by the Company; they imported to France nearly forty million livres annually, as against about twenty million brought in by the Company. The re-establishment of the monopoly for a new Company was therefore bitterly opposed by them; but Calonne insisted, and the decree was issued April 14, 1785. The stock of this Company was eagerly sought for, and in 1786 was increased from twenty to forty million livres, and the term of the privilege from seven to fifteen years. The details of its trade have already been given; that it prospered was due in great measure to the increased demand for Asiatic goods.

At the same time the pamphlet war over its existence was carried on with zeal; and it was a subject of interest to the deputies in the *Assemblée constituante*, — an interest reflected from that taken by the people at large, who in 154 *Cahiers* had discussed its affairs. Some of the arguments used are quoted below. The Company's monopoly finally shared the fate of other like privileges; and in April, 1790, free trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope was decreed by a majority of one hundred and ten. As in the case of the colonial compact, self-interest was a large factor in the decision reached; that this was in accord with the teaching of the economists, while the other was in opposition to the logical conclusions of those who upheld commercial liberty, is not to be doubted; on the one hand, it was a repudiation of Colbert, and, on the other, confirmation of his system. In both cases the financial interests of the French merchant were recognized and supported.¹

¹ The view that participation in commerce was ignoble was opposed by several writers, *e. g.* [Le Monnier]: *Le commerce honorable ou considérations politiques contenant les motifs de nécessité, d'honneur et de profit qui se trouvent à former des compagnies de personnes de toutes conditions pour l'entretien du négoce de mer en France, composé par un habitant de la ville de Nantes*. Nantes, 1646, 4to. Coyer: *La noblesse commerçante*, Paris, 1756, 12mo. Clement: *Colbert*, i. p. 515. Colbert referred to the "nécessité indispensable de le [commerce] restreindre dans les mains d'une compagnie ou de quelques particuliers." Bielfeld: *Institutions politiques*, i. p. 302: "Les Concessions et les Privilèges, que les Souverains des principales Nations de l'Europe accordent à des Compagnies exclusives ne doivent point être envisagés comme des Monopoles, ou comme une infraction faite à la liberté du Commerce. Ce sont, au contraire, de nouvelles branches de Commerce qu'on ouvre au Public, chaque particulier pouvant, à proportion de l'intérêt qu'il y prend, participer au profit général de l'association. Les objets que ces Compagnies embrassent sont, d'ailleurs si grands, si vastes, si dispendieux, qu'un simple Citoyen, quelque opulent qu'il soit, ne sçauroit y atteindre. Il est vrai que ces Octrois privent ce même Commerce de la concurrence, ce qui est une perte immense, comme nous l'avons déjà remarqué. Mais y a-t-il dans le monde un établissement qui ne porte avec soi quelque inconvénient? C'est dans la choix des moindres que consiste la prudence politique." Child: *Trade*, pp. 78-80: "1. That 'restrained limited companies are not alone sufficient to preserve and increase a trade. 2. That limited companies, though established by act of parliament, may lose a trade. 3. That trade may be carried on to any part of Christendom, and increased without companies. 4. That we have de-

Closely linked to these matters was the commercial treaty with Great Britain, which had been negotiated in 1786. Along

clined more, or at least have increased less, in those trades limited to companies, than in others, where all his Majesty's subjects have had equal freedom of trade." Saint-Pierre: *Rêves d'un homme de bien*, pp. 206-207: "C'est pour des commerces lointains il faut des établissements, et de grandes dépenses qui ne peuvent produire que plusieurs années après. Il faut donc un premier fonds très considérable." A company alone could gather the capital. Dareste: *Hist. de l'administration*, ii. p. 268; pp. 397 et seq. A *mémoire* by a *député* of Dunkerque in 1654 complains of the monopoly of certain trades by special cities, and especially of that of the *Compagnie d'Orient*. 409 et seq. A *député* of Nantes argues strongly against all companies. 412. A *député* of La Rochelle, says: "La liberté est le premier mobile de commerce." Vignon: *Expansion de la France*, pp. 50 et seq. Uztariz: *Theory, etc.* i. pp. 18, 176 et seq., 180-192. Accarias de Serionne: *Les intérêts des Nations de l'Europe*, i. pp. 88, 352: "On a souvent réclamé, surtout en France et en Angleterre la liberté du commerce contre les compagnies des Indes. On n'a pas fait attention qu'on réclamait une liberté inutile et qu'aucun négociant particulier ne serait en état d'en faire usage, si elle était accordée." Montesquieu: *Esp. des lois*, l. xx. c. 10. Villars: *Mémoires*, iv. p. 265. Bonnassieux: *Grandes compagnies*, pp. 166-168, 454 (a company was formed at Paris in 1787 under the Sardinian flag for Indian trade in order to avoid French monopoly laws), 481-485. (An interesting *mémoire* of about 1715 is here quoted from *Arch. nat. liasse F. 502.*) D'Argenson: *Journal et mémoires*, v. p. 331 (Dec. 21, 1748); vii. p. 138 (March, 1752). Gomel: *op. cit.* ii. p. 151. Condillac: *Le commerce et le gouvernement*, in *Mélanges d'Écon. pol.* p. 431. "Ce privilège exclusif était une atteinte portée à la liberté, puisqu'il donnait à une seule compagnie un droit qui appartenait à tous les citoyens. Les négociants réclamèrent mais inutilement. La nouvelle compagnie [1785] donna de l'argent et le privilège fut confirmé." Morellet: Article in *Dict. du commerce*, i. pp. 587, 596, 598. *Mémoire contre la Compagnie des Indes*, pp. 1, 2: "La nouvelle Compagnie des Indes s'est rendu un objet d'inquiétude & d'alarme tout à la fois dans le commerce maritime & dans le commerce intérieur du Royaume. Par l'étendue de son privilège, elle retranche à l'industrie & à l'activité nationale le commerce des deux tiers du globe. . . . Et c'est avec vingt millions de capital qu'elle veut faire un commerce qui exigeroit un milliard, & dans lequel les particuliers du Royaume pourroient verser deux cents millions! Elle a surpris au Gouvernement une permission de faire elle seule l'approvisionnement de la France, pendant deux ans, de toutes les marchandises des Indes, en les prenant dans les ports de l'Europe. C'est un commerce au moins de cinquante millions, qui excède les forces de son capital. C'est de plus un monopole étranger à son propre privilège; lequel lui accordoit assez, en lui donnant le droit exclusif de faire des expéditions dans les Indes, à la Chine, dans la mer Rouge, sur les côtes d'Afrique, &c. Ce monopole pèsera à-la-fois sur la Nation, qui aura moins de ce genre de marchandise, qui les payera plus

with the military struggle between the two countries a tariff war had been waged; discriminations in custom duties had led to reprisals and prohibitions; since 1690 almost every decade had seen changes in the duties levied by one or the other on the imports from its rival, till in 1779 the English tariff attained an average of seventy-five per cent *ad valorem* on all French manufactures which were not in the first place contraband; and France had on her side taken proportionate measures for protection. This policy was based on the theory of the balance of trade, which has already been explained; the principle of action being the idea that it was to a nation's advantage to purchase little and sell much in the international market. The new school of economists, however, declared that a balance in money was futile to determine the real profit to a nation of her international trade, and that entire liberty of commerce was the

cher, & sur le commerce intérieur, à qui il enlève un approvisionnement qu'il feroit avec plus d'abondance & d'économie. Pour se soutenir dans ce monopole, la Compagnie a fait prononcer contre le commerce les plus dures prohibitions, les peines les plus sévères, les précautions les plus inquiétantes." Cf. Tessier: *Inventaire des Archives hist. de la chambre de commerce de Marseille*, p. 304 (Protest of April 9, 1786). For the statistics of this period (1769-89), *vide* the tables previously cited in App. I. Daubigny: *Choiseul*, pp. 236 *et seq.* Levasseur: *France et ses colonies*, iii. pp. 177 *et seq.*, 191 *et seq.* Deschamps: *op. cit.* pp. 26, 28, 101 *et seq.*, 113 *et seq.*, 123. Cf. *passim*. Hernoux: *Rapport sur le privilège de la Compagnie des Indes* (March 18, 1790). Arnould: *op. cit.* i. pp. 270, 280, 286, 287: ii. p. 156. (The author is very bitter against East Indian trade; his favorite phrase is "le gouffre d'Asie.") *Précis pour la Compagnie des Indes*, pp. 6, 7. *Arch. parl.* ii. p. 472 (Art. 4); iii. pp. 606, 607; iv. pp. 342 (Ballainvilliers, tit. 5, Art. 9), 56, 57 (*Montpellier*); v. pp. 68 (*Saint Cloud*, Art. 27): "Que tous privilèges exclusifs, comme ceux accordés à la Compagnie des Indes, seront aussi abolis;" 281 (*Noblesse de Paris*, Art. 10); 354 (*Clergé de Péronne, Montdidier et Roye*): "Nous demandons une loi en vertu de laquelle un négociant ne déroge pas lorsqu'il est noble . . . que le privilège exclusif de la nouvelle Compagnie des Indes soit révoqué, et que ce commerce, qu'il n'est pas possible d'empêcher, soit déclaré libre pour tous les sujets du Roi . . .;" 384 (*Sénéch. de Ploërmel*; Art. 67), 549 (*Sénéch. de Rennes*, Art. 208), 596 (*Noblesse de Rouen*, Art. 65), 739 (*Tiers État de Sens*, Art. 3); vi. pp. 53, 85, 109 (*Sénéch. de Vannes*, Art. 86): "Interdiction de tout privilège exclusif pour quelque branche du commerce que ce soit, notamment celui de la Compagnie des Indes. . . ." These references might be continued to greater length were it necessary.

true maxim of finance. But this teaching had not affected the conduct of foreign trade till the treaty of 1786 marked a sharp advance toward this position, for the treaty was so radical that none as liberal has since been negotiated between the two nations. The violence of the attack upon it was due to a variety of reasons; one in particular was significant of the controversy in France over Asiatic matters. The French market was a profitable one to importers of East Indian goods, and as English success in India had supplied London merchants with the means to assist French luxury, the new treaty broke the last barrier down; it opened up the whole question of the wisdom of further endeavor to compete with Great Britain in Indian waters; if France were to leave this field, a large share of Asiatic goods which ultimately reached her cities would do so only at the profit of a British middleman. As we have seen, the quarrel between those who supported a monopoly and those who advocated free trade with India was an important one at the time of the Revolution, and this aspect of the Asiatic question had a distinct effect on the reception of the English treaty in France. Thus many *Cahiers* asked on one page both for the abolition of monopoly, a tenet of the physiocrats, and for the abrogation of the treaty of 1786, a return to the old school of Colbert and Forbonnais. In England the opposition to the treaty was based somewhat on economic, but chiefly on wider political grounds; the antagonism of the two nations is nowhere made clearer; and yet it was the plan of Pitt and Eden to proceed from the negotiation of this treaty to the statement of a common principle of action between the two countries, which would settle their difficulties in India and Holland. These negotiations we will not even sketch here, for their place as an index of the tendency of national policy in the immediate future is not important. The history of the period is so crowded that in this brief summary of the situation in France much has been omitted which would enter into a more detailed account, but which can scarcely add

to the strength of the point here made that the French colonies were prosperous, and that their fate and all the great issues of colonial expansion and administration were at stake in the Revolution. The influence which colonial ideas exerted on continental policies will be estimated later; at present the examination of the British interest in Asia must be undertaken.¹

The history of British India throws light upon many anomalies, none perhaps stranger than the extension of English control in India at a period when the mind of the nation was largely engrossed in other matters. The theory of an absent-minded conquest of India by Englishmen is based on this situation; Sir John Seeley has sent this generalization far and wide, and many elements of truth are to be found in it, for the growth of British power in that region is certainly not the result of an early decision by the nation at large, or by its rulers, to make Great Britain the sovereign power in all India. On the other hand, blind acquisition was not the policy of the Company or of its servants; the extension of British control was in part the result of local conditions in India; but there is also evident the definite purpose to prevent, if possible, the enjoyment of Asiatic wealth by other European organizations, and as

¹ Gomel: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 213 *et seq.* Adam Smith: *op. cit.* Bk. iv. chaps. 2, 3, 6. Fitzmaurice: *Shelburne*, iii. pp. 323, 386. Morellet had given Shelburne his ideas on free trade, which were embodied in the negotiations. Stourm: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 12 *et seq.*, 60. Du Quesnay: *Maximes générales du gouvernement*, Nos. xxiv., xxv. in Daire: *Les physiocrates*, i. p. 101. Melon: *Essai politique sur le commerce*, pp. 130 *et seq.*, 150 *et seq.*, 265 *et seq.* Auckland: *Corr.* i. pp. 86 *et seq.*, 123, 149, 154, 158, 163, 191, 220 *et seq.*, 245-249, 277, 279 *et seq.* Lecky: *Hist. of England in the XVIIIth Century*, v. pp. 37-46. Hansard: *Parl. Hist.* xxvi. 413 *et seq.*, 488. Anquetil du Perron: *Dignité du commerce*, pp. 157 *et passim* to the end. A long series of extracts from the *Cahiers* are there given. *Arch. parl.* iii. p. 534, 606; v. p. 548, 600 (Art. 57 *et seq.*); vi. p. 109 (Art. 88). Cf. Anisson-Dupéron: *Essai sur les traités de commerce de Methuen et de 1786 in Journal des Économistes*, 1^{er} sér. xvii. (April, 1847). Dupont de Nemours: *Lettre à la Chambre de commerce de Normandie*, Rouen, 1788. Boyetel: *Recueil de divers mémoires relatifs au traité de commerce avec l'Angleterre*. Versailles, 1789. Morellet in *Dict. du commerce*, i. p. 587, 596. Beausobre: *Politique*, i. p. 282.

the interest of the people was aroused expansion became a fixed policy. At first in the direction natural to a trading company, and later along other lines, drawn by political exigency and the genius of the race, the power of England in India grew; fitfully in the beginning, then, under the impulse of expanding empire and dread of French attack, the work was pressed on. The political and administrative history of this progress would carry us too far afield; and as the scope of this investigation shuts out the study of the general colonial question in Great Britain at this period, as one involving interests in every quarter of the globe, our scrutiny into the problem of British dominion in India must likewise be confined to economic and international aspects.¹ Our examination of English trade with India, while it has the same object as that of the French colonial trade, must also be somewhat limited, as is natural in the affairs of a mercantile adventure, where the interference of the state is almost as rare and late as it was both usual and early in the history of French enterprises. The value of the results must be measured not only by the information gained, but also by the bearing it may have on the theory which was universal in France, that the wealth and power of Great Britain rested in great measure on her Asiatic trade and possessions; but of this more may be said later. The period studied must again be the eighteenth century only; a time when the United Com-

¹ Seeley: *Expansion of England*, p. 207: "Our acquisition of India was made blindly. Nothing great that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so accidentally, as the conquest of India." Since the view of Indian history which is given in the text was adopted by the author, the second volume of Hunter's *History of British India* has appeared; on p. 4 of the Introduction, the Editor, Mr. P. E. Roberts, expresses Sir William Hunter's ideas on this matter and gives additional evidence to support the statements in this text, criticising Sir John Seeley and the "notion that our Indian Empire was an unconscious lapse into greatness." Cf. p. 273, — Letter to Fort St. George, Dec. 12, 1687: "The Directors look 'in a most especiall manner' to the Madras Council to 'establish such a Politie of civill and military power, and create and secure such a large Revenue as may bee the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sur English dominion in India for all time to come.'"

pany, benefiting by the commercial advances of the old London Company, was able both to increase trade and to extend sovereignty. That trade at the end of the seventeenth century was by no means small, nor was the political importance attached to its progress the fancy of a pamphleteer. The service of that commerce in helping to a favorable balance of trade, and its use in supporting naval power and giving to Great Britain a paramount place in international politics were recognized by men like Davenant, the best writer of his day in matters of trade and politics. He declared in 1698 that whatever country got "the full and undisputed possession" of the East India trade would "give law to all the commercial world," and later he continues: this trade "has extended and enlarged our concerns and interest abroad, begot new traffic to us; and . . . this commerce, with the growth of the West India plantation, have principally contributed to put of our side the general balance between us and other countries; from whence follows, that we shall be confined to a narrow compass, and must no more pretend to the dominion of the sea, if by ill-conduct, in these two important branches, we should be reduced to deal only in our native product and home manufactures." The conduct of this trade, after the Earl of Godolphin's award (1708), settling the claims of rival companies and ushering a new period, was both sober and profitable till the attack of the Bourbons roused a band of merchants to new duties, and won for them the support of the state in a struggle for Asiatic dominion.¹

¹ Davenant: *Works*, i. pp. 126, 138 *et seq.* (In Lyall: *Rise of British Dominion in India*, pp. 41-43, a mistake is made in saying that Sir William Davenant wrote the *Essay on the East India Trade*; it was Charles Davenant, his son.) For the Award, cf. Bruce: *Annals of the Honourable East India Company*, iii. pp. 667-771. Cf. Hunter: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 382, 383. The literature of this subject is rich. One pamphlet (1681) is particularly worthy of note — Philopatris: *That the East Indian Trade is the most national of all Foreign Trades* (publ. in Somers: *First Collection*, iv. pp. 34 *et seq.*). The main propositions are as follows: "I. That the East India Trade is the most National of all Foreign Trades. II. That the clamours, Aspersions, and Objections made against the present East India Company, are

A statistical inquiry into the Asiatic trade of Great Britain and its ratio to her total trade at various times during the eighteenth century, will illuminate the economic aspect of the problem of Asia, and will at the same time open up the question of foreign policy in these matters. The prosperity of Great Britain began to show itself clearly in the closing years of the seventeenth century; British commerce had doubled in the thirty years prior to 1699, when it amounted to over 12,000,000 pounds sterling. The war which broke out in 1702 injured it somewhat, so that in 1710 it did not quite touch 11,000,000 according to the official figures, but as the rates of value were still those of 1696, the sale amount was slightly larger; and in the language of the day, a favorable balance of trade was created to the extent of £2,679,487. In this commerce the imports of the East India Company after 1708 averaged annually £758,042, and the exports about £575,000, carried, in 1710, in ten ships sailing from England; it may be noticed in passing that the imports from the West Indies averaged at this time a little over £600,000. The years that followed were full of action and the resources of the Company were heavily taxed by the costs of war, though the Govern-

Sinister, Selfish, or Groundless. III. That since the discovery of the East Indies, the Dominion of the Sea depends much upon the Wane or increase of that Trade, and consequently the Security of the Liberty, Property and Protestant Religion of this Kingdom. IV. That the Trade of the East Indies cannot be carried on to National advantage, in any other way than by a General Joynt Stock. V. That the East India Trade is more profitable and necessary to the Kingdom of England, than to any other Kingdom or Nation in Europe." The opposition published tracts trying to prove the East India Trade prejudicial to the manufacturers of England. Cf. Somers: *op. cit.* iv. pp. 56 *et seq.* Pollexfen: *England and East India inconsistent, etc.*, London, 1697; and *Ibid.*: *A discourse of trade, coin, paper credit and of ways and means to gain and retain riches.* London, 1696. On this subject cf. Fortrey: *England's Interest and Improvement*, London, 1673; H. T.: *Britannia Languens*, London, 1689; and Child: *Discourse on Trade* (previously quoted). Fifty years later a bitter attack was made by a foreigner under the pseudonym of Nickolls: *Advantages, etc.*, pp. 160, 191. He prophesies the ultimate and complete ruin of all East Indian trade, and the uselessness of all settlements in that region so far as the English are concerned, pp. 176, 177. He presents the strongest arguments of the day against Trading Companies.

ment bore a large share of them in order to defeat French ambition. Yet in 1780, in the heart of a period when the French were making a successful stand in India and the American colonies were slowly toiling toward victory, the sales at the India house in London were over £3,000,000, the exports to the East Indies and China were nearly half a million, and the shipping owned by the Company was measured at over 60,000 tons. The general commerce of the nation had also increased, though not in such proportion; in 1780 the total imports to Great Britain were valued at £11,664,967, of which £2,612,910 came from the West Indies; and the total exports were £13,554,093. Of the foreign commerce of the kingdom the Asiatic branch was therefore not quite 15 per cent. With the peace of Versailles in 1783 an even greater rate of increase began, for the strain of the war in India had been harder than many English writers have cared to confess; it appears to-day, however, that had it not been for the arrival in India of the news of peace, the French would have gained all of southern India, the British forces being in sore straits; but the *status quo* of 1761 was all France had asked for in the treaty, and that opportunity was lost. A change had also been made in the character of the British power in India; essentially an organization chartered for trading purposes, the political functions of the Company were first clearly recognized in 1773; in 1784, after a hot fight in Parliament, a new constitution was drawn up; and it was in the course of these debates that the "English nation first began to realize their responsibilities for the government of India." The Charter act of 1793 embodied in its provisions the most vital parts of Mr. Pitt's famous India Bill; and the monopoly of trade was encroached on to the extent of 3,000 tons annually of private trade authorized by law. It is under these new conditions, therefore, that Asiatic trade must be studied.¹

¹ In Appendix II. statistical tables will be found to support the figures given in the text. The early history of the East India Company is noteworthy for the

Beginning in 1783, when the exports of the United Kingdom were £14,681,494 and the imports £13,122,235, the East India

enormous profit on comparatively small investments, — the voyage which lasted from 1611 to 1615 bringing a profit of 218 per cent; after the reconstruction of the Company in 1657 the dividends paid between that date and 1691 were nearly 25 per cent per annum. Cf. Craik: *History of British Commerce*, ii. p. 15. Chandler: *History of the House of Commons*, iii. p. 86. Report of Parl. Committee, June 13, 1698. (Quoted by Hunter: *op. cit.* ii. p. 279.) In 1681 stock in the Company, of a par value of one hundred pounds, was quoted at 280. Philopatri: *op. cit.* p. 40. For matters treated in the text, cf. also Bastable in *Dict. of Political Economy*, p. 344. Hunter: *Indian Empire*, pp. 664, 665. M'Arthur: *Financial Facts*, pp. 29, 274 (App., Table III.). Chalmers: *Estimate, etc.*, p. 207 and table. Cunningham: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 532-537. Malleon: *Duplex*, pp. 177 *et seq.*, and *Final French Struggles*, pp. 70 *et seq.* Mill: *Hist. of India*, iv. p. 292 (note by H. H. Wilson). Rapson: *Struggle Between France and England for Supremacy in India*, p. 120. For the documents of an administrative nature, cf. Auber: *Analysis of the Constitution of the East India Company*. The Acts of importance are: 13th of George III., cap. 63; 21st of George III., cap. 65; 24th of George III., cap. 25; 33d of George III., cap. 52. Kaye: *Hist. of the Administration of the East India Co.* pp. 123 *et seq.* Cf. also *Encyclopédie méthodique. Dict. du Commerce*, i. pp. 96-117. (Statistics of English Trade (1752-73), supposed to be based on Whitworth.) Vorontzov: *Arkhi*, ix. p. 51 (S. to A. Vorontzov. London, May 29 (June 9), 1786): "Après le commerce des Indes orientales, celui de la Russie est celui qu'il importe le plus à l'Angleterre de conserver dans l'état où il se trouve. . . ." This is interesting testimony to the rôle of Asiatic trade.

Note on the Condition of Dutch trade with the East Indies. The Dutch East India Company had been very prosperous, paying high dividends until about 1670, since which date a steady decline had ensued, which nearly became a rout after the war of 1780. In 1666 a dividend of 75 per cent is noted; and from that date to 1661, 25 to 30 per cent was a maximum dividend. Shares worth 3000 florins at par went as high as 18,000. In 1670 a 40 per cent dividend was declared. At that time about 150 merchant ships and 40 men-of-war employing 25,000 sailors and 12,000 troops, were used in the trade and its protection. By 1740 these numbers had been cut nearly in half, though shortly before this time Uztariz thought France, Spain, and England should unite to overcome the Dutch in Asia. The war with England in 1780, however, seriously injured them. The Company between 1780-90 became a burden to the government and received a subvention of 68,000,000 florins; in 1784 the Company's debts amounted to 85 million and the goods on hand to 20 million florins; by 1791 the debt had become 95 million; and on May 31, 1794, the total liabilities stood at 127,553,280 fl., and the assets at 15,287,832 fl. The invasion and conquests of the French as well as losses to the English still further ruined the Company, which soon ceased to exist. Uztariz: *Theory*, i. p. 49. Clement: *Hist. de Colbert*, i. p. 342. Beausobre: *Politique*, i. pp. 266 *et seq.* Castonnet-Desfosses: *Rivalité de Duplex et de La Bourdon-*

trade, including China, amounted to £1,301,495 imports, which were sold in the London market for about sixty per cent above this, their official value, and £701,473 exports. The continent expected at this time to see a decline of British power; it hoped that her debt would prove too heavy a burden, that her losses in America, and her struggle with the native powers in India, secretly aided by the French, would exhaust her vitality and leave her commerce and her colonies a prey to others. As has been shown, this opinion was common, and a prophet of Great Britain's immediate success and financial progress was obliged to plead the statistics of her increasing wealth to enforce his belief in her destiny; thus a correspondent of Count A. R. Vorontzov, the Russian ambassador at London, declared that, though few might share his opinion, the condition of English trade warranted his statement. Mr. Pitt's speech on the Budget in 1790 is to this point, for he said, "The country at this moment is in a situation of prosperity far greater than at any period the most flourishing before the last war." The imports in 1789 had risen to £17,828,000, of which Asiatic trade had supplied £3,453,897 of goods to be valued in the home market at £6,000,000, and the West Indies nearly £4,000,000 (official value); the exports were of a value of £18,513,000 (Macpherson's figure is £19,340,548), of which about £13,000,000 were British manufactures, — a gain of over one million in the latter item since 1787, and a gain of three million over the annual average of the six years prior to the outbreak of the American war. Such welfare was in part the result of peace. The condition of trade in 1793, before the Revolutionary struggle was thoroughly started, affords a comparison with that at the end of the American war, by which to determine the effect that was really had on Asiatic commerce and

nais, p. 14. Leroy-Beaulieu: *Colonisation*, pp. 64, 74-75. Van Lijnden: *Dissertatio de commercio*, p. 174. "Majoris prosperitatis, qua per breve spatium ante bellum Anglicum gavisus sumus, idem bellum, anno 1780 nobis illatum, finem fecit, et sequens, quod nobis ab eodem populo bellum suscitatum est, toti fere mercaturæ nostræ minam paravit." Bonnassieux: *Grandes compagnies*, p. 60.

trade in general. The total foreign commerce of the United Kingdom in 1793 was £39,643,944, of which the exports were £20,388,828, leaving a balance of trade of over a million pounds. These exports included nearly sixteen million (official value) of British produce and manufactures and £2,719,246 in bullion and merchandise sent to the East Indies. The returns from that region were valued at the custom house at three and a half million pounds, but were sold at a gross profit of over sixty per cent. The West Indies sent over four million pounds, but the increase of sale value over official value was not so great. Thus the total foreign commerce of Great Britain had increased over seventy per cent within a decade, and the East India branch had more than trebled. (The imports from the West Indies had not quite doubled, the figures for 1783 having been £2,820,387.) The shipping to carry this wealth had increased accordingly: as against 8,342 British vessels of 669,802 tons manned by less than 60,000 sailors in 1783, Great Britain and Scotland had, in 1793, 12,901 vessels, of 1,367,420 tons, and the British dominion had 16,329 vessels, of 1,564,520 tons, manned by nearly 120,000 sailors. The East India Company had been obliged to double its fleet, and, though in 1788 not one tenth of the general export trade from Great Britain was carried in foreign bottoms, the service of foreign ships was required in India to carry the product of individual ventures back to Europe. British prosperity, as Lord Auckland wrote, "surpassed all idea." "A degree of opulence is now circulating through the country with an unexampled energy and activity both in agriculture and manufactures," he wrote to another friend; exultation was thus the justifiable note of Mr. Pitt's speech of February, 1792, when he gave account of the nation's health. Furthermore the ratio of the business done in 1780 between England and the East, to the grand totals for foreign commerce in 1780, as has been shown, was not quite 15 per cent; that proportion was kept up in spite of the degree of prosperity to which Mr. Pitt bore witness, so that in 1793 the

corresponding ratio was nearly sixteen per cent, calculated entirely on official values, and without attention to the greater demand for Asiatic produce and the higher prices of the London market.¹

¹ *Vide* Appendix II. The ideas of Emperor Joseph II. on the decadence of Great Britain are typical of opinion on the continent. Arneth: *Joseph II und Leopold*, i. p. 152 (J. to L. Jan. 23, 1783): "Voilà donc cette grande puissance [England] qui tenait en balance la France, tombée entièrement et pour toujours; toute considération et force perdue, et, par un sacrifice volontaire descendue au rang de puissance de second ordre, semblable à la Suède et au Danemarck et probablement elle ne tardera pas à être également commandée par la Russie, comme ces dernières." Vorontzov: *Arkhiiv*, xxix. pp. 13 *et seq.* (Pictet to A. R. Vorontzov. London, June 9, 1787). Hansard: *Parl. Hist.* xxviii. 698-700; xxix. 816-838. Auckland: *Corr.* ii. p. 457 (Auckland to Sir Morton Eden, Oct. 19, 1792). Smyth: *Memoirs of Sir Richard Keith*, ii. p. 377 (Auckland to Keith, Feb. 9, 1791). Cornwallis: *Corr.* i. p. 197 (Ewart to Carmarthen, Berlin, Sept. 10, 1785). Report of Cornwallis's address to King of Prussia: "That although the finances of England had suffered by the late expensive war [American], yet that had not been in greater proportion than those of her rivals; and by the plan of strict economy, which was adopted, and the flourishing state of her commerce, there could be no doubt that England would be able to support her weight and dignity with the other powers of Europe." Macpherson: *Annals of Commerce*, iv. pp. 39, 135, 287. Report of Select Committee of East India Company, 1792 (p. 243): "All the foreign companies, except the Dutch, have failed or are in a very declining state. Their trade can no longer come under the description of commercial adventure; it depends chiefly upon conveying to Europe the fortunes of British individuals; . . ." Arnould: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 35, 36. Bowles: *Retrospect*, pp. 113 *et seq.* The revenue of the Government from the Company was another item which could not be included in the trade statistics, yet was an element in the general value of Asiatic connection. In 1773 it amounted to £2,000,000, annually. *Annual Register*, 1773, p. 76. M'Arthur: *op. cit.* pp. 31 *et seq.* During the eighteenth century the trade between Great Britain and her "plantations" had increased so that at its close the trade with Jamaica was considerably larger than that with all the plantations in 1700. Rose: *Increase of the Revenue, Commerce, and Manufactures of Great Britain*, pp. 40 *et seq.* Anderson: *History of Commerce*, iv. p. 666. M'Arthur: *op. cit.* pp. 259 *et seq.* (figures for shipping). Chalmers: *op. cit.* pp. xxvi, cix *et seq.*, 142 *et seq.*, 207 *et seq.*, 240 *et seq.* The share of the China trade in the East India commerce is worthy of note. In 1783 £120,000 were exported from England in ships of 6,000 total tonnage; in 1792 the figures were £626,000 and 17,981 tons respectively. Tea had increased from an annual importage to England of 5,605,074 pounds in 1784 to 18,108,533 in 1792. The stock of the United Company had also risen; in December, 1783, India stock was quoted at 120, and in 1792 at 191. (Cf. p. 250

The importance of political problems awaiting solution during these years in India would induce the belief that the mind of the English people was struggling with their intricacy and vastness ; but though at certain junctures the fate of a political party, hanging on the success or failure of a bill for the administration of India, roused the nation to a sense of responsibility, the general ignorance shown in England of the real course of events in Asia forced Burke to the opinion that "if the whole Gentoo race had but one neck, [our countrymen] would see it cut with the most perfect indifference." The national attitude of the British people toward India, however, must not detain us here ; and the study of financial aspects must now be followed by a consideration of foreign policy. The period between 1765 and 1785 was, on the whole, not one of expansion for the British in India ; rather were they forced to fight for their authority, to intrigue in order to separate their rivals by mutual jealousy, even to face the menace which they hoped they had removed, — that of French control in regions of great area and wealth, a hazard to their safety and a source of aid to their enemies. But the collapse of the Mughal Empire and the rise of Sikh power in the North freed the hands of the English for a time, and they were enabled to deal singly with forces which, if united, might have changed their history in Asia. The increasing strength of the connection between India and the British government, as well as the widening scope of European

for figures of shipping.) The industrial inventions that crowded the closing years of the century, though at first a stimulus to unhealthy speculation and rash investment, soon proved their value. Cotton manufacture was installed at a critical period, when the American colonies had been lost ; but it was a source of great strength for the Napoleonic struggle, the total exports of cotton between 1793 and 1815 amounting to £225,954,439, official value, and 250,000,000, real value. Baines : *Cotton Manufacture*, pp. 503, 504. Some differences are to be noted in the figures given by various authorities and also a variation in the financial year. An examination of the tables in the Appendix will show the estimates which seemed to be most trustworthy ; and a reference will be found there to the difference between the official and real or sale value figures which at first sight seems to be misleading.

politics, gave rise to speculation on the continent as to the real effect of these struggles. Mirabeau was among the first to prophesy the interest of Russia in Indian matters, and to augur the storm which England would be called to brave should Russia press to their logical end her plans for control in Central Asia. Of Russian plans, more will be said later; but it is interesting to find in this connection that memoranda were drafted urging on the Russian government the opportunity for trade with India by the Black and Red Seas as well as by land routes. The same policy dictated the political mission of the Jesuit priests, sent in the Russian interest to China, when, in 1793, Lord MacCartney was sent out by the British. While it was not decisive action on the part of Russia, it clearly showed the trend of her policy.¹

¹ Auckland: *Corr.* i. pp. 77 (Burke to Eden, May 17, 1784), 342, 343. (H. Elliot to Eden, Dec. 26, 1783): "Foreigners in general think we are in danger of losing our East India possessions entirely by the intrigues of the French and the strength of their allies in Hindostan, and are, consequently, more solicitous to learn what military force will be left for the defense of those distant provinces, than to follow the different modes of civil government we are so anxious to establish. I am not a little tainted with the same principles, and am persuaded that the nations of Europe are perhaps more desirous to see us driven out of Hindostan than they were to divest us of the sovereignty and exclusive trade of our colonies in America. Our empire in the East was not originally founded upon justice; it was acquired by force and by force I believe it must be maintained . . . [he pleads for a strong government] for ensuring the possession of a distant province, the envy of our rivals, and the last remaining source of trade and opulence." Teignmouth: *Life*, i. p. 68. Mirabeau: *Histoire de Berlin. Lettre* No. 29, Dresden, Sept. 26, 1786. During the war between the English and Hyder Ali, Bengal traded with Russians to the north; Russia in 1783 had sent a fleet to seize Astarabad, but was not successful. "Cette entreprise a échouée; mais elle n'est pas abandonnée, et si peu, que l'on voit en ce moment à Pétersbourg un plan en relief des ouvrages dont on veut fortifier Astrabat. De tous les projets gigantesques de la Russie, celui ci est peut-être le moins déraisonnable puisque la nature des choses le lui a indiqué et qu'il y a déjà une navigation intérieure complètement établie depuis Astracan, par le Volga, la Mita, le lac Jemen, le Wologda, le canal de Ladoga et la Newa, jusqu'à Pétersbourg. Si jamais ce plan était suivi avec succès et activité, il faudrait une de ces deux choses ou que l'Angleterre songeât sérieusement à une coalition avec nous contre le système du Nord, ou qu'elle laissât prendre toutes sortes d'avantages sur elle à Pétersbourg, car on y aurait alors des intérêts tout-à-fait contraires aux siens,

The period between 1786 and 1793, during which Lord Cornwallis was Governor-General of India, is an important one in administrative history by reason of what is known as the permanent settlement of the land revenue of Bengal; by it the *Zamíndárs*, or hereditary government tax farmers, were recognized, the assessment on land was fixed, at first for ten years and later permanently, and the right of the *Zamíndár* to collect it was established. Proprietary government was thus the principle of action, though appeal was made to native tradition and custom. Trade was brisk and the Company prosperous, yet Great Britain was not the sovereign power nor even the paramount power in India; and when the second war with Mysore came on in 1790 the British allied themselves with two native sovereigns — the Nizám of Haidarábád in the Decan, and the head of the Maráthá Confederacy — against Tipú Sultán. It will be remembered that two years previously this ruler had sent an embassy to France, and that his chief aim in foreign policy was to unite the enemies of Great Britain under his leadership. His defeat, therefore, in 1792 may be regarded as a blow to French interests in Asia as well as a strengthening of English hands. Of his subsequent career more will be said in another chapter. The success of the British in the war which had ended in 1783 had proved the security of British sea communications with India; that of the second Mysore war (1792) showed that as long as they could

et il pourrait s'y former de terribles orages contre sa puissance aux Indes." Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, xxiv. pp. 180-187; ix. pp. 229 *et seq.* (S. to A. Vorontzov, 13 (24) Jan. 1792). He writes of the necessity of Russia's keeping on friendly terms with China, and at the same time to "traverser les projets des Anglais à la Chine" [MacCartney's mission]. He proposes to send a mission of Jesuits and Russian officials, nominally a scientific expedition, to remain in Peking, thus keeping Russia well-informed, and enjoins great secrecy. Cf. pp. 253, 288. Plans of the English mission dwarf those of Russia: "Je vous avais marqué le dommage que cela fera à nous si mylord Macartney réussit à Peking"; there is need of a good Russian ambassador there, of clever Jesuits, etc. Cornwallis: *Corr.* i. p. 315. The plan of sending a British envoy to China was suggested by Dundas in July, 1787, in order to improve trade and forestall the French, who were suspected of plans in that direction. ii. pp. 1 *et seq.* Further plans in 1789.

deal with the native states singly little was to be feared; the combination to be dreaded by them was that of a union of native rulers. Such an event, however, as invasion from the north, or effective attack by an enemy independent of Europe as a base, if attended with war in India on the part of the Nizám, the Maráthá powers, or Mysore, could prove equally dangerous to them. The policy of England, therefore, was to prevent either of these contingencies; that of her enemies was both to strike at her sea power, thus threatening her line of communication with the East, and to foster in India whatever conditions would imperil her security there.¹

If such were the state of the British connections with Asia

¹ Kaye: *op. cit.* pp. 162 *et seq.* Cornwallis: *Corr.* (Administration) i. pp. 211 *et seq.*, 270 *et seq.*, 298, 304, 448, 532 *et seq.*, 540 *et seq.*, 552 *et seq.*; ii. pp. 13 *et seq.*, 191 *et seq.*, 459 *et seq.*, 542. *Idem*: i. pp. 333 *et seq.* (Cornwallis to Malet, Calcutta, March 10, 1788). On the close connection between Mysore and France, the alliance of the English with the Maráthá powers and the Nizám, cf. 343-345, 352, 390, 423 *et seq.*, 536 *et seq.*; ii. pp. 112 *et seq.*, 117-120, 475 *et seq.* *Idem*: i. pp. 462 *et seq.* (the attack by Tipú Sultán on the Rajah of Travancore, 1790, and the alliance of the English with the Maráthás against Mysore); ii. pp. 8, 68 *et seq.*, 92 *et seq.*, 134 *et seq.*, 175 *et seq.*, 490 *et seq.*, 501-540 (the campaign against Tipú. Peace signed 1792); Baird: *Life*, i. pp. 51 *et seq.*, 104 *et seq.* (the war with Mysore, 1790-1792); Teignmouth: *Life and Corr.* i. pp. 97, 148 (Shore [Teignmouth] to Cornwallis, Oct. 4, 1787): "[If we merely act on the defensive] Tippoo will destroy our resources, by ravaging the Carnatic, and, when he has driven us to the last distress, call in the assistance of the French to complete it," 163, 169, 175 *et seq.*; Mackintosh: *Memoirs*, i. pp. 194, 195 (Mackintosh to Gentz, Feb. 5, 1804). The quality of British rule in India. He refers to "our ill-gotten, but well-governed, Asiatic empire." A curious and significant comment on the lack of ability in English generals and on the light in which England's position in India was viewed by Europeans is given by S. Vorontzov in a letter, dated Nov. 17 (28) 1794, to Count A. Razumovski. Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Part. 4, p. 217: "Les généraux anglais ne sont pas faits pour conduire des armées; c'est bien eux-mêmes, qui devraient être subordonnés à des généraux allemands, dont le moins capable sait plus de tactique que tous les Anglais ensemble. Leux fameux Cornwallis n'est bon qu'à faire la guerre aux Indiens, où encore il n'aurait jamais réussi à vaincre Tipoo-Saib sans le secours puissant des Marattes." Cf. Dirom: *Narrative of the Campaign in India which terminated the war with Tippoo Sultan in 1792*; and, in the "Rulers of India Series," Seton-Karr: *The Marquess Cornwallis*; and Bowring: *Haidar Ali and Tipú Sultán*.

in 1793, in what light were they viewed by Frenchmen; what were the ideas current in France regarding Great Britain's power as related to India; and what influence did questions of sea-power, colonies, and Asiatic dominion exert at the time when the struggle between the two rivals was to be renewed? The work of Raynal in spreading the belief that England's power was based on her Asiatic commerce and that her position in India was unstable and open to attack on all sides was important. More must be said later of his influence, through the mind of Napoleon Bonaparte, on the history of the world during the next quarter-century. The author of the *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes* estimated the English occupation of Bengal to be one of the great events in the economy of history; but he refused to credit any force save that of chance with its accomplishment and prophesied the overthrow of the British, and the return of the French to power in India. "The very circumstances," he wrote, "which have opened this career of glory and power to the English, far from promising a continuance of their success, foretell for them the most fatal disasters." He painted the rôle of France as the liberator of India in equally vivid colors. A disciple of his writes in the same terms several years later, — that India is the Achilles heel of the British Empire; for Great Britain, stripped of the wealth she gained from her Asiatic possessions, could "lead but a precarious existence" and would "no longer excite the alarm of France and of Europe." Arnould, the statistician, with all his prejudice against the East India trade, wrote that India meant annually about 250,000,000 livres of commerce and revenue to the English; and the oratory of the Revolution, forgetful also of the large figures of French colonial trade, magnified this statement till the very vitality of England seemed to them to rise from an Asiatic source. When the West Indies were included in their speeches, the commerce of these possessions was proclaimed as the founda-

tion of British power on the ocean. Indeed the negotiations which looked to peace, and even an alliance, between England and France were based on the French idea that the words "colonies," "sea-power" and "India" were magic terms by which the British mind could be controlled. This plan, for which Talleyrand stood sponsor, sprang from his strong belief regarding the utility of a colonial domain, which he expressed several years later in his well known *Mémoire* on this subject; he advocated colonial expansion as a source of strength, in the case of France as a safety valve to rid the home country of men whose political passions were too violent, and in general to call popular attention to matters beyond the sea; in a word, colonial expansion was to be for the modern world what a foreign war had been to the classic, — a remedy for internal disorder. These views were embodied in a report which Talleyrand made early in 1792 urging an alliance between France and Great Britain on the basis of a division of colonial empire by which their mutual commercial prosperity would be secured and their naval power would be used, in conjunction with that of the United States, to free the Spanish colonies in South America, thus opening them to their trade; to create, in fact, an international syndicate whose monopoly would be in colonial estates. The instructions given to Chauvelin and Talleyrand in April of that year included a proposal for a reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of both countries in Europe, Asia, and America, and a scheme of attack on Spain should that state continue hostile. Talleyrand, on his previous visit to England, had talked with Lord Grenville on these matters, and in his account of the conversation to M. Delessart he sounded the note familiar to Frenchmen by pointing out that by the terms of his plan Great Britain would be protected as to Ireland and India, — the two weak spots in her imperial armor.¹

¹ Raynal: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 196, 483, 493. Legoux de Flaix: *L'Indoustan*, i. pp. 395-96. The writer is inspired by Raynal, who, he says, foresaw the further aggrandizement of Great Britain; he wrote five memoirs on this subject, 1790-

When this dream of defensive alliance with Great Britain vanished, and when the scope of the Revolution became

1800. "La France seule, beaucoup plus intéressée dans ces résultats que les autres puissances européennes, devait employer toutes ses forces pour s'opposer à ces conquêtes des Anglais dans l'Indoustan. Et s'il est vrai de dire que les corps politiques ont une partie plus sensible, ainsi que les corps humains, sur laquelle doivent être dirigés tous les coups d'un ennemi éclairé, c'est sur les possessions britanniques de l'Inde que tous nos efforts auraient dû se porter. Privée des ressources immenses que l'Angleterre obtient de ces possessions, et livrée à celles de son pays, son existence était précaire, et les justes sujets des alarmes de la France et de l'Europe se seraient naturellement et graduellement évanouis." Arnould: *Balance du commerce*, i. p. 285. Gouy: *Vues générales*, p. 2: "C'est par le commerce des deux Indes que l'Angleterre et la Hollande ont élevé, tour-à-tour, leur trône sur l'Océan. Si naguère la France tenoit le balance entre les Souverains de l'Europe, si elle a anéanti pendant un temps les prétentions d'une rivale toujours jalouse de sa splendeur, c'est à la prospérité de la culture des colonies. . . ." Nairac: Speech in the *Assemblée*, June 28, 1790: "Jetez les yeux sur l'Angleterre; son commerce de l'Inde est immense. Il produit annuellement plus de 80 millions de retours. Il fournit presque toutes les nations de l'Europe; il fournit à ses propres besoins et cependant les manufactures n'y languissent pas." Also the speeches of Begouen and Mirabeau, at the same time, on Indian Trade, Marseilles, and the Levant. Talleyrand: *Essai sur les avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles*, in *Mémoires de l'Institut*, etc., ii. pp. 300, 301. After recommending Northern Africa, various neighboring islands, and Egypt as fit to replace French losses in America, he concluded: "De tout ce qui vient d'être exposé, il suit que tout presse de s'occuper de nouvelles colonies; l'exemple des peuples les plus sages, qui en ont fait un des grands moyens de tranquillité; le besoin de préparer le remplacement de nos colonies actuelles pour ne pas nous trouver en arrière des événements; la convenance de placer la culture de nos denrées coloniales plus près de leurs vrais cultivateurs; la nécessité de former avec les colonies les rapports les plus naturels, bien plus faciles, sans doute, dans les établissements nouveaux que dans les anciens; l'avantage de ne point nous laisser prévenir par une nation rivale, pour qui chacun des nos oublis, chacun de nos retards en ce genre est une conquête; l'opinion des hommes éclairés qui ont porté leur attention et leurs recherches sur cet objet; enfin la douceur de pouvoir attacher à ces entreprises tant d'hommes agités qui ont besoin de projets, tant d'hommes malheureux qui ont besoin d'espérance." The plan of the English alliance had much in common with the diplomatic policy of General Dumouriez. Cf. Sorel: *Un général diplomatique. Dumouriez*, etc., in the *R. de D. M.* 3 sér. lxiv. (1884), pp. 302-332, 575-606, 798-829. Pallain: *Talleyrand et le Directoire*, pp. xlii. et seq., lv. (Mémor by Talleyrand): ". . . les vaisseaux de la France et de l'Angleterre réunis iront ouvrir dans la mer Pacifique, dans la mer du Sud, et dans l'Océan Méridional le commerce libre de cette immense partie des Indes occidentales. . . . Après une révolution, il faut ouvrir de nouvelles routes à l'industrie, il faut donner des

apparent in the politics of both nations, the ideas which had prompted plans for co-operation to a common end revived among the French the old outcry against England. The period of confusion and disorganization in the French colonies, which was in part the legacy of the Ancien Régime and in part incidental to the radical policy of the Revolution, had been profitable to Great Britain, and as her enmity to the extreme phases of the Revolution became known, the furious hatred of her which had been inbred in the subjects of the Bourbons was renewed in the French mind in its new national self-consciousness. Early in January, 1793, Kersaint had declared that the struggle between the two great rivals would be to the death; and Brissot, in his speech on the war with England, asked "if it were possible that she could withstand well directed onslaughts in India"; he then drew a picture of Frenchmen "restoring independence" to India with the help of native rulers, re-establishing the India trade "on a sound basis, the basis of *fraternité*," driving out the English, and thus making it easy to undermine "a power whose colossal figure revealed weakness and invited ruin." This explosion of feeling was the natural result of the same thought which had prompted the attempt to concert a plan of action with Great Britain; for, if it were true, as Burke had said, that no combination of the powers which did not include Great Britain as leader could expect to make any impression on France, the object of France must be to isolate Great Britain, and to regard war with her as a means to gain sea-power and colonies: "*Angleterre — Bât à exterminer*" were the terse words of a secret

débouchés à toutes les passions." Pallain: *Talleyrand à Londres en 1792*, pp. 98 *et seq.*, 106. (Talleyrand to Delessart, London, Feb. 17), report of a conversation with Lord Grenville. Talleyrand said: "[I desire] qu'il s'établisse entre nos deux nations une garantie réciproque de toutes nos possessions orientales, occidentales, et Européennes (M. Delessart verra sûrement là qu'en écartant toute idée de cession j'ai touché les deux cordes sensibles pour l'Angleterre: l'Inde où est la guerre, et l'Irlande qui est menacée de troubles); pp. 219-242 (instructions of April 20), and especially 232. Cf. Lecky: *op. cit.* vi. pp. 5-12, 47-54.

note written in the summer of 1794. In crude outline the sentence anticipated the history of the next twenty years.¹

This policy, itself a bequest of the Ancien Régime, got

¹ Barral-Montferrat: *Dix Ans*, i. p. 8. (The despatches given by this writer are taken almost entirely from the Public Record Office, London.) (Hailes to the Duke of Dorset, Paris, January, 1784): "France is so impoverished that we shall do well to profit by this and sap her influence, enfeeble and humiliate her, though preserving toward her at the same time an outward frankness and cordiality." Malouet: *Mémoires sur les colonies*, iii. p. 244. Villèle: *Mémoires*, i. p. 52. In 1791 "l'empressement de nos éternels rivaux, les Anglais, à faire tourner au profit de leur puissance l'état de désorganisation, de démenace et de faiblesse où nous avait jetés la Révolution." Page 53: "L'influence française allait être anéantie dans ces contrées [East Indies], où elle avait tant grandi pendant la guerre précédente par les brillants exploits maritimes de M. de Suffren et par l'accroissement de l'empire de notre puissant allié Hyder-Ali." Stephens: *op. cit.* ii. p. 495. *Le Moniteur*, Jan. 15, 1793. Brissot's speech: "Il faut déjouer le cabinet anglais comme nous avons déjoué Léopold et Frédéric-Guillaume; il faut le forcer de nous donner une explication précise qui nous tranquillise à jamais, ou tirer l'épée contre les Anglais; et, croyez-en le génie de la liberté, les matelots français ne le céderont point aux vainqueurs du Brabant, et la mer aura aussi son Jemmapes. . . . Dites-nous s'il est possible qu'elle [England] puisse y [India] soutenir des attaques bien dirigées, combinées avec les princes de ce pays, et dans un nouveau système; dites-nous si, lorsque les républicains français se présenteront dans ces parages, non pour remplacer les Anglais en les chassant, mais pour rendre l'Inde à son indépendance, pour y rappeler le commerce à la vraie base, la base de la fraternité, dites-nous si dès-lors ils ne trouveront pas et dans les princes et dans les peuples autant d'alliés, et s'il ne leur sera pas facile de renverser une puissance dont la statue colossale accuse la faiblesse et appelle la ruine?" *Documents inédits in La Révolution française*, xiv. p. 1112: "Diplomatie de la République française conformément au plan tracé par le Comité du Salut public," l'an II. Burke: *Heads for Consideration*, in *Works*, iii. p. 406 (written in Nov., 1792): "That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor ever can be, the least rational hope of making an impression on France by any continental powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the soul of the whole confederacy against it." *Le Moniteur*, Jan. 16, 1793. Speech of Kersaint in the National Convention on Jan. 13: "Citoyens, je crois avoir prouvé, le 1^{er} janvier, que nous étions en situation d'opposer à la Nation Anglaise une résistance ferme, et de réduire enfin au moins à l'incertitude cette ambition des Anglais, de dominer toutes les puissances maritimes de l'Europe, et de lui faire sentir que si elle nous force à la combattre, cette guerre qu'on lui a présentée comme très-facile, sera une guerre terrible; car un combat entre deux Nations qui veulent être libres, est un combat à mort, et ne peut finir que par la destruction de l'une ou de l'autre."

ready support in France, for it appealed to the people both as brave politics and sound economics; it was good military strategy to cut the enemy's line of communication, to attack his weak point and to strike at the supposed base of his supplies. For it was by protecting these from attack, by pledging their security, that Talleyrand had hoped to win Great Britain to the side of France, and the same details counted now in war as they had the year before in peace. Then Spain was to pay the costs for the aggrandizement of the two allies; now the program of France included her as an ally chiefly in order to prevent her from being of use to Great Britain. The Frenchmen who thought of colonial expansion reckoned on the colonies to draw away the soldiers and plotters who endangered the young Republic; they planned the acquisition of Louisiana, Spanish Santo Domingo, and the Cape of Good Hope, while rebellion instigated in India, Ireland, and, if need were, South America should distract the enemy; they hoped to keep the Spanish colonies from becoming naval bases for the English fleets, to increase their own sea-power by forcing an alliance with Spain; in a word, to isolate and maim Great Britain. They were acting on Burke's maxim: "Spain is not a substantive power; she must lean on France or on England;" and Spain was essential to the Republic, which had succeeded a Louis XIV. and had inherited his plans for a Spanish succession, a Latin Mediterranean and a French colonial Empire. As the coalition against France began to show signs of breaking up, the signature of a treaty of peace with Spain became a matter of importance to the French who were influenced by such considerations as the above. Such a treaty, providing for an alliance between the two nations and looking to common action against England, was therefore hailed with joy (August, 1796). The instructions to the French diplomats had been to increase the naval force, to plan for control of the Mediterranean, and to strike at Great Britain with Spanish arms. In addition to the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, the negotiations dealt with

such matters as united naval action and the cession of Louisiana to France when Gibraltar should have been won from Great Britain. It was proposed that Sweden, Denmark, the Batavian Republic, and the Ottoman Empire should be invited to join the alliance. When, therefore, a few months later the Spanish fleet arrived at Toulon it was greeted by verses which, though crude, clearly reflected the French policy: —

“Salut, enfants de la Castile,
A nos voix mêles vos accents;
Formons une seule famille
Aux yeux des Anglais pâlisants. (*Sung twice.*)
L'intérêt commun nous éclaire,
Nos mains porteront désormais
Pour nous l'olivier de la paix
Et la foudre pour l'Angleterre.

(*Chorus* :) Espagnol et Français, nos drapeaux sont unis;
Jurons, jurons : paix entre nous, guerre à nos ennemis.”¹

¹ Verses written by Poupinet to the air, “Allons, enfants de la patrie,” and sung in the theatre at Toulon. Quoted by Grandmaison: *L'Ambassade française en Espagne*, p. 114. Cf. pp. 110–113, 314–317, 320–321. De Clercq: *Recueil*, i. pp. 245, 287. Martens: *Recueil générale*, vi. pp. 45 *et seq.*, 124 *et seq.* Aulard: *Politique étrangère*, in *Révol. franç.*, xiv. pp. 1111–1113. Pallain: *Talleyrand à Londres*, pp. 157 *et seq.* (Biron to Dumouriez, Valenciennes, March 19, 1792.) “... Vingt vaisseaux armés et prêts à mettre à la voile pour l'Inde en imposeront à toutes les intrigues royales anglaises, et la nation, je le répète, ne permettra pas au ministère, au Parlement même, de courir le risque d'une guerre avec la France; une telle guerre peut, en effet, présenter des suites désastreuses et probables à une nation qui n'a d'autre hypothèque à donner à une dette immense que son crédit. Personne ne peut calculer le bouleversement que produirait à Londres la chute de la Compagnie des Indes, et tout le monde le sait.” *La diplomatie révolutionnaire*, in *Rev. de la Révol.*, ii. p. 361. (Merlin to Goupilleau, March 7, 1795), propositions regarding Spanish treaty: “En résumé la République désire dominer sur la Méditerranée et augmenter ses forces sur l'Océan.” Sorel: *France et Espagne*, in *Rev. hist.*, xiii. p. 271 (instructions to French representative, Pérignon, March 16, 1796): “L'Angleterre est l'objet principal de la politique de la France. C'est pour atteindre l'Angleterre que la République a traité avec l'Espagne.” Burke: *op. cit.* iii. p. 397. Bailleu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. p. 80. Report by Sandoz-Rollin of a conversation with Delacroix, Paris, July 12, 1796. Delacroix said: “... Le système en est arrêté; nous chasserons les Anglais de la Méditerranée, et nous y réussirons infailliblement, ou en

This general theory of politics and commerce, which looked on sea-power as the object in the attack on Great Britain, had eloquent supporters at this period and in the years which saw the rise of Bonaparte. The mission of France was to "wreak vengeance on the tyrant of the seas," a state whose "power was purely artificial," based on ill-gotten wealth and stolen colonies, whose policy aimed at the commercial ruin of all others by depriving them of their foreign establishments and wrecking their prosperous colonial trade; the Revolution had been their opportunity, and battle must be joined with them till France was again possessed of her empire over-seas. Poet and pamphleteer joined in the outcry against a state whose downfall was their dearest hope, and clamored for colonial conquest as the crown of victory and the ideal of an imperial republic. Whether their efforts met with failure or success is a matter beside the mark; whether their belief in the Asiatic source of Great Britain's power was true or false is not important, if it can be shown that their ideas influenced the course of events, and that their teaching imbued Napoleon Bonaparte with theories and purposes which were to move Europe and Asia.¹

mettant garnison française dans lesdits ports, ou en exigeant leur fermeture à tout bâtiment anglais. . . ." *Ibid.* i. p. 107. Report of Sandoz-Rollin on the discussion as to the destiny of the Brest fleet, Paris, Dec. 30, 1796: "Toute l'attention du public se porte dans le moment présent sur l'expédition de Brest: on cherche à en pénétrer le secret et on se perd en conjectures inutiles. Tantôt on veut que ladite flotte soit destinée pour la Jamaïque, et qu'elle ait le projet d'armer et d'insurger les noirs qui s'y trouvent contre les colons anglais: tantôt on veut qu'elle soit destinée à reprendre le Cap de Bonne-Espérance et Trinque-male; tantôt on veut qu'elle soit dirigée contre l'état de l'Église, afin de forcer le Pape à la paix et d'exiger de lui des contributions considérables. L'Irlande est toujours pour moi [Sandoz] le point qui concentre le plus de probabilités pour cette expédition." Baumgarten: *Gesch. Spaniens*, i. p. 72: "Von der Ausbreitung der britischer Seemacht wurde kein europäischer Staat directer betroffen als Spanien, dessen Existence an seiner maritimen Selbständigkeit hing, an der dadurch bedingten Sicherheit seines ungeheuren Colonialbesitzes, dessen Hafen jeder fremden Macht zu versperren für ein Axiom der spanischen Handelspolitik galt," pp. 75 *et seq.*

¹ Villers: *Rapport relatif aux Marchandises anglaises*, p. 17. Dubroca: *op. cit.*

It remains to examine opinion in England and to trace the evolution in her policy. The pleasure that Englishmen felt at the disorder in France was natural, for Mr. Storer expressed the common idea when he wrote to Lord Auckland: "As long as France will but continue in her present ridiculous and miserable situation, old England is perfectly safe"; indeed the expectation in England was that France would "soon cease to be an object of alarm to other nations," and would "sink within herself into an abyss of horrors of every kind — famine, civil war, rapine, massacres, and ultimately a separation of governments and various dismemberments." The very policy of neutrality to which Great Britain at first clung was guided, according to Mr. Burges, by such firm belief in "the immense advantages to be derived by this country [England] from such a state of anarchy and weakness as France is at present [1790] plunged in" that it seemed to him madness "to interfere in any measure which may even remotely, tend to put France into

pp. v-vii, xi, 15-17. Chenier: *Œuvres*, iii. pp. 186, 187, *Elégie, La Mort du Général Hoche*: —

"L'heure approche où la France
Du vainqueur des Anglais remplira l'espérance.
Debout sur des débris, l'orgueilleuse Angleterre.
La menace à la bouche, et le glaive à la main,
Réclame encore la guerre, et veut du sang humain.
Elle dont le trident, asservissant les ondes,
Usurpa les trésors et les droits des deux mondes;
Rendons aux nations l'héritage des mers;
Entendez, mes enfants, la voix de l'univers
Déléguer aux Français la vengeance publique,
Voyez Londres pâlir au nom de l'Italique" [Bonaparte].

Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Part 4, p. 80. (Dietrichstein to A. Razoumowski, London, April 6, 1802.) In speaking of the mistakes made by England, charging her with having attempted to make use of the Revolution to her own ends, he also speaks of the value which the possession of Santo Domingo would have been to England, for France would have surrendered the Netherlands, Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, or the Cisalpine Republic in order to regain it. This judgment, though very possibly at fault, shows the realization of the importance attributed to colonial territory by many statesmen of the period.

the situation where a long and terrible experience has taught us she had the power to injure us." It was with calm interest and amusement, according to Lord Auckland, that the average Englishmen regarded the Revolution; even an Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wrote in 1792 that England had no concern in foreign politics. She was too busy taking her profits from her increasing commerce and manufactures. There was joy over the news from India of Tipú's defeat, for "now the temple of Janus could be closed" without prospect of its being opened soon again. These were the views of men who regarded only the interest of Great Britain, and who, though they might acknowledge with Burke "that France by its mere geographical position, independently of every other circumstance, must affect every state of Europe," nevertheless watched the course of events, not for the checking of this philosophy or that democracy, but for opportunity to increase the wealth and prosperity of Great Britain, whether by peace or war. That this could be done better by neutrality than by intervention in the affairs of France at first seemed probable; to "let well enough alone" was the maxim. But Mr. Pitt was charged with hypocrisy, with fomenting the hot spirits of the French to new orgies of blood; he would have acted with greater honor, wrote Count Pinto, the Portuguese minister, had he "declared war against France, demolished Cherburg, destroyed her navy, and seized her colonies." Yet the policy of Pitt, whether it commended itself to Englishmen or to Continental critics, was wise beyond doubt; "he served his country well," even Pinto wrote, and waited till popular opinion should bear him out in moving against France, and until the necessity of checking her plans in the Low Countries seemed greater than the profit to be gained by quietly waiting till unwise legislation and economic disorder in the French colonies should complete their work. The very aims which were attributed to English policy by friends and foes before the declaration of war go far to indicate the general idea regarding

the ends to be gained by Great Britain in the event of hostilities. While the allied powers fancied themselves as carving up France and indemnifying themselves in Europe for the cost of the war, the only points on the Continent which the English spoke of getting were Dunkirk and perhaps Calais, for their spoils were acknowledged to be in Asia, the West Indies, and on the Ocean. This was only a recognition of the quality of Great Britain's power — "*la seule puissance vraiment maritime*," as Count Vorontzov said — and of the trend of Pitt's policy; in 1789 he had pushed a plan to fortify in the West Indies and to add to the fleets stationed in the East Indies and the Mediterranean. But, though Lord Grenville may have consented to the inevitableness of war when in conversation with Count Simon Vorontsov, and listened interestedly in 1792 to De Curt and his scheme for an English occupation of Guadeloupe, the ministry did not move until it was thought the right time had come for war with the French; a time in which, as Lord Sheffield wrote (Oct. 21, 1792) "there would be a complete opportunity for annihilating their marine and their colonies."¹

¹ Cornwallis: *Corr.* i. p. 349 (Grenville to Cornwallis, Dec. 20, 1787), *Auckland MSS.* (B. M. Additional, 34,434), J. B. Burges to Lord Auckland, Dec. 28, 1790. Quoted by Clapham: *Causes of the war of 1792*, p. 16. Gower: *Despatches*, p. 155 (Paris, Feb. 10, 1792): "Upon the whole, the rapid increase of anarchy, not only in the metropolis but in every municipality of this disjointed kingdom, renders a war of some sort necessary, and if a bankruptcy should insue it is to be hoped that France will not remain entire." Burke: *Works*, iii. p. 394; Auckland: *Corr.* ii. pp. 377 (Storer to Auckland, Nov. 28, 1790), 398 (Auckland to Lord H. Spencer, March 20, 1792): "This indifference as to foreign affairs is general through the kingdom; you may find it even in our newspapers; perhaps it may be justly attributed to the great prosperity of the country, which confines all attention to inferior and insular details;" 413 (J. B. Burges to Auckland, July 3, 1792), 439 (Sept. 4, 1792), 443-444 (Auckland to Morton Eden, Hague, Sept. 18). England's answer to requests for intervention had been: "that our neutral conduct gives us no claim to interfere either with advice or opinions unless solicited; and that our general wishes, on the one hand, are, that France may never again resume the same restless and troublesome system which has so often been fatal to the peace of nations; and, on the other, that an executive government may exist there so as to restrain the present lawless and atrocious spirit;" 458 (Lord Sheffield to Auckland, Oct. 21); 464 (Grenville to Auckland, Nov. 6), 485 (Auck-

Thus when the war did begin in 1793 it was nominally over the French invasion of Dutch territory; apparently the motive was strictly European, an infringement of rights which Great Britain claimed in the light of continental treaties and international law. But the importance of Holland as a neutral or friendly state to England had been of steady growth; the matter had become more distinctly a "British interest," as the colonial affairs of England had become more and more vital to the welfare of the nation. For as France gradually lost her own ability to injure British establishments abroad, the convenient weapons which she might use for this purpose, namely Dutch sea power and colonial posts, became correspondingly more important to her; and the English policy of keeping the Republic free from French control became more determined and essential to the peace and growth of the British Empire. Indeed English diplomacy in Holland had aimed continuously at checking the maritime strength of France, while that of France had as consistently directed its efforts to employment of the Dutch colonies in Africa and Asia as bases from which

land to Lord Loughborough, Jan. 6, 1793); 488 (Storer to Auckland, Jan. 11, 1793): iii. pp. 43 (Crawford to Auckland, Brussels, April 29, 1793); 79 (Auckland to Grenville, July 14), "It is a question worth consideration, whether, in supposing the feasibility of such a conquest, we ought not to insist on holding Dunkirk (and, perhaps, also Calais)"; 86 *et seq.* (Memoir of M. Jarry, on the "Line of Somme"). Burke: *Corr.* iii. pp. 224, 265, 266, 268, 274, 336, 343, 347 (on Pitt's neutrality). Rose: *Diaries*, i. p. 85. Pitt wrote in Sept. 1788, that the state of France "seems to promise us a considerable respite from dangerous projects." Cf. p. 108. Malmesbury: *Corr.* ii. pp. 437, 438, 441. Hansard: *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. pp. 44, 170, 767, 919, 929, 940 (the neutrality program in the House); xxx. 250-256 (Corr. of Chauvelin and Grenville in 1793 just before the war). Vorontzov: *Arkhiu*, Count S. Vorontzov, writing in 1796 of his relations with Lord Grenville before the war of 1793. He had a chance "de lui parler souvent sur la nécessité de rompre avec la France. Il a été longtemps sans en convenir et à la fin il avoua que le ministère sent cette nécessité, mais que la nation n'est pas encore disposée à cette rupture, ce qui était vrai aussi"; ix. pp. 226 (S. to A. Vorontzov, Dec. 2(13), 1791), 272 (*Idem* Nov. 7 (18), 1792); xi. p. 296 (Pinto to A. Vorontzov, 1792). Lecky: *op. cit.* v. pp. 200, 206, 560 *et seq.*; vi. pp. 1 *et seq.*, 105-106, 123. Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Part 4, p. 80.

to strike at British prestige, to sow seeds of insurrection and war among the native populations of India, and to interrupt the progress of English control in that region. In 1787, when an ascendancy of France in the Dutch states had seemed imminent the English had shown their determination to prevent it, by war if necessary; and the triple alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, and the Netherlands had been in part the result of that feeling. The character of such a war, in which France would have had the support of the provinces of Holland, Groningen and Overijssel, was clearly foreseen by Mr. Pitt in 1787 when he wrote to Lord Cornwallis, then Governor General in India, that "in this situation, the first struggle will actually be for the foreign dependencies of the Dutch Republic; and if at the outset of a war we could get possession of the Cape and Trincomale, it would go further than anything else to decide the fate of the contest." The despatches of Sir James Harris, afterwards Lord Malmesbury, and of Mr. Eden, afterwards Lord Auckland, had been urgent in declarations that the policy of France in Holland was directed against England in Asia, and, as Count Simon Vorontzov reported, that the "existence of the English in the Indies depended on the success of his [Pitt's] plan for getting the Dutch out of the hands of France, and for allying the Republic to England." The Dutch affair was, as Lord Grenville said, the bond between Great Britain and the Continent. The motives which had led the English government to oppose the plan of an exchange by Austria of her territory in the Low Countries for Bavaria were the same which, in 1793, led her to object to any scheme that would settle France with a weak rather than a strong neighbor on her northern frontier; they also at one time gave some reason to suppose that, in the event of any seizure of French territory by the allies, England might agree to a partition that would lessen the power of France on that part of her border. But the successes of the French armies soon led to a proposal in England that, after supporting Holland to the utmost of her

power, Great Britain should withdraw from continental interference, should gain the surrender of the Dutch colonies in both hemispheres, and should press with undivided energy a naval war destined to ruin the commerce of France and to strip her of her colonies, "either till the course of events might leave us masters of the sea, or till the French system might break to pieces under its own extent and weight." The hope of the French, according to English lights, was to create in the Netherlands a subservient state ready to their hand in every attack on Great Britain; the marine and commerce of England were thus to be destroyed, "her colonies taken from her and ultimately the standard of anarchy displayed over the ruins of London." Naturally there were those both in England and France who saw no wisdom in such far-fetched schemes. To those who regarded republicanism as a greater enemy than France herself, "the distraction of the efforts of England from the heart of French power to its extremities" was looked on with great disfavor. Yet the very criticisms of Pitt's policy are full of meaning; as Sheridan put it in 1808, "the various governments which this country had seen during that period were always employed in filching for a sugar island, or some other object of comparatively trifling moment, while the main and principal purpose was lost and forgotten." "This war upon sugar islands," in the words of Mr. Windham, thus met with disapproval from those who failed to see that but for such islands and the questions connected with them Great Britain might not have gone to war at all. Indeed Mr. Wilberforce believed that Pitt was persuaded by Dundas, that arch-expansionist, whose influence was later destined to have such great effect in the growth of British India, that England might "at a small expense" seize and keep all of the French West Indian colonies; in short, that Dundas had incited in Pitt "a thirst for colonial conquest." To accept this as the only explanation would be both unwise and unnecessary, for the desire for colonial expansion as a motive

to war is strong enough without seeking to displace all other causes of hostility.¹

¹ Auckland: *Corr.* i. pp. 195 (Pitt to Eden, Sept. 14, 1787; on the importance of opposing the French in Holland); 205 (Carmarthen to Eden, Sept. 28, *Idem*); iii. pp. 5 (Grenville to Auckland, April 3, 1793); 7, 8 (Loughborough to Auckland, April 3); 15, 16 (Bentinck to Auckland, reporting Count Mercy, April 10); all on the question of the future of the Netherlands as related to France; 23-26 (Dundas to Sir James Murray, April 16), a strong letter declaring the policy of England; 274 (Auckland to Pitt, Nov. 28, 1794, proposing an aggressive colonial policy); 286 (Auckland to Spencer, Feb. 20, 1795 on the naval program); 290-91 (Crawford to Auckland, Frankfort, March 3, giving the plans of France); 397 (H. Elliot to Auckland, Dresden, 1798, giving the real purpose of France against England). In an anonymous brochure of 1799, entitled "*Les nouveaux intérêts de l'Europe*," pp. 58-59, the writer, who is a royalist, declares that in order to completely rob France of her colonies, the United States should be induced to seize Santo Domingo. Pallain: *Talleyrand à Londres*, pp. xxii, 374-381. Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, ix. p. 121 (S. to A. Vorontzov, London, May 2 (13), 1788). Barral-Montferrat: *op. cit.* p. 301. Malmesbury: *Diaries*, ii. pp. 355, 367, 372; on Pitt's policy in 1787. Cornwallis: *Corr.* i. pp. 321-325 (Pitt to Cornwallis, Aug. 2, 1787). The success of France in Holland would be a serious matter for the British in India, and was much to be apprehended. ". . . if things unfortunately should come to extremities, we shall be engaged in a contest in which France will probably for a time have the support of the province of Holland, and perhaps that of Groningen and Overijssel; while we shall have on our side the remaining provinces, making the majority of the States-General. In this situation, the first struggle will actually be for the foreign dependencies of the Republic; and if at the outset of a war we could get possession of the Cape of Good Hope and Trincomale, it would go further than anything else to decide the fate of the contest. We should certainly be justified in taking possession of these posts on behalf of the majority of the States, and to secure them against France. It is therefore much to be wished that on the first news of hostilities you should find the means of striking a blow at Trincomale. If anything can be tried against the Cape it must of course be from hence." Cf. pp. 327, 328, 337, 352 (Dundas to Cornwallis, March 31, 1788): "A connection between Holland and us in India, and the dissolution of the French connection with that Republic, are most important events with a view to the strength and permanency of our possessions and power in Hindostan. . . . Our principal and indeed our only object in an alliance with the Dutch respecting India must be to secure ourselves against the danger of our ever being deprived of the use of the harbor of Trincomale in the event of a future war." Cf. Lecky: *op. cit.* vi. pp. 72-79, 132. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution*, iii. p. 276. Moore: *Sheridan*, ii. pp. 203-204 (1793): "The distraction of the efforts of England from the heart of French power to its remote extremities, in what Mr. Windham called 'a war upon sugar islands,' was a waste of means as unstatesmanlike as it was calamitous, and entitled Mr. Pitt to the satire on his policy conveyed in the remark of a

On the continent the course of the Revolution and the fortunes of war obscure for a time the trend of French public opinion; in the changes of her government and the victories of her armies France was profoundly interested, but when opportunity arises to judge of her relations to Great Britain, apart from strictly European complications and local affairs, the prominence of the colonial issue is again made evident. The lesson which was to be learned from the events of 1792 to 1797 bore out the judgment of Burke when he wrote in November, 1792, that there was nothing in the internal state of things in France which altered "the national policy with regard to the exterior relations of that country;" but that, on the contrary, there were "many things in the internal circumstances of France" which rendered the "active assertion" of the fundamental principles in her former policy more pressing than at any previous time in her history. Thus the central fact in the history of France as a world power, had been the often conflicting interests of her continental and her colonial dominions. The Republic, which was determined to emulate Louis XIV. and to attain her "natural limits" in Europe, was met with the same difficulties which had checked the Bourbons in their desire to fill the rôles of both a land and a sea power. The triumph of the old policy would have required the defeat of England; and the realization of French republican ideals demanded the recognition by Great Britain of a French state, larger and more powerful than that which she had gone to war to despoil, and insisted on her acquiescence in the supremacy

certain distinguished lady, who said to him, upon hearing of some new acquisition in the West Indies, 'I protest, Mr. Pitt, if you go on thus, you will soon be master of every island in the world, except just these two little ones, England and Ireland.'" Wilberforce: *Life*, ii. pp. 10, 391. He thinks Dundas influenced Pitt to the French war, — "his persuasion [was] that we should be able with ease and promptitude, at a small expense of money and men, to take the French West India Islands, and keep them when peace should be restored; in truth, but for Mr. Dundas's persuasion that the war would soon be over," the war would never have been begun. Burke said to Dundas, "You must indeed go to war; but you greatly mistake in thinking it will soon be over." Cf. pp. 92, 332. Cf. also above, p. 17, note.

of France as a world power. The events which brought about so different a situation from that expected by Englishmen when they embarked on a career of colonial conquest at the expense of France are part of a political history which need not be retold here. The attention of the English to their policy had resulted in such advances in both Asia and America that they alone of the allies had gained in territory; but the intention of France to isolate them had well nigh been accomplished, and, in spite of an increased commerce, the burdens of the war and the popular wish for peace forced Pitt to agree to negotiations with the French government. The tortuous progress of diplomacy at Lille would not be worth study for our purposes did it not show to what extent the plans of France clashed with those of England, and above all to what degree the hopes of peace were ended by disagreement on colonial affairs. The results of the war had given France the control of the Netherlands and the alliance of Spain, together with the disposal of many ports of entry, which she proposed to shut to English commerce. England had captured in the West Indies — Martinique, Santa Lucia, Guadeloupe, with its dependent islands, Tobago, St. Vincent, Grenada, Trinidad, and on the mainland, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice (Guadeloupe was recaptured by the French in 1794); in Asia — Pondicherry, Ceylon, with its fine harbor of Trincomali, Malacca, Cochin, several smaller ports in India, the Bandas, and Amboina; and, most important of all, the Cape of Good Hope. The English came to Lille prepared to acknowledge the new boundaries and spheres of influence of France in Europe, to restore all the French colonies captured since 1793, and to keep only Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Cochin, which was to be exchanged for Negapatam in Tanjore. But the French soon met this proposal with a demand that all the conquests, made not only from her but from Spain and the newly formed Batavian Republic, should be surrendered by Great Britain. Lord Malmesbury, while continuing to negotiate, in hope that the

differences among the French representatives would profit him, was further disappointed by the news of the Portuguese treaty with France, which left England in total isolation. The real, though extravagant, hopes of the French were better expressed in a memoir which was not presented at the time, but which has since come to light. This demanded, in addition to what has been stated, the cession of the Channel Islands, the restoration of Canada, and of the Indian possessions of France prior to 1754, together with a resumption of the Newfoundland fishery, and the cession of Gibraltar to Spain. This document, of which Mr. Lecky has made use, is valuable in so far as it shows the political aspirations of France. Peace might easily have been consummated on terms easier to Great Britain than these; but the determination of Pitt to keep Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope free from French intrigue, to strengthen the English control in Asia and on the route thither, was sufficient to forbid a treaty in the present temper of France. She had no idea of agreeing to half-way measures, and, even though the West Indian captures should be nullified, the importance of the Asiatic position of Great Britain weighed heavily on her mind. Whatever additional causes, therefore, may have helped to bring on the war of 1793 and may have prevented its early conclusion, the influence of the colonial question was great and lasting, both in exciting hostilities and in prolonging the struggle; whatever had been the conflicting interests of France and Great Britain in Europe, and however mistaken were the opinion and policy of the two powers as to the objects and results of the war, the problem of Asiatic dominion had had much to do in fixing its character. The war failed to secure the desires of the allies, but it served to reveal them; the wishes of France were realized in Europe, but her larger hopes were still unfulfilled. The course of the Revolution, far from fastening the attention of all men on Paris, opened new avenues for ambition and was destined to turn the eyes of Napoleon Bonaparte toward Asia, as the source of power and

the seat of empire ; the movement was already well on its way to turn the Mediterranean into a French sea, to make the Levant the scene of action, and to bring the Eastern Question into close relation with that of rule in further Asia. The progress of that movement is still to be traced.¹

¹ Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Part 4, p. 218 (S. Vorontzov to A. Razumovski, Nov. 17 (28), 1794), on the temper of the English people as regards the war; p. 254 (*Idem*, Nov. 28, 1796), on the purpose of France to injure England. Burke: *Works*, iii. p. 394. Cornwallis: *Corr.* ii. pp. 222 *et seq.* Auckland: *Corr.* iii. pp. 137, *et seq.*, 371, 372. Teignmouth: *Life*, i. p. 244. Bailleu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. p. 102, Report of Sandoz-Rollin. Zusammenkunft und Gespräch mit Malmesbury über die Friedensunterhandlung zwischen Frankreich und England. Okt. 31, 1796: "Lord Malmesbury ne disait rien des prétentions de l'Angleterre: je l'en fis convenir. 'Vous sentirez bien,' répliqua-t-il, 'que notre intention est de rendre à la France quelques-unes de nos conquêtes dans les Indes occidentales, pour contrebalancer les restitutions à faire à l'Empereur: mais on ne saurait exiger que l'Angleterre renonçât au Cap de Bonne-Espérance et à quelques autres établissements dans les Indes orientales: cela serait trop injuste.'" Malmesbury: *Correspondence*, iii. pp. 369, 397, 430, 434, 464, 489-497, 554, 561-569, 576, 580-589. MSS. in *Tome Supplémentaire*, xv., *Dépt. des aff. étrang.*, quoted by Lecky: *op. cit.* vii. p. 397. Mahan: *Sea power and the Revolution*, i. pp. 115-118. Sorel: *op. cit.* iv. pp. 460 *et seq.*, 469. Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, viii. p. 289.

CHAPTER II

THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE REVOLUTION

The Problem of Asia ; its Character — Religion and Politics — The Influence of Asia on Europe — The Evolution of the Eastern Question — The Situation in 1774 — The First Partition of Poland and the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji — The Attitude of Russia ; panslav and slavophile — The Policy of Russia, of Prussia, of Austria, of France, of Great Britain — The Condition of the Ottoman Empire in 1774 — The Eastern Question and the American War — The Austro-Russian Alliance of 1781 — Catherine's "Greek Plan" — Prussia, France, and the Porte, 1780-87 — The Policy of Great Britain — The Triple Alliance : Prussia, England, and Holland, 1788 — Hertzberg's Plan — Revolution at Paris — The Congress at Reichenbach — Russia and the Triple Alliance, 1790-91 — The Treaties of Sistova and Jassy — Catherine and Europe in 1791 — The Condition of Poland, 1772-91 — The Constitution of May 3, 1791 — The War of 1792 — Prussia, Russia, and Poland, 1791-93 — The Second Partition of Poland — The Attitude of Austria — Thugut and Razumovski — Kosciuszko — The Third Partition of Poland — The Austro-Russian Agreement of 1795 — The Peace of Bâle — Russia and the Porte, 1792-96 — The War with Persia — French Diplomacy at Constantinople, 1787-97 — The Economic Aspect of the Eastern Question — French Trade in the Levant during the Eighteenth Century — The British Levant Trade — The Importance of the Mediterranean in World Politics — France and Rome.

THE continuity and importance of the Eastern Question are due in large part to geography ; its complexity is increased by differences of race and religion. It is above all in the East that commerce joins with race and religion to stir the greed of peoples and to guide the policy of states. There are, therefore, few problems in history which so present the cumulative force of great human motives as does the Eastern Question ; not many other political problems of the present depend so largely on the past. The Eastern Question is an epitome of history. It proceeds from conflicting interests representing the full variety of

human endeavor; it tells of movements epochal in the life of the world; and it includes affairs both small and great, which are themselves vital in the history of widely scattered peoples and states. The form which the larger problem of Asia takes in modern history both shows its origin and exemplifies its character; in its essence it is caused by the attempt of Europe to impress her thought and civilization on Asia. In the past the question might well have been called the problem of Europe, for the object of Eastern statesmen has been to make Europe a part of Asia; to this end labored Persian, Arab, Tatar, and Turk. Whether this attempt will be renewed in the future is "on the knees of the gods"; but even if the active power of Asia be spent, the record of history must be that the influence of Asia on Europe has been greater than that of Europe on Asia. The religion of Europe comes from the East, though Western standards of judgment, such as cosmopolitan feeling and the objectiveness of life, have greatly modified it. The spirit of Asia is one of religious faith; her standards of measurement are not of this world: that of Europe is material; her gauge is of "things done that took the eye and had the price." And many of even these material conquests, on which Europe so prides herself, are due to Asia in the first place. In secular affairs, also, the influence of Asia on Europe has been of more continued value than that of Europe on Asia; the building of Constantinople was in itself an acknowledgment of the power of the East; the capture of that city by the Ottoman Turks was only the final step in a long process which had been going on since the death of Alexander the Great; it sealed with victory the plan to make Asia Minor once more an Asiatic province. In itself it was not an abrupt change, for the Empire, of which Constantinople must always be the head, had been growing more and more oriental in character. The final invasion of Europe by the Turks may therefore be regarded merely as the active assumption by a Sulaiman, an Amurath, a Muhammad of the mission which

Darius and Xerxes had failed to carry out. Furthermore, the position of an Asiatic ruler in Europe is significant. He keeps his Eastern character. On the other hand, the attempts of Europeans to rule in Asia have been unsuccessful unless their system had more of the East than of the West in its structure and method. Thus Alexander's genius guided him to orientalize his rule in Persia and Central Asia in order to consolidate his power. And in British India, though this may seem to be an exception to the rule, only the special conditions of dominion in that region enable the British to govern as they do. The measure of their power is set by non-interference in things oriental, by the divisions of their Asiatic subjects, and by the strength of the British army. The Englishman in India has been forced to leave behind him much that is essentially European in government and institutions. Were it not for this fact and for more important racial differences, an interesting analogy might be drawn between the position of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and that of the British Empire in India.¹ The upshot of the whole matter is, that so far the Asiatic has shown greater static force than the European has dynamic force; his conservative power is stronger. He can believe, and he can wait.

On turning to history again it is easy to see that the Asiatic with such characteristics has had the opportunity to exercise a direct influence on European affairs for many centuries, and that in the Eastern Question Asia has had a political tool ready to its hand. In the zenith of its power the Ottoman Empire took tribute from Hapsburg Emperors and received French embassies asking for its alliance. It fought Persia in the East and Spain in the West; the Mediterranean was a Turkish sea, and the forces of Islam controlled the trade routes between three continents. During the period of Ottoman decline this influence on European history was increased, for

¹ *Odysseus: Turkey in Europe*, p. 91.

the political system of Europe, its diplomacy and its law of nations were in many ways guided by the necessities of the Eastern Question. Thus the policy which raised Prussia to the rank of a first-class power had as one of its main supports a defensive alliance with the Porte; in like manner France, who had called in the Sultan to re-adjust the balance of power in southern Europe and the Mediterranean and later urged him to intervene in Poland to restore that of the North, was impelled by situation and tradition to consider more carefully her policy in the East; in the case of Russia and Austria their relations to each other and to every state in Europe have been controlled in great part by the varying aspect of the Eastern Question; and finally, Great Britain renewed her acquaintance with that problem and found in the closing years of the eighteenth century that her interests in it were also those of her imperial future. It is obvious, therefore, that those who fix such and such a date in modern times for the beginning of the Eastern Question not only ignore one of the oldest and greatest factors in world history, but also forget important events in the history of western Europe. In beginning a review of that question at the year 1774 such an idea is particularly objectionable, for all that can be claimed for that date is that it marks an important development in the problem. The purpose of this chapter is to review the history of Asiatic influence on Europe by means of the Eastern Question during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The diplomacy of the period has been a subject of study for many historians, and in the present investigation both time and method forbid an exhaustive treatment of that aspect of the matter, though newly published despatches or neglected material may here and there be of service. Attention must also be paid to the economic side of the question and to the nature of the Mediterranean problem. It may then be possible to show the relation between the Eastern Question, the colonial problem, and the still larger matter of Asiatic dominion at a time

when each was taking the character it was destined to keep till the closing years of the nineteenth century.

The first partition of Poland (1772) and the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) between Russia and the Porte, were in themselves matters to give men pause; yet they were the logical result of a system with which Europe was already familiar, and dealt with affairs which had long troubled diplomacy. The jealousies of Western nations and in particular those between Russia, Austria, and Prussia required that no one of them should gain in power by expansion of territory unless there were a proportionate increase on the part of the remaining states. Thus, unable to expand singly, all must agree to do so together; and the elaborate system of indemnification, of alliance for partition, which marks eighteenth-century history was utilized by them in various attempts to solve the Eastern Question and its corollary, the Polish Question. It was the balance of power in motion.¹ The changes which these events of 1772 and 1774 effected in the state of Europe were slight compared with those to come, of which they were a sign; instead of establishing peace or maintaining the integrity of states, they showed the way to war and conquest. Frederick the Great had written of a "fire which lurked beneath the ashes"; but such treaties failed to quench it; it was soon to set Europe ablaze.²

Although the limits of this study hinder us from looking closely at the matter, a review of the various policies followed

¹ The "balance of power" is an equilibrium in which no one state or alliance of states secures a preponderant position to menace the proper and natural political policy of any other state or alliance of states. Political ambition required a complement to such a system; and there arose a system which we may call that of "concurrent partition," by which the territory of some politically isolated or weakened state was divided by mutual agreement among two or more other states in shares proportionate to their several interests and positions. Cf. Montesquieu: *Esprit des lois*, x. c. 2; xiii. c. 7. Favier: *Doutes et questions*, in Ségur: *Politique*, iii. p. 318. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution*, i. pp. 39 et seq.

² Frederic II.: *Œuvres*, iv. p. 98.

by the great powers will not lead too far afield and should give a starting-point from which to trace the future course of affairs.

The rise of Russia and her advent into the political arena where the Eastern Question was under discussion have been among the most important factors in the development of that question. At that same time, in the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire began to decline in power; neither movement has been continuous, for the policy of Russia has not presented the irresistible and evenly victorious aspect which some writers delight to give it, nor have the gradual losses of the Turks been so uniform and destructive as the casual observer might suppose. Indeed the vitality of an oriental state is beyond the mind of the average European diplomat, and the frequent renewals of strength that have evidenced the real might of the Turk have in every instance taken the West by surprise. The expansion of Russia has usually been along the line of least resistance; but on the whole it has been none the less natural and justifiable. In Europe the endeavor of Russia to realize the former ethnic boundary of the Slav race has led to conflict with the Germans and Magyars; and the attempt to prove a title to Constantinople and to unite under one political head the various branches of the Orthodox communion has placed Russia as the power whose interest in the Eastern Question is second to none. These two sides of her policy have had much influence in linking central Europe with the East; for Russia's efforts to satisfy her economic desires and to realize her religious and national ideals have greatly modified the policy of Austria, and since the Seven Years' War have also made the policy of Prussia a distinct factor. In late years two movements, the *panslavic*, and the *slavophile* movements, have had much to do with the interpretation of Russia's mission: *panslavism* aims to unite all Slav populations under one political head, and has had a varying but nevertheless important effect on the peoples of the German Empire, Austria-

Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. The nationalist or *slavophile* movement has as its basis a conception of the destiny of Russia and of the meaning of world history which is foreign to the mind of the rest of Europe. It supposes three elements in the history of the Eastern Question: Europe, Asia, and Russia. The greatest Slav state is thus placed in antagonism both to the dominant ideas of that world which was once ruled from Rome and Aachen, as well as to those of a world which held to Asiatic standards. That Russia will prove the amalgam between Europe and Asia, and by being the greatest power in both continents will guard her Slavic traditions, is the hope and belief of these nationalists. The Slav extends Hegelianism; he looks on the Latin and Teuton, in whom the *Weltgeist* of Hegel's philosophy is successively manifested, as dying peoples whose mission is nearly over. This *Weltgeist* is to pass to the Slav, whose rule is to be world-wide and whose interpretation of life is the final one; in this Slav world the community is to be sovereign and autocracy the highest political concept. Whether this process be one for all Slav peoples or whether Russia alone will enshrine this power is a separate question. During the eighteenth century history was in the making which later was to justify to the mind of the Russian of to-day such philosophies and political theories. By 1774 much had been accomplished.¹

The way had been prepared for Russian advance in the West by the state of affairs in Poland. That country, by its geographical situation and the character of its government,

¹ Klaczko: *Le congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslavite*, in *R. de D. M.*, Sept. 1, 1869. Leroy-Beaulieu: *Les réformes de la Turquie — La politique russe et le panslavisme*, in *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1876; and *L'Empire des Tsars*, i. pp. 208 et seq. Wallace: *Russia*, pp. 414, 580, 598 et seq. Holmstrom: "Ex Oriente Lux," in *No. Am. Rev.*, July, 1899, especially, pp. 9, 15, 26. Washburn: *The Coming of the Slav*, in *Contemporary Review*, lxxiii. (1898), pp. 1-13. Cf. Foulke: *Slav or Saxon*, N. Y. 1898. Pobyedonostseff: *Reflections of a Russian statesman*, London, 1898. Leger: *Russes et Slaves*, Paris, 1897. Honegger: *Russische Literatur und Kultur*, Leipzig, 1880.

lent itself to the designs of greedy neighbors ; the war of factions at home, together with complicated questions of religious tolerance, only emphasized the anarchy of mediæval feudalism and the inability of native rulers to solve the problems of modern life. Poland was ready for the butcher. Her unrest was the opportunity of rival powers, who determined that no reform should be allowed within her borders. As was said in 1767 : " Russia is too keen to help in the slightest degree the aggrandizement and augmentation of the sovereign power in Poland, — for the interests of Russia as well as those of all the neighboring states would not permit that that power should escape from her present state of feebleness and inertia." ¹ In the southeast the recurring outbursts of ancient Ottoman valor and the jealousies of powers such as Prussia and Austria, together with the prospect of decided opposition by France, the traditional ally of the Sultan, had combined to check Russian advance in the past. Under Catherine II., who in her earlier years had been inspired by Count Münnich with dreams of Eastern dominion, the march to Byzantium was renewed. The outbreak of war in 1768 complicated Polish affairs, ultimately offering a solution to some of their perplexities, for the prospect of Poland's downfall had had much to do with the Turkish declaration of war, and the cost of that war was finally sought in Poland that Turkey might preserve the Danubian principalities from the hands of Russia, or of a Poland dominated by Russia. Instead of Turkey saving Poland, Poland was used to save Turkey. Thus Austria, giving a querulous assent to a policy which was at best an expedient, was freed from the danger of Russian control on the lower Danube ; Prussia was able to strengthen and enlarge her eastern borders, and the Ottoman Empire preserved to a great extent her territorial integrity, though she let an insidious enemy gain treaty rights to interfere in her own internal affairs. Russia in four short

¹ Finckenstein and Hertzberg to Solms (Prussian Amb. at Petersburg), Berlin, Sept. 19, in *Sbornik*, xxxvii. p. 92.

hours won a battle by skilful diplomacy which has since profited her as no war she ever fought. In the hasty negotiations at Kutchuk-Kainardji Russia was recognized as the protector of the Danubian principalities and guarantor for Tatar independence. She gained a strong foothold on the Black Sea, but gave back her most important conquests. She had interfered in Poland to protect the Orthodox Poles from Roman Catholic persecution, and she became the protector of Greek Christians in the Ottoman Empire, thus using religious matters to further political purposes. The interpretation of vaguely worded articles gave her rights which she has since used with ever increasing latitude. But she freed no Christians from Muslim dominion, and within a few years added largely to her Muhammadan population by including the Tatars of the Crimea within her Empire. However uncertain may seem her claims as based on this treaty, their tendency was foreseen at the time, and though the territory of the Turks was preserved, the Austrian diplomat, Thugut, wrote that the Ottoman Empire bid fair to become a Russian province as the result of that document. There could no longer be any question as to the determination of Russia to realize her ideals of expansion in the Balkan peninsula. It remained for the other great powers either to sell their acquiescence in that movement or to concert measures in order to prevent it.¹

¹ Favier: *Conjectures raisonnées*, in Ségur: *Politique*, i. pp. 350 *et seq.*, 363-364. Rambaud: *History of Russia* (trans. by Lang, Am. ed.), ii. pp. 87-96. Brückner: *Katharina II.*, pp. 269 *et seq.* Castéra: *Histoire de Catherine II.*, ii. pp. 17, 171 (Cath. to Henry of Prussia): "J'épouvanterai la Turquie; je flatterai l'Angleterre; chargez-vous d'acheter l'Autriche, pour qu'elle endorme la France"; 174, 183 *et seq.*, 265. Boukharow: *La Russie et la Turquie*, pp. 14 *et seq.* Moltke: *Poland* (trans. fr. German), pp. 75 *et seq.* Holland: *A Lecture on the Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey*, London, 1877. Hammer: *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, viii. pp. 562 *et seq.* (documents). Martens: *Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie. Prusse*, vi. p. 65. Martens: *Étude historique sur la politique russe dans la Question d'Orient* (1877). Sorel: *The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century*, *passim*, and pp. 240 *et seq.* Zinkeisen: *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, v. pp. 918 *et seq.* Dohm: *Denkwürdigkeiten*, i. pp. 433 *et seq.* Corres-

The policy of Prussia at this period is too intricate an affair to follow with any detail, but the relation of that power to the Eastern Question is clearly to be seen a century before Bismarck deceived half Europe by declaring that, as far as Germany was concerned, the solution of that problem was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. At the time of the Seven Years' War a defensive alliance with the Ottoman Empire was one of Frederick the Great's foremost plans. His ambition for Prussia forced him to reckon with Russia, Austria, and France; but by means of the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question he was enabled to carry on his policy of aggrandizement. The increase of Russian power in central Europe placed him in a dilemma: should he oppose that state he would incur a costly war; should he submit to her pleasure he would have a still stronger neighbor to contend with in the future. The way out of his difficulty was to try to profit by her very advance. As he wrote himself, "it was not to the interest of Prussia to see the Ottoman power crushed, for if necessary it could be useful to make diversions in Hungary or in Russia, according to which of the two states might be at war." In Poland, therefore, the bargain must be made by which Prussia would gain most useful territory, Russia would be repaid for the costs of her Turkish war, and Austria appeased and relieved from the fear of seeing Russia on the Danube. To this end Frederick directed his diplomacy. Before the

pondence between Frederick the Great and Count von Solms, in *Sbornik*, xxxvii. pp. 235 *et seq.* (Solms to the King, Petersburg, June 16 (27), 1769). The plans of Orlov in Greece; 364 (Solms to the King, Jan. 28 (Feb. 8), 1771). He thinks Russia will insist only on the independence of the Tatars, the possession of Asov, and free navigation in the Black Sea; 365 (*Ibid.*); 380 *et seq.* (Prince Henry to Finckenstein, Petersburg, Jan. 23, 1771); 408, 409 (Solms to the King, March 4 (15), 1771). Suggests that Poland be indemnified by the restoration to her of Moldavia and Wallachia; 419, 448, 449, (*Ibid.*); 461, 462 (Panin's views on Turkey, April, 1771), 497. Cf. also de Smitt: *Frédéric II., Catherine et le partage de la Pologne*, Paris, 1861. Khrapovitski: *Journal of Catherine* (ed. Barsukov. In Russian). Vide Bilbassov: *Katharina II., Kaiserin von Russland im Urtheile der Welt-literatur*, trans. fr. Russian by Pezold.

Porte had determined on war with Russia he had done his best to allay the fears of the Turks regarding Russian aggression in Poland by explaining that the entire matter was only a quarrel between various Christian Churches — Greeks, Latins, and Lutherans — in which the Porte could have no interest. After the Porte had declared war and was threatened with serious loss of territory by Russia, his policy became involved still more closely with events in the East. Above all things he dreaded a general European war, in which by his treaty of alliance with Catherine he would be obliged to take the part of Russia; opposed to him he would undoubtedly find Austria, France, and Turkey. Thus the problem before him was to get the Polish territory he desired, to save the Ottoman Empire from dismemberment, to strengthen his position in Germany against his rival at Vienna, and at the same time to avoid a war. His solution of this problem proved acceptable not only to himself, but also to Austria and Russia. Poland alone suffered. The Porte refused to make peace at a time when she might have got help from Prussia and by that delay incurred the dangers which the treaty of Kainardji brought on her. But the partition of Poland, while it relieved Frederick, made the influence of the great Slav power still greater in central Europe, and brought heavy burdens on his successors. At Constantinople he had held in check the forces making for the partition of Turkey, and though his immediate interest in the Eastern Question lessened in the remaining years of his life, the usefulness of the Ottoman Empire to Prussia had been clearly shown. In the future Prussia and the Porte were to be parts in the same political system.¹

¹ Corr. of Frederick and von Solms, in *Shornik*, xxxvii. pp. 38, 59, 80, 81 (Finckenstein and Hertzberg to Solms, Berlin, July 18, 1767). The Porte "a conclu que ne s'agissant en Pologne que d'un différend de religion il n'était pas nécessaire que la Porte s'en mêlât et qu'il serait assez temps qu'elle y prît un parti, lorsque l'on verrait que son intérêt et sa gloire l'exigeaient"; 109 (Frederick to Solms, Potsdam, Nov. 6, 1767): "Il pourrait arriver, qu'à l'occasion d'une guerre intestine en Pologne, la Porte ottomane s'en mêlât, ou alors, la Russie aurait sur les bras la

In tracing the policy of Austria the Eastern Question becomes a matter of peculiar interest, for both history and political prophecy declare that the future of Austria is closely linked to that of the Ottoman Empire; and that the solution of the Turkish question will at once raise that of Austria-Hungary. The Russian program has operated to produce disorder in the Dual Monarchy, where racial and religious antagonisms incite the ambition of every neighbor. The varied interests of Austria in the eighteenth century had much to

guerre contre les Turcs, et moi une contre les Autrichiens et contre les Français"; 144, 145, 150, 164-172. 205 (the King to S., Potsdam, Feb. 1, 2769). The plan attributed to Count Lynar for the partition of Poland is here given. Cf. also 209-211 (S. to the King on the same subject), and 215-218; 278 (the King to Solms, April 22, 1770) on the matter of the Russian alliance; 301 *et seq.* (the Russian demands on Turkey in 1770); 317 (the hatred of Austria for Russia will profit Prussia); 323-334 (conversations of Prince Henry of Prussia and Count Panin in 1770 over the pacification of Poland); 353, 354 (Russia and the Porte in January, 1771); 394 *et seq.* (negotiations in February, 1771, over the partition); 432-434 (the King to Solms, Potsdam, March 24, 1771). Prussia's share in Poland; 478 (Finckenstein to the King, Berlin, May 14, 1771): "L'envie d'avoir un dédommagement pour les frais de la guerre et les difficultés que la cour de Vienne suscitera pour les prendre [by Russia] sur la Moldavie, la Valachie, et la Crimée fourniront l'occasion de lui faire sentir qu'un démembrement de la Pologne est le seul moyen de couper le nœud gordien et que V. M. est très-disposée à y donner les mains, pourvu qu'on lui fasse sa convenance"; 479, 498-502 (dangers of war and the Prussian system in Sept. 1771); 506, 512, 558-661 (Frederick urges action in Poland, Nov. 1771). Favier: *Conj. raisonnées*, in Ségur: *op. cit.* i. pp. 288, 307. Vergennes: *Mémoire*, in *Ibid.* iii. p. 123. De Rohan: *Mes découvertes*, in *Ibid.* iii. pp. 247, 248. Frédéric: *Œuvres*, iv. (*Mémoires* (1763-1775), pp. 34 *et passim*. The Prussian side of the negotiations is well treated in Reimann: *Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates*, i. pp. 305 *et seq.* Duncker: *Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen*, pp. 113 *et seq.* (*Die Besitzergreifung von Westpreussen*), and Ranke: *Die Deutschen Mächte und der Fürstenbund*, Leipzig, 1872. Consult also Zinkeisen: *Die orientalische Frage in vier Stadion*, in *Hist. Taschenbuch*, 1855; Nottebohm: *Die preussisch-türkische Defensivallianz*, 1763-1765; Wissowa: *Friedrich der Grosse und die Türkei*; Dopsch: *Zur Orientpolitik Friedrichs des Grossen vor Beginn und beim Ausbruch des siebenjährigen Krieges*; Kleinast: *König Friedrich II., von Preussen, und die Ungarn*, and the *Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen* when the volumes covering this period are published. Cf. especially Porsch: *Die Beziehung Friedrichs des Grossen zur Türkei bis zum Beginn und während des siebenjährigen Krieges*. Marburg, i. H. 1897.

do with the vacillation of her policy in the Eastern Question, and with her attitude toward Russia. In Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Balkans, Austrian interests were at stake. At home, two parties with different policies made the confusing situation still harder to obviate.¹ The conservative party of Maria Theresa dreaded fresh expansion, that of Joseph and Kaunitz played for high stakes in every quarter, though German affairs were more to its liking than other matters. The alliance of 1756 with France had been in part designed to keep Prussia in check and thus to enable Austria to retain her leadership within the Empire. Thus when the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg, who both had historic claims in Poland, began to show intention of interfering in that country, Austria, fearful lest she might not profit, ordered her troops to cross the Polish border and to seize territory to which the political imagination of the most patriotic Austrian could scarce find title. In regard to the Turkish war, Austria stood ready to take up arms for the Porte, signed an alliance with the Turks, received a subsidy from them, and then, satisfied that Russia would not gain final possession of the Danubian provinces, bargained for a large accession of territory from Poland, and with Russian acquiescence also took Bukovina from the Ottomans. Maria Theresa might deplore the circumstances in which Austria was placed and regret the shameless chaffering of the diplomats, but she was forced to agree to the plans of Kaunitz and Joseph. As Frederick the Great wrote,

¹ The geographical and political situation of the house of Austria required that the aggrandizement of any other power should be balanced by an equivalent or proportionate increase in her own strength and size. The partition of Poland might not be welcome to Austria, but that she should have a share in it was a *sine qua non*. As Metternich said in 1808 regarding the solution of the Eastern Question: "Nous devons beaucoup sacrifier pour la conservation de la Porte; mais notre existence réelle et notre considération politique, les principaux éléments de la vie d'un grand État, doivent mettre des bornes à nos vœux. Nous ne pouvons sauver la Turquie; il faut donc aider à la partage, et tâcher d'en avoir le plus grand lot possible." *Nachgelassene Papiere*, ii. p. 153. Cf. also Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, i. p. 444.

"Still she wept, but still she took." On the other hand, Austria, by her insistence on the continued life of the Ottoman Empire, retained her important position in the southeast and postponed the day when Russia might prove a far more dangerous neighbor than had the Porte in recent years. By a policy of delay and hesitation she carried her point and increased her territory. It remained to be seen if this disgraceful episode in her diplomatic history would aid or hinder her in the future.¹

Closely linked with the policy of Austria was that of France. The alliance of 1756 between the two powers had brought about a great change in the diplomatic system of France; prior to 1756 the Bourbons had sought in the Porte an ally whose armies would effect a diversion in the southeast of

¹ The documents are to be found in Beer: *Erste Theilung Polens*, Wien, 1873. Cf. especially pp. 11-32. Arneth: *Geschichte Maria Theresias I.* vii. and viii., Wien, 1877; and *Maria Theresia und Joseph II.*, Wien, 1867; in Arneth and Gefroy: *Correspondance entre Marie-Thérèse et le Comte de Mercy-Argenteau*, Paris, 1874; and in Hammer: *Gesch. des osman. Reiches*, viii. Cf. also Corr. of Frederick the Great, in *Sbornik*, xxxvii. pp. 233, 234, 242, 293 *et seq.*, 309, 358, 359, 371 *et seq.*, 469-472, 518, 564, 565, 575, 641. Favier: *op. cit.*, in Ségur: *op. cit.* i. pp. 20, 21, 38, 39. Austria would not let Russia take too much from the Turks, for, as Joseph II. said to Ségur: "If Austria has been endangered many times by the turbans, she would have been in a much more perilous situation if the Russian caps were at Constantinople," p. 253, note. Castéra: *Catherine II.* ii. pp. 216 *et seq.* Beer: *Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774*, pp. 23 *et seq.* Arneth: *Zwei Denkschriften Maria Theresias*, in *Archiv für Oesterr. Gesch.* vol. 47, Wien, 1871. Beer: *Denkschriften des Fürsten Wenzel Kaunitz-Rittberg*, in *Archiv für Oesterr. Gesch.* vol. 48, Wien, 1872. And *Aufzeichnungen des Grafen Williams Bentinck über Maria Theresia*, Wien, 1871. Arneth: *Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs über Oesterreich im 18. Jahrhundert*, in *Archiv für Oesterr. Gesch.* Part 2, vol. 22, Wien, 1863. Wolf und Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst: *Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia*, Berlin, 1884. General books on the first partition are: Poniatowski: *Mémoires et Correspondance avec Madame Geoffrin*; Viomesnil: *Lettres sur les affaires de Pologne*; Dumouriez: *Mémoires*; Angeburg: *Recueil des traités concernant la Pologne*; Karéef: *Les causes de la chute de la Pologne*, in *Rev. historique* (1891). Beer: *Friedrich II. und von Swieten*; Von der Bruggen: *Polens Auflösung*; Schlözer: *Friedrich der Grosse und Katharina die Zweite*; Janssen: *Zur Genesis der ersten Theilung Polens*; Gross-Hoffinger: *Die Theilung Polens*; Röppel: *Polen um die Mitte des XVIII. Jahrhunderts*; Rulhière: *Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne*, continued by Ferrand: *Les trois démembrements de la Pologne*. Vide the bibliography in this thesis for further details.

Europe, and who would thus distract the hostility of the house of Hapsburg from France. The court of Versailles had designed Turkey, Poland, Sweden, and Prussia to hold in check Russia and Austria, should France again engage in war with her old rival, England. To this end Vergennes, the French minister at Constantinople, had been instructed in 1755 to prevent the Turks from risking a war with Persia which would call off their attention from western affairs and to hold the threat of interference by Turkey over the heads of the two imperial courts in Europe, thus making it evident that France held the Ottoman armies in leash at the Danube and kept the peace in eastern Europe only so long as Russia and Austria refrained from menacing her or her allies. This was the old French plan for maintaining the *status quo* on the continent. The treaties of 1756, which reversed this policy and ranged Prussia with Great Britain against France and Austria, worked great loss to French influence in the Ottoman Empire, for the Porte could not see its old ally bound with Austria, a power whose plans for aggrandizement at Turkish expense had brought them to war many times in the past, without feeling that French advice must now be discounted and that the Ottoman power must henceforward turn elsewhere for a friend in Christendom. That he might pose as that friend became the wish of Frederick the Great, as has been already indicated. Thus France was compelled to reverse her policy at Constantinople; to urge that the Austrian alliance could in no sense be regarded as a menace to Turkey, that Prussia instead of a trusted ally was an insidious enemy, and that the Turks would do well to turn their military energies toward Persia, and above all leave Austria and Russia free to co-operate with France against Prussia and Great Britain. For these objects France was ready to exert her utmost powers by diplomacy and oriental bribery.¹ This policy was destined to last only as long as

¹ On the alliance of 1756, cf. Broglie : *Le secret du Roi*, Paris, 1879. Boutaric : *Corr. de Louis XV.*, Paris, 1886. Rousset : *Corr. de Noailles et de Louis XV.*, Paris

the artificial system of which it was a part. By the defection of Russia and her alliance of 1764 with Prussia, and by the treaty of peace with England in 1763, the entire system suffered a great blow. With the resurrection of the Polish question the inherent interests of France in the East again came to the front; and Vergennes, still the French representative at the Porte, was called on to propose to the Turks a third line

1865. Broglie: *L'alliance autrichienne*. Waddington: *Louis XV., et le renversement des alliances*. Masson: *Mémoires et lettres de Bernis*. Vandal: *Louis XV. et Élisabeth de Russie*. MSS. of M. Bourges quoted by Bonneville de Marsangy: *Ambassade de Vergennes à Constantinople*, i. p. 120: "Dans le système de politique et d'alliance qui constituait alors l'équilibre européen, la Turquie devait, avec la Pologne et la Suède, balancer au profit de la France l'alliance de l'Angleterre et de la Russie." *Ibid.* i. pp. 197 *et seq.* (instruction to Vergennes in 1755 in *Arch. des aff. étran., Turquie, vol. 129*). 204 (Rouillé to Vergennes, May 11, 1755); 215 (Vergennes to Rouillé, Aug. 17); 335 *et seq.* (Rouillé to Vergennes, June 1, 1756): "Le traité de Sa Majesté [Louis XV.] avec l'Impératrice [Maria Theresa] n'ayant, comme je vous l'ai mandé, d'autre objet que le maintien de la paix, ne change rien aux principes de Sa Majesté qui l'ont toujours eue pour objet. Nous n'avons jamais excité les Turcs à entreprendre la guerre contre aucune puissance chrétienne; vos instructions le portent précisément. Si nous leurs avons fait des représentations sur le procédé de la Russie, elles étaient autant fondées sur leur intérêt que sur celui de la Pologne, dont la liberté est aussi chère à Sa Majesté qu'elle doit être à la puissance ottomane. . . . Les clauses de l'alliance défensive entre Sa Majesté et l'Impératrice pourront déplaire au nouveau Grand Vizir [Mustafa Pasha], si par des raisons tirées de sa situation de celle de l'intérieur de l'Empire ottoman ou peut-être excité par le roi de Prusse, il déterminait le Grand Seigneur [Othman III.] à déclarer la guerre à la cour de Vienne. Vous pouvez, en ce cas, faire entendre que ces clauses, ordinaires dans tous les traités défensifs, ne doivent point alarmer les Turcs"; pp. 343, note, 350; ii. pp. 31, 42 (Bernis to Vergennes, Nov. 29, 1757. *Arch. aff. étran., Turquie, vol. 133*): "Vous deviez tâcher de les [Turks] engager à tourner leurs armes contre la Perse, les divisions dont ce royaume est agité et le nombre des prétendants au trône leur ouvrant un chemin facile à des conquêtes assurées." (This is the opposite of the instructions given in 1755, cf. i. p. 198); 74 (Choiseul to Vergennes, June 11, 1759. *Turquie, vol. 135*); 77 *et seq.* (*Mémoire* of Vergennes to the Porte, Aug. 15, 1759); 86. Cf. on French policy during the century, Bailleu: *Prenssen und Frankreich*, i. pp. ix, x. Favier: *Conjectures raisonnées*, in Ségur: *Politique*, i. pp. 338, 339, 344 (note by Ségur): "La destruction de l'Empire Ottoman est le coup le plus funeste qui puisse arriver à la France"; ii. pp. 2, 13. *Idem*: *Doutes et questions*, in *Ibid.* iii. pp. 334, 335. *Mémoire de M. de Vergennes sur la Porte ottomane*, in Ségur: *op. cit.* iii. pp. 115, 116, 119, 126, 142; Castéra: *Catherine II.* ii. p. 229.

of action. This was to regard any interference with Poland by Russia and Prussia as a cause for Turkish intervention to preserve the liberty and integrity of Poland. As has been shown, the endeavors of both Catherine and Frederick were to allay the alarms of the Porte regarding Poland, and to oppose the policy of France in these respects. When finally the Turks did declare war, the French tried to bring about an alliance between Austria and the Porte; but the attitude of Austria, shown in her seizure of Polish territory and her betrayal of the Turks, baffled French efforts to bring about a successful intervention to save Poland. The French themselves were lacking in power, and, though urging on the Turks to war, offered to bargain with Prussia over Polish affairs. Their much talked of interest in Poland was thus suffered to die away in a diplomacy whose rôle was entirely passive, while their ineffective protests had shown to Europe how divergent had become the policies of France and Austria, the allies of 1756.¹

¹ Saint-Priest: *Mémoires sur l'ambassade de France en Turquie*, pp. 150-177. Favier: *Doutes et questions*, in Ségur: *op. cit.* iii. pp. 338: "Le traité de Versailles ruine également à la Porte et dans toutes les cours voisines de la Porte le crédit de considération que la France y avoit relativement à la puissance fédérative;" *Mémoire de Vergennes* in Ségur: *op. cit.* i. pp. 140 *et seq.*, 154. *Mémoire du comte de Broglie* (March, 1775), in *Idem*, i. p. 195. Bonneville: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 226 *et seq.* (Praslin to Vergennes, Oct. 18, 1763. *Arch. aff. étran., Turquie, vol. 139*). France is opposed to a partition of Poland, wishes to secure the help of the Porte, and prefers the Elector of Saxony for King of Poland, but is not ready to support him by force, p. 241. The Porte answers that the entrance of the Russians into Poland does not affect it; pp. 277 *et seq.*, 304 (Choiseul to Vergennes, April 21, 1766), "Le moyen le plus certain de rompre ses projets [Russo-Prussian alliance as assisted by Great Britain and, in particular, Russia], et peut-être de culbuter de son trône usurpé l'impératrice Catherine, serait de lui susciter une guerre. Il n'y a que les Turcs à portée de nous rendre ce service. Je n'ignore pas l'état de faiblesse et décadence de l'Empire ottoman, la faiblesse encore plus grande, s'il est possible, de son administration; mais serait-il de toute impossibilité de proposer et de suivre des moyens qui portassent le Divan à une guerre dont, d'ailleurs, le succès définitif ne nous intéresse pas vivement, mais dont la déclaration et le sort nous mettront à portée de détruire les mauvaises intentions de Catherine?" 329 *et seq.*; 375 (Choiseul to Saint-Priest, Nov. 14, 1768, *Turquie, vol.*

The relation of Great Britain to these matters was decided in large measure by her antagonism to France; whatever the system of politics, there were few occasions in the latter half of the eighteenth century when these two powers were not ranged on opposite sides. Thus the Ottoman Empire was at first scarce regarded by Englishmen as an object of interest to them, either politically or commercially, save as it entered into the scheme of French diplomacy and trade. The partition of Turkey, it was felt, would deprive France of an ally, and, while there might be other reasons why it should not be hoped for or participated in, yet on the whole it was not an event which need call for vigorous action on the part of Great Britain to avert. Russia was a most profitable customer; the Baltic trade was almost entirely in British hands; and any measures which would strengthen the Northern powers against the Bourbons in the South were regarded as likely to be favorable to Great Britain. Furthermore, the sincere desire of the English people was for peace; the condition of their domains in America and Asia called for earnest attention; and the leaders at home were not the best fitted to solve hard diplomatic problems or deal successfully with great international crises. The Seven Years' War had added largely to British territory in other continents, but the effect of the war in England had not been wholly good. The tide of politics ran high, and disorder threatened in every quarter; the dissensions of a people working out the problems of free government were not calculated

145): "La guerre [between Turkey and Russia] est donc déclarée; c'était le premier objet de nos vœux," 385 *et seq.*, Corr. of Frederick and Solms, in *Sbornik*, xxxvii. pp. 127-128. French emissaries were working against Russia in the Crimea (1767); 184, the hostility of Russia and France, Nov. 1768, 224, 312, 334, 335. Rambaud: *Instructions, Russie*, i. pp. liv, lviii. Beer: *Erste Theilung Polens, Documente* (Mémoire of Choiseul to Mercy, 1769), pp. 5-7. Saint-Priest: *Partage de la Pologne, passim*. Sorel: *Instructions, Autriche*, pp. 439-446, 449, 485 (instructions to Breteuil, Dec. 28, 1774): "On ne peut se dissimuler que différents événements relatifs à la guerre des Turcs et au partage de la Pologne, n'aient un peu altéré l'esprit de l'union des deux cours" [France and Austria]; 493. Broglie: *King's Secret*, ii. pp. 249 *et seq.*

to make for a strong foreign policy ; and it is scarcely surprising that the statesmen of Europe believed Great Britain to be travelling toward internal anarchy and political oblivion. Indeed the policy of Great Britain in Polish and Turkish affairs was so weak and ineffectual that a keener political prescience and a more thorough understanding of the British character and constitution than those possessed by the continental leaders were needed in order to give a more hopeful estimate of England's future. The clue to this British indifference as to matters so vital to all Europe is to be found in the proposals in 1766 for an alliance of England, Russia, Prussia, and the Northern states against the parties to the Bourbon family compact in the South. That compact then in union with the Austrian Hapsburgs was declared by Sir Andrew Mitchell, the English ambassador at Berlin, to be "the most formidable combination ever formed, and the most dangerous to the liberties of Europe." In the negotiations for this alliance Turkey appears as the stumbling-block, England refusing to consider an attack by the Porte on Russia as a "*casus fœderis*," which would compel her to assist her Russian ally. Thus Great Britain showed her determination to avoid alliances which would entangle her in Eastern affairs ; and Englishmen in general were indifferent to Russian success against the Turks ; some even rejoiced, as Lord Chatham, who wrote to Shelburne in 1773 : "I am quite a Russ. I trust the Ottoman will pull down the house of Bourbon in his fall." On the other hand, while Catherine was cordial in her feelings toward the English, she was wiser than many, for she wrote to her ambassador in London (1769) that, though the English then thought but little, they were always traders, and the acquisition by Russia of territory on the Black Sea might arouse their jealousy. It was indeed a matter of trade which finally brought Great Britain to take action, and for a time threatened war between her and Prussia. This was the question of the trade of Dantzic ; while the English ministers confined them-

selves to polite expressions of disapproval toward the entire matter of Polish partition, — Lord Suffolk, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, terming it, with insular indifference, “a curious transaction,” — they endeavored to preserve the freedom of Polish trade, and in this secured a partial victory. The trade of England with Dantzic was to be on the same basis as in the past; this arrangement was concluded in 1774; and with regard to all else Suffolk contented himself by writing to Gunning at St. Petersburg: “The Business of the Partition is, I fear, too far advanced to be, in any great degree, revocable.” It was indeed by August, 1774, the date of this letter.¹

¹ Chatham: *Corr.* iii. pp. 30-32, 36 *et seq.* Mr. Stanley, English ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote in 1766 that “the court of Russia, situated at a great distance from the Southern powers, possessed of no colonies, and having little trade or navigation, consider themselves as more secure from dangers of every kind than any other state in Europe;” 83, note, 174, 175, 298, 299 (Chatham to Shelburne, Oct. 20, 1773). Martens: *Traité conclus par Russie, Angleterre*, ix. pp. 278. Rochefort, English Amb. at Petersburg, to Cathcart, Nov. 24, 1769 (rejoicing over Russian victories), 280 (Catherine to Chernichev, March 3, 1769). Boutaric: *Corr. de Louis XV.*, ii. pp. 16 *et seq.*, 176. Sorel: *Eastern Question*, pp. 78 *et seq.* Beer: *Documente*, p. 11. Michael: *Englands Stellung zur ersten Teilung Polens*, Leipzig, 1890, *passim*, and especially pp. 5, 85, 89-91. Macaulay, *Essay on Lord Chatham*, writing of Great Britain in 1768-82, says: “A nation convulsed by faction, a throne assailed by the fiercest invective, a House of Commons hated and despised by the nation, England set against Scotland, Britain set against America, a rival legislature sitting beyond the Atlantic, English blood shed by English bayonets, our armies capitulating, our conquests wrested from us, our enemies hastening to take vengeance for past humiliation, our flag scarcely able to maintain itself in our own seas, such was the spectacle which Pitt lived to see.” In *Sbornik*, xxvii. p. 44 (Catherine II. to Madame Bielke, July 30, 1775): “Je souhaite de tout mon cœur que mes amis, les Anglais, s’accommodent avec leurs colonies; mais tant des mes prophéties se sont accomplies, que je crains de voir l’Amérique se détacher de l’Europe de mon vivant;” also p. 147, (the same, April 25, 1778): “Pour vos amis, les Anglais, on peut leur dire ce que Molière fait tant répéter à George Dandin: ‘George Dandin, tu l’as bien voulu.’ Ces gens-là font toujours ce dont personne ne s’avise; il y a 15 ans qu’ils sont partis du pied gauche. Lorsque toute l’Europe était attentive à voir les mesures de vigueur qu’ils allaient prendre, que vont-ils faire? ils publient un jour de jeûne; le beau moyen de relever le courage d’une nation! À présent ils prônent partout leur faiblesse.” Cf. p. 153. Castéra: *Catherine II.* ii. p. 128; iii. p. 55. Arneth: *Joseph II. und Leopold von Toscana*, i. p. 152. (Leop. to Joseph, Jan. 23, 1783), on England’s “downfall.”

Such was the relation of each of the great powers to the Eastern Question in 1774. The situation of the Porte was lamentable indeed, for, as Favier wrote : " Russia crushes her, Prussia betrays her, and Austria, after having levied a contribution on her, seeks the division of her spoils." France had used her as a tool and given her poor advice, and Great Britain was at best indifferent to her fate. Yet the Ottoman Empire was destined to withstand Russia in five wars within a century, to see Austria and Prussia reach their nadir of political existence, to watch the fall of the Bourbons and of two Napoleons, and to number Great Britain among the main supports to her existence. The politics of the nineteenth century have been largely involved with the fate of the Porte, and those of the twentieth bid fair to resemble them. In 1774, however, France, the ancient ally of the Turks, could find no better way to extricate them from the difficulties in which the execution of the treaty of Kainardji had plunged them than to advise them to yield to the demands of Russia rather than risk annihilation by war. The condition of affairs in Germany offered no encouragement to the Turks, for the rivalry of Austria and Prussia had been renewed, and the question of the Bavarian succession was soon to bring these two powers to the verge of war. Frederick the Great had been developing his plans for the *Fürstenbund* ; and Austria had turned to Russia, hoping to displace Frederick in the political system of Catherine, and thus gain her support to check the growing strength of Prussia within the Empire. The price which Austria would be forced to pay for a Russian alliance had already been assessed by French diplomats, who judged that Austria would be called by Russia to join in a plan for the joint partition of the Ottoman dominions in Europe. The French were free in their declaration to their ally at Vienna that the interests of France were irreconcilable with those of Russia, and that Austria, in entering into an alliance with Russia, would place herself in opposition to all that France held to be essential in her policy toward the Eastern

Question. "We would regard," wrote the diplomats of Versailles, "the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, its invasion by Russia, or its partition between the two imperial courts, as one of the greatest political calamities." But, however serious such a catastrophe might appear to the French, it soon became evident that in spite of their brave words a policy of obstruction was all that they were willing to attempt; the resources of the kingdom were being drained by the war against Great Britain in behalf of the American Colonists; and the French ambassadors in the East were therefore forced to use their shrewdest diplomacy to persuade the Turks that discretion was the better part of valor. The Porte could scarcely be expected to welcome this advice, and the prestige of France continued to wane, especially so as it became evident that the question of a commerce with Russia by the Black Sea ports was working in the minds of some Frenchmen to lessen their enmity toward Russia. It is curious to note in this connection that, though the French had in mind to develop a Russian trade in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the English were thinking to introduce Russia to the Mediterranean as a political force and as their ally. This proposal was discussed between Sir James Harris, Lord Stormont, and Prince Potemkin early in 1781. The Russians were to end the war between France, England, and Spain on the basis of the treaty of Paris of 1762 and of *uti possidetis*, and to secure the evacuation of North America by the French. The American Colonies were not to be mentioned in the matter, and England was to be free to deal with them alone. As a return a treaty of perpetual defensive alliance was to be signed between Russia and Great Britain, and the island of Minorca was to be ceded to Russia. With a naval station at Port Mahon the Russians would be able to hold the French in check. This suggestion, for in the end this was all it amounted to, was first made by Potemkin, who, looking to the future, was urgent that Russia should again attempt the Eastern Question by sea in the south as well as

by land in the north.¹ This idea was only an index of Russia's intention to raise the Eastern Question in its most serious aspect. The plans which were forming in the minds of Catherine and her advisers were calculated to settle once and for all the most vital points in the entire matter; they included a wholesale partition of Ottoman dominions and the creation of a new political situation in southeastern Europe. These plans could not be carried out except with the assistance of an ally in central Europe. Ten years earlier Prussia would undoubtedly have been chosen by Russia, but now Austria was far more suitable for the purpose. Her geographical position and the character of the new Emperor, Joseph II., made her a more likely partner in schemes for expansion. As Rumiantzov wrote in 1783, Russia and Austria had a common enemy in Asia and no conflicting interests in Europe. Yet the desires of Catherine to carry out this program of aggrandizement were not at first welcome to Austria, who had hoped to keep an entirely passive attitude as regards the Eastern Question, and who preferred to have a weak eastern neighbor in the Turks rather than one so aggressive as the Russians were certain to prove. It was with this in mind that Louis Cobenzl, the Austrian ambassador at Petersburg, wrote an exhaustive paper on the policy of Austria. He urged that it was Austria's interest to support the Ottoman Empire up to a certain point. When, however, such a policy if persisted in would bring about a war in which Austria would be compelled to face Russia,

¹ Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 32-44. Castéra: *op. cit.* p. 52. Ségur: *Politique*, i. pp. 140-145 (the French embassy at Constantinople, 1756-73). Broglie: *Observations*, in Ségur, i. pp. 88, 89, and notes. Favier: *Conj. rais.*, in *Ibid.* ii. p. 23. Vergennes: *Mémoire*, in *Ibid.* iii. pp. 154, 198. Rambaud: *Instructions*, ii. pp. 338-39, 361-62, 375. Sorel: *Instructions*, pp. 503 (Instructions for Breteuil, March 2, 1777), 527. Dearborn: *Black Sea Commerce*, i. p. 107. Vide Antoine in the Bibliography. Malmesbury: *Diaries and Correspondence*, i. pp. 299, 315 *et seq.*, 323 *et seq.*, 346 *et seq.* (Harris to Stormont, Petersburg, Dec. 5, 1780); (Stormont to Harris, London, Jan. 20, 1781), 439. Saint-Priest: *La Guerre de Bavière et le Congrès de Teschen*, in *Études*, i. pp. 299 *et passim*.

Prussia, the Protestant princes of Germany and possibly England, Austria should reconcile herself to the doom of the Porte and take steps to profit by the partition of Turkish territory. To be sure, Austria would enter such a war allied with France, Turkey, Sweden and the Catholic princes of Germany, yet the risk of the undertaking would be too great. He then enters into an elaborate study of the possible lines of partition; but it is unnecessary to follow him further; the gist of the matter as regards the court of Vienna has been shown.¹

Despite these considerations Austria was nevertheless anxious to consolidate a Russian alliance. Prussia was hostile, France might fail her, but united with Russia she could be certain that she would receive her share should the Ottoman Empire at last be partitioned. The letters establishing this alliance were exchanged between Catherine and Joseph in May, 1781. Joint action with respect to the Porte was agreed on; and in September of the following year Catherine wrote to Joseph outlining a new settlement of affairs in south-eastern Europe. These plans included the creation of an independent state formed of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, as the Kingdom of Dacia, to be ruled by a Greek Orthodox prince; in the event of Russian successes in the Crimea another state was to be formed south of the Danube after the Turk had been expelled from Europe; this was to be a new Byzantine Empire under the Grand Duke Constantine. Russia for herself desired Oczakov and the Black Sea coast between the Bug and the Dniestr, with one or two islands in the Archipelago for naval and commercial purposes, while Austria was to increase her territory on the southeast. Joseph replied very cautiously, pointing out many difficulties and yet asking for himself a great increase in power. He wished to

¹ Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, xxvii. p. 92. (N. Rumiantzov to A. Romanovitch, Frankfort, March 10, (21) 1783.) Cobenzl's memoir is given in abstract in Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 39-43. For Russian progress in the East, 1777-83, cf. Herrmann: *Gesch. Russlands*, vi. pp. 32-80.

gain territory which would strengthen his frontiers in Galicia and Bukovina, and to take Wallachia as far as the Aluta, the cities of Nikopolis, Widdin, Orsova, Belgrade, together with a zone of three leagues breadth on the banks of the Danube; from Belgrade he proposed that a line should be drawn, which could include Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria, Dalmatia, and parts of Servia and Montenegro, to a point on the Adriatic below the Gulf of the Drina. Thus Austria was to regain the territory lost by the treaty of Belgrade in 1739 and restore the boundary set by that of Passarowitz in 1718. Furthermore, Joseph stipulated that Austrian trade via the Danube was to be free; and he proposed to indemnify Venice for Istria and Dalmatia by giving that state the Morea, Crete, and Cyprus. It would be hard to imagine more reckless juggling with geography than this, and yet there are few things in eighteenth-century history which better illustrate the political system of the period.¹

The difficulties of which Joseph had written were serious ones, for he feared the attack of France and Prussia. Unless an agreement were made with France he felt that the scheme could not be carried through, but if that power were given Egypt in the coming partition, and Prussia were held in check by a display of force, it would be unnecessary to pay the court of Berlin the high price he was certain it would demand for its acquiescence in the plan. In other matters he agreed with

¹ Tratchevski: *Das russisch-österreichische Bündniss vom Jahre 1781*, in *Ilist. Zeit.*, xxxiv. pp. 361-396. Martens: *Traité's, Autriche*, ii. pp. 96 *et seq.* Malmesbury: *Diaries*, i. pp. 236, 238, 483. Dohm: *Denkwürdigkeiten*, ii. pp. 4 *et seq.*, 16. Herrmann: *Gesch. Russ.* vi. p. 461. Ranke: *Die deutschen Mächte*, pp. 109 *et seq.* Arneth: *Joseph II. und Katharina*, pp. 67-92, 143 *et seq.*, 170 *et seq.* Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 47 *et seq.* Brückner: *Katharina II.*, pp. 331 *et seq.* Zinkeisen: *Gesch. osman. Reiches*, vi. pp. 268 *et seq.*, 350 *et seq.* Brunner: *Corr. intimes de Joseph II.*, pp. 24, 29. Castéra: *op. cit.* iii. pp. 90 *et seq.* Wolf: *Oesterreich und Preussen*, pp. 4 (Riedesel writes, March 17, 1780): "L'appetit des acquisitions dans cette cour [Vienna] est insatiable," 6, 9, 94. Rambaud: *Hist. of Russia*, p. 113. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution*, i. pp. 451, 519, 520. Hassall: *The Balance of Power, 1715-1789*, pp. 362, 363. These three last named writers all differ from each other and from the account given in the text above.

Russia, though he wrote to his brother Leopold in Tuscany that Catherine was so possessed with her "Greek plan" that she greatly underestimated the difficulties to be overcome. Joseph doubted both the weakness of the Turks and the strength of the Russians; and, though he was enthusiastic over the schemes for Austrian expansion and the acquisition of southern ports, he nevertheless incessantly harped on his fears of France and Prussia. In writing to Mercy-Argenteau, his ambassador at Paris, he elaborated these statements, especially with respect to the value of Egypt to France, both intrinsically and as a means of injuring British commerce. Indeed at one time he hoped that the continuance of the war in America between France and Great Britain might keep the Bourbons from interfering with his plans, and if it had not been for the British surrender at Yorktown it is possible that Joseph and Catherine might have been bolder in pressing their schemes for partition. Such were the preliminaries of this plan, which, if it had been carried out, would have greatly changed the history of the nineteenth century.¹

¹ Arneth: *Joseph II. und Leopold von Toscana*, i. pp. 140 *et seq.* (Joseph to Leopold, Nov. 24, and Dec. 16, 1782). Arneth and Flammermont: *Mercy-Argenteau, Joseph II., et Kaunitz*, i. pp. 139 *et seq.* (Joseph to Mercy, Dec. 7, 1782). He writes of his plans with Catherine II. and of the services of Saint-Priest, the French ambassador at Constantinople, in persuading the Turks to yield to Russian demands. He inquires whether France would remain neutral if he and Catherine should attempt to partition Turkey, or whether "la France fût capable d'entrer en pour-parlers avec les deux cours impériales et de leurs donner les assurances nécessaires de la neutralité et en même temps de se stipuler soit des avantages de commerce ou une partie des dépouilles de l'Empire Ottoman, dont l'Égypte, selon mes observations faites déjà depuis quelques années, surtout depuis l'envoi de M. de Tott dans cette province, a fait l'objet des speculations de la France; et effectivement si cette province riche, fertile et commerçante par elle même, devenait une colonie française, dans peu de temps la France, moyennant le port de Suez sur la mer Rouge et en ouvrant une communication bonne et assurée contre les brigands sur l'isthme; serait la maîtresse de tout le commerce du golfe Persique et des grandes Indes, qu'elle ferait par le chemin le plus court et le plus assuré savoir par la Méditerranée. Éclairiez-moi, mon cher Comte, sur ce que vous pensez à l'égard de tout ceci, et si la France préférerait dans les circonstances actuelles une guerre de terre avec moi et de rompre les

The two monarchs were not as yet agreed, Catherine soon showing her disapproval of Joseph's proposal to take Istria and Dalmatia. She wrote to him that the acquiescence of Venice was necessary to their other plans, and that the Greek Empire would be much injured by the loss of the Morea and the neighboring islands, which would have to be used to indemnify Venice. In fact the Empress was dissatisfied that Joseph should wish to modify her proposals. The exchange of letters on the subject continued, but other more pressing matters delayed a final agreement. These were the affairs of the Crimea, where the question of Tatar independence bid fair to bring about a war between Russia and Turkey. By the treaty of Kainardji these tribes had been freed from Turkish rule, though they were Muslim. Catherine now proposed to incorporate them in her Empire. The Porte protested, but both the French and British representatives urged submission, which was finally though unwillingly yielded. The services of France were guided by a fear of a final catastrophe for the Ottoman Empire should war actually break out; but those of England were given as from one friendly power to another. Mr. Fox offered English mediation to Russia, and even spoke of an English fleet acting with that of Russia in the Mediterranean, but this was only to be on condition of the renewal of an Anglo-Russian alliance. In the mind of Catherine the English were to be assigned the business of holding France in check should the war really break out and the plans for partition materialize. It is hard to say what France could better have done, but the results were certainly unfortunate, for the Turks were greatly irritated by the French advice to submit

liens qui nous unissent pour conserver l'Empire Ottoman et empêcher la possibilité de sa destruction. L'acquisition projetée de l'Egypte porterait le coup le plus sensible au commerce de l'Angleterre, objet qui merite à tous égards d'entrer dans la balance des avantages et convenances qui le Roi et son ministère pourraient se procurer à cette occasion." Arneth: *Joseph und Katharina*, pp. 170 *et seq.* (J. to K. Nov. 13, 1782). Wolf: *op. cit.* p. 95 (Kaunitz to Reviczky, Oct. 31, 1783). Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 65 *et seq.*

to Russian demands in the Crimea and Kuban, and Vergennes and Saint-Priest began to blame each other for having followed a policy which still further lowered French prestige at Constantinople. Indeed a curious pamphlet controversy regarding the condition of Turkey and the French policy became a matter of talk in Paris; and the lines were drawn between the admirers of Islam and the Turks and their detractors. The literature included books by Peyssonnel, de Tott, and Volney. It is only fair, however, to remember that though France and Great Britain had but just ended their war, the French diplomats stood ready during the year 1783 to form an Anglo-French alliance with Turkey to stop Russia and Austria in their plans for partitioning the Ottoman Empire; but England was unwilling. On the whole there was a national feeling of relief in France when it became apparent in October, 1783, that Catherine was satisfied with the Crimea, at least for the time being. This may be seen in the instructions given to de Noailles, the French ambassador at Vienna. These declared that the Franco-Austrian alliance was seriously threatened by that of Austrian and Russia. France intended to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by every means in her power, but preferred pacific to hostile measures; she would continue her alliance with the Emperor as long as it were possible without exposing the dignity and interest of the state. The object of French policy was, therefore, "to keep the peace between the Turks and Russians by inspiring the Turks with a spirit of conciliation and by insensibly preparing them for sacrifices." A more difficult program it is hard to conceive.¹

¹ Rambaud: *Instructions, Russie*, ii. pp. 361, 362, 375, 392, 393. Martens: *op. cit. Angleterre*, ix. pp. 325-327. (Cath. to Simoline, Jan. 23, 1784.) Russia must thank the English for their "concours amicale en empêchant les Turcs de se lancer dans une guerre." Malmesbury: *Diaries*, ii. pp. 22, 42, 47, 50. Sorel: *Instructions, Autriche*, pp. 526, 534. (Instructions to de Noailles, Oct. 4, 1783.) *Le Moniteur*, June 30, July 1, 1855. The despatches of Vergennes, Barthélemy, d'Adhémar, Montmorin, Choiseul, d'Esterno, and Breteuil from Jan. 6 to Oct. 30,

Other matters assisted this plan of postponing the final destiny of the Turks; Austria and Russia were unable as yet to take aggressive action. At the time when it still seemed likely that the Porte would show by war her resentment against Russia, Kaunitz had outlined Austria's situation, showing three possible solutions of her difficulty. Either "she could remain passive, or she could oppose Russian views, or finally she could make common cause" with the Empress. He advised for the last-named line of action, which was in reality that already pledged by Cobenzl at St. Petersburg. But Kaunitz and Joseph both insisted again that France must be propitiated and Prussia must be put "*extra statum nocendi*" as far as Austria was concerned, before any active steps could be taken by the two imperial courts to carry out their plans. The Prussian diplomats had indeed been alarmed at the prospect both of the annihilation of their former ally, Turkey, and of the increase in the power of their rival, Austria. The removal of Prince Nikita Panin from power at St. Petersburg had been connected with the formation of the Austro-Russian alliance, and a complete reversal in the situation of the past twenty years had thus taken place. Prussia had been occupied in strengthening her position in Germany, while her relations with France had somewhat improved. That she should be prepared to fight for this position was necessary, owing to the continual desire of 1783, regarding a Turko-Anglo-French coalition to stop Russia and Austria from partitioning Turkey. Vorontzov: *Arkhiw*, ix. p. 4 (S. to A. Vorontzov, Venice, March, 1784). Staël-Holstein: *Corr.* pp. 3, 4 (Jan. 5, 19; Oct. 11, 1784). Les-cure: *Corr. secrète*, i. pp. 578, 580, 581 *et seq.*, 459. (A rhyme which appeared in Paris, in Feb. 1782, is here given. In part it was as follows:—

"La France entreprend . . . tout,
L'Espagne ne fait rien du . . . tout,
L'Angleterre se bat contre . . . tout,
L'Empereur tire parti de . . . tout,
La Russie voudroit balancer . . . tout.")

Eton: *Survey of Turkey*, pp. 5-7. Ranke: *Die deutschen Mächte*, p. 106. *Sbornik*: xxvii. pp. 250-252 (Cath. to Potemkin, April 14, 1783). Commenting on Joseph's letter: "Quand le gâteau sera cuit, chacun prendra de l'appétit." Arneth: *Joseph und Katharina*, pp. 193 *et seq.* (J. to C., April 8, 1783).

Joseph to secure Bavaria in exchange for the Austrian Netherlands. This plan, about which Joseph consulted his ally on the Neva, further complicated the oriental projects. In fact the varied interests of Austria, as well as the radical internal reforms which Joseph was pressing throughout his dominions, were destined to weaken Austrian foreign policy in the Balkans. Matters thus hung fire, though a brisk interchange of letters between Vienna and Petersburg served to keep the diplomats of both states busy with suggestions and modifications of their respective plans.¹

The opposition which Prussia would have offered to Austrian expansion in the Balkans in the years 1780-86 was probably over-estimated by Kaunitz, for Frederick declared that he had no intention of acting as "the Don Quixote of the Turks." Furthermore the relations of France and Russia had in reality not been as cool as some would think; the League of Armed Neutrality of which Russia was the head, had shown the French that it might be possible to accommodate their desires to those of Russia and yet profit in economic directions. Frederick was absorbed in his *Fürstenbund*; France was temporizing; and Great Britain was friendly to the imperial courts in spite of Russia's attitude during the American war, for at

¹ Beer: *Joseph, Leopold und Kaunitz*, pp. xi, 147 (Joseph to Kaunitz. Persano, Jan. 16, 1784): "Les affaires turques paroissent encore très embrouillées, mais je suis parfaitement de votre avis que la Porte finira par céder. Il faut que vous, intruissés [*sic*] bien décidément Herbert [Austrian minister at the Porte] à exiger absolument l'égalité parfaite avec la Russie relativement au commerce et à la libre navigation sur le Danube et par les Dardanelles. . . ." Ranke: *op. cit.* p. 459 (Frederick to Duke Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Jan. 7, 1782). Lescure: *op. cit.* pp. 460, 461 (Feb. 5, 16, 1782). Martens: *op. cit. Autriche*, ii. pp. 134, 135 (Kaunitz to Cobenzl, 1785), 188 (*Ibid.* Nov. 28, 1788). As a "*Ceterum censeo*" he wrote: "tant que la puissance de la Prusse ne sera pas amoindrie, toutes les intentions, les plans et les entreprises des deux cours impériales seront toujours entravés et anéantis par elle." Häusser: *Deutsche Gesch.* i. p. 223 (based on Royal Prussian Archives). Dietz, the Prussian minister at the Porte in 1784, "hielt es für Preussens Pflicht das türkische Reich gegen seine Bedränger zu schützen, schon wegen des Zuwachses an Macht, der im Falle der Auflösung Russland und Oesterreich verstärkte."

bottom English statesmen were anxious lest the French might supplant them at St. Petersburg and either gain in the Levant trade or share in Turkish spoils. The Austrians, however, were not ready for war; they wished a more definite assurance as to their share in the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire; and the Russians had not completed their acquisition of the Crimea. Therefore this delay, and the passing of the critical moment for action; for if the two courts had attacked Turkey in the midst of the American war, it is doubtful if France or Great Britain would have effected much either for or against the scheme of partition, and Prussia would never have acted alone, especially when there was a possibility that Austria might become more of a Balkan and less of a German power, thus giving Berlin greater prestige in the Empire. On the other hand, the Turks might have made a strong fight, and unless defeat should have come to them earlier than now seems possible, they might have held their enemies at bay till time and changing politics should assist them. It had so happened in the past. In 1787, however, conditions had changed; Frederick the Great was dead; disturbances in the Netherlands were tending to bring Great Britain and Prussia together in order to preserve Holland from French influence; Catherine was making her oriental progress in the Crimea, thereby moving the Turks to hostilities; and Joseph was no longer hesitating with regard to expansion in the southeast. The war between the imperial allies and the Porte finally broke out in 1787. These events were destined to renew the friendly relations between Prussia and the Porte, and to draw England into Eastern matters almost against her will. The result of the Dutch troubles, which were treated in the previous chapter, was to lead the Prussian and British representatives at Constantinople to oppose French policy there, and covertly to urge the Turks on to war against the two imperial courts, hoping thus to distract the French from their interests in Holland. The British government declared with respect to the Turkish question that its wish was

to take no part in the matter, but that if France should decide to reverse her policy and should join with Russia and Austria, in the belief that the Ottoman Empire was now doomed, and should take steps to secure Egypt and some islands in the Levant as her share, Great Britain would then hold herself in readiness to take action. What that action might be, not even the ministers themselves as yet knew. In the meantime the French had continued their efforts to strengthen the Turkish army; and many officers and engineers had been sent by them to serve the Sultan. They had also negotiated a treaty, endeavoring to obtain for themselves special trading privileges in Egypt, and transit via the Red Sea to India. Indeed in the memoirs and correspondence of the period constant reference is made to the importance both of the Black Sea trade and of Egypt as a station on the road to India. There can be no question that France also was uncertain what line of action to take, and that she tried to play for Russian favor by her policy toward the Porte, while at the same time she intimated to the English that it might be wise for the two powers to forget their differences in the Netherlands, and to stand together to preserve the *status quo* in the East. The Russians, therefore, justly distrusted France, and though willing to temporize with her, dreaded any break with Great Britain, since Mr. Pitt had said plainly to Count Vorontzov, the Russian ambassador, that the English would never be offended at any conquests that Russia might make, but that they would never permit any aggrandizement on the part of France. Curiously enough, the British government seems for a time to have been so blinded by its dread of France that it stood ready to give Russia a free hand in the Levant, reserving India for England, thus dividing the oriental trade-world between the two powers. Prussia, however, was destined soon to point the way for England in another direction.¹

¹ Rambaud: *Instructions, Russie*, ii. pp. 376, 415, 430, 482. Barral-Montferrat: *Dix ans, etc.*, i. pp. 143 *et seq.*, 284, 300, 304, 319, 325, 346. Masson: *Dépt.*

With the accession of Frederick William II. to the throne of Prussia (1786) there was for a short time a lessening of hostility between Berlin and Vienna; but within the year the old rivalry became as bitter as before; and Prussia began to turn to the Porte as an ally against Austria and Russia, and to Great Britain as an ally against France. The intricacies of European politics and the ambition of Hertzberg, the Prussian minister, were soon to involve first Prussia, and later Great Britain in the tangle of oriental diplomacy. The gist of Hertzberg's plan was that Prussia should sign a treaty of defensive alliance with the Ottoman Empire and should then propose that, in order to escape annihilation at the hands of Russia and Austria, the Porte should ask Prussian mediation and should cede Moldavia and Wallachia to the Emperor Joseph, and Bessarabia and Oczakov to the Empress Catherine. Turkey should then be guaranteed its integrity south of the Danube. Austria, under threat of rebellion in Hungary and Belgium, should return part of Galicia to Poland; Poland in turn ceding some territory to Prussia which would further round out the eastern border. This was to be accomplished by a union of Prussia, Sweden, Holland,

des affaires étrangères, p. 49. De Testa: *Recueil*, ii. p. 76. Zinkeisen: *op. cit.* vi. pp. 552 *et seq.*, 582 *et seq.*, 616 *et seq.* Arneth: *op. cit.* pp. 274 *et seq.* Ranke: *Serbien*, p. 58, note 1. Brückner: *op. cit.* pp. 346 *et seq.* De Ligne: *Mémoires*, i. pp. 41-102. Ségur: *Mémoires ou souvenirs*, iii. pp. 9 *et seq.* Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution*, i. pp. 528, 532. Martens: *Traité, Angleterre*, ix. p. 341. Vorontzov: *Arkhiw*, ix. pp. 111, 136, 139, 168; xix. p. 353. Wolf: *Oesterreich und Preussen*, pp. 148 *et seq.*, 210 *et seq.* *Sbornik*: xxvii. pp. 377 *et seq.*, 393-395, 463, 472. Auckland: *Corr.* i. pp. 213, 217, 220-222, 231, 232, 235, 245-249, 262, 263, 273, 280, 281, 290-296, 299-302. Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Pt. 4, pp. 135, 136 (Morkov to A. Razumovski, July 28, 1787): "La France négocie, interpose ses bons offices, tâche d'effectuer un accommodement et de prévenir la rupture. Son crédit à la Porte est baissé; les insinuations prussiennes y prévalent. . . . [Speaking of the Dutch complications and French weakness] Pour nous je crois, que c'est ce qui nous conviendrait mieux pour l'arrangement définitif de toutes les affaires que nous avons du côté de l'Orient et de l'Asie. L'Angleterre paraît tout à fait s'être jetée dans les bras de la cour de Berlin." Brückner: *Die Reise Katharina's II. nach Südrussland im Jahre 1787*, in *Russ. Rev.* ii. pp. 1-33; 97-132. On Prussia and England in 1785, cf. Cornwallis: *Corr.* i. pp. 201 *et seq.*

Great Britain, and the Porte, who should threaten the imperial allies with a general war. Prussia was further to profit by a favorable commercial treaty with the Porte. This was not a new plan; Hertzberg had suggested at the time of the first partition of Poland that Austria should be given her share of the booty at the expense of the Turks. But on the whole the proposition was manifestly impracticable; Russia was bent on the complete overthrow of the Porte, and wished at the same time to keep the Danubian provinces free from Austrian control; Austria was unwilling to cede Galicia, and would have looked with great disfavor on an increase of Prussian territory; both Sweden and Great Britain were unprovided for; and above all, the Ottoman Empire would be unwilling to accept the Danube as a frontier unless forced by the necessities of defeat. Nevertheless the news of the plan alarmed Austria greatly since the Russian troops had proved themselves incapable, and the Austrian armies, being compelled to bear the brunt of the campaign, had been defeated by the Turks. The outlook, therefore, seemed dark to the Emperor, and he wrote in a despairing tone to his brother Leopold and to Kaunitz. The very success of the Turks, however, made them less tractable and more unwilling to agree to the Prussian proposals; in fact they outwitted Hertzberg by persuading his agent, Dietz, to negotiate a treaty of offensive alliance, — something to which the Prussian government was by no means willing to subscribe.¹

¹ Wolf: *op. cit.* pp. 111, 112, 131 *et seq.*, 162 *et seq.*, 223, 226, 232 *et seq.* Hertzberg: *Précis*, in *Zeits. für Geschichtswissenschaft*, i. pp. 21, 24: "Lorsque la guerre s'alluma en 1788 entre les deux cours impériales et les Turcs, et que ceux-ci furent menacés d'être expulsés de l'Europe, ce qui auroit pu procurer à la maison d'Autriche, l'ancienne rivale de celle de Brandebourg, un aggrandissement trop dangereux, je conseillois au roi, que la Prusse s'y oppose avec ses deux alliés [England and Holland] et tâche de maintenir l'équilibre dans l'orient et le nord, d'abord par une déclaration vigoureuse et en case de besoin par une intervention encore plus efficace," p. 26; and *Recueil des déductions*, i. p. v; iii. pp. xiv, 8, 20, 44, 58, 63. Vivenot: i. *Kaunitz und Leopold* (Kaunitz to Mercy, Wien, Jan. 6, 1790), p. 479: "Wir haben in zuverlässige Erfahrung gebracht, dass

In the meantime the Russians had been troubled by the prospect of war with Sweden as well as by the manœuvres of

der Berliner Hof seit dem Ausbruch des niederländischen Aufruhrs seinen bisherigen Plan ganz abgeändert hat und wirklich entschlossen ist, die kaiserlichen Höfe zukünftiges Frühjahr mit behilfe der Polen anzugreifen; dass derselbe in dieser Hinsicht der Pforte einen neuen Offensiv-Allianz-Tractat antragen lässt, welcher von allen vorigen absurden Bedingungen entledigt ist und keine andere Forderung enthält, als dass die Pforte den Krieg fortsetze und keinen Frieden ausser einverständlich mit Preussen und seinen Allirten schliesse; dass sich endlich der preussische Hof nicht nur des dies fälligen Beifalls der Seemächte versichert hält, sondern auch ihrer Seits Verheissungen erhalten haben will, dass sie ihm durch thätige Massregeln freien Rücken verschaffen werden." Duncker: *Friedrich Wilhelm II. und Graf Hertzberg*, in *Hist. Zeit.* xxxvii. (1877) pp. 1-43. Zinkeisen: *Gesch. des osman. Reiches*, vi. p. 674 (Hertzberg to Dietz, Nov. 20, 1787): "Si les Turcs se trouvent poussés et si l'on en vient à une négociation de paix, alors tâchez de les porter à demander la médiation du Roi conjointement avec celle de France, qui leur convient mieux que celle de l'Empereur," p. 676. (Hertzberg to Dietz, Jan. 26 and Feb. 9, 1788.) Hertzberg regarded his plan as "fondé sur la plus saine et la plus juste politique. . . ." "Mir scheint dass kein vernünftiger Mensch diesem Plane widerstehen könnte: Denn da er das einzige Mittel ist die Pforte zu retten, so denke ich dass jeder nur einigermassen aufgeklärte türkische Minister sich dafür entscheiden müsste." Cf. pp. 677 *et seq.* Häusser: *Deutsche Gesch.* i. p. 224 (Hertzberg to Dietz, Nov. 24, 1787). Since Dutch affairs had been satisfactorily settled, "so möchte ich wohl, was in meinen Kräften liegt, thun, um den gegenwärtigen Türkenkrieg zu einer Verherrlichung meines Ministeriums zu benutzen. . . . Frankreich wird für Sie wenig thun und kein anderer Hof wird sich ohne Hoffnung auf grosse Vortheile für Sie exponiren wollen: . . . Glauben Sie, man könnte die Pforte dazu bringen, dem Kaiser die Moldau und Wallachei und den Russen die Krim, Oczakow und Bessarabien abzutreten; jedoch unter der und andere Mächte, die ich beiziehen würde, dem osmanischen Reich seine dauernde Existenz jenseits der Donau in der Weise garantiren, dass die Donau und die Unna die ewige Grenze zwischen dem osmanischen Reiche und der Christenheit bilden würden? Ich sollte glauben es wäre zugleich dahin zu bringen, dass um diesen Preis Russland auf die Vassallenschaft Georgiens und alles dessen, was jenseits des Flusses Cuban liegt, verzichte, sich nicht mehr in die inneren Verhältnisse der Türkei einmische und seine Handels- und Schifffahrts-privilegien auf Grenzen zurückführe, die billig und mit der osmanischen Souveränität verträglich sind. Zugleich habe ich die Idee eines guten Aequivalents, welches von Seiten der beiden kaiserlichen Höfe Preussen erhalten würde; die Türkei würde dabei kein Opfer bringen, sie hätte Preussen nur einen recht günstigen Handelsvertrag zu bewilligen und die freie Schifffahrt im Mittelmeere vor den Barbareskenstaaten zu schützen." *Ibid.* i. p. 227, Dietz thought on March 8, 1788, that it was opportune "den vereinten Vergrößerungsentwürfen Oesterreichs und Russlands entgegenzutreten; Preussen meinte er

Hertzberg and by the prospect that Great Britain might become hostile. Catherine urged Count Simon Vorontzov, at London, to secure England's withdrawal from her Prussian alliance. This was in vain, for Pitt was more and more inclined to view eastern matters with a jealous eye. The treaty with Prussia had been signed on August 13, 1788, and Great Britain was now committed to a policy which must soon place her in opposition to the two imperial courts. These two powers had renewed their treaty of 1781, and thus, in 1789, in the very month when the *États Généraux* met at Paris, Russia and Austria signed an agreement to continue the war in the East and to press their schemes for Turkish partition. In fact the two allies could not but regard the internal condition of France

musse sich mit Schweden, Polen, und Grossbritannien zur Erhaltung der Türkei verbinden und die österreichische-russische Allianz mit ausserster Energie bekämpfen." Arneth: *Joseph II. und Leopold von Toscana*, ii. pp. 165, 178, 195. Beer: *Joseph, Leopold und Kaunitz*, pp. 305 *et seq.* (Joseph to Kaunitz, Aug. 26, 1788). Upon the receipt of "*interceptes*" revealing Hertzberg's plan and his instructions to Dietz the Emperor was much alarmed. He protested "que de resister à deux ennemis à la fois comme la Porte et le Roi de Prusse qui environnent toute la Monarchie est chose impossible, et d'autant plus impossible que la foiblesse et la nullité des moyens de la Russie sont evidens, et que de la France, ni d'aucune autre part je n'ai rien à attendre mais bien au contraire je suis sur de la plus mauvais volonté à mon égard. Couvrir et defendre seulement nos frontières contre les Turcs, qui s'étendent depuis la mer Adriatique jusqu'au Dniester, et defendre la Bohême, la Moravie et une partie de la Galicie contre le Roi de Prusse en même tems [*sic*] est de toute impossibilité. . . . Si avec cela, le Roi de Prusse et l'Angleterre viennent à s'en mêler comme il est clairement exprimé dans les interceptes . . . en nous obligeant à leur faire en même tems la Guerre alors . . . la Monarchie est perdue, parcequ'il faudroit diminuer le nombre de troupes qui se trouvent actuellement contre la Porte pour empêcher seulement le Roi de Prusse de ne pas occuper toute la Bohême et la Moravie et marcher sur Vienne." Herrmann: *Gesch. Russlands*, vi. pp. 199-209; Phillipson: *Gesch. des preuss. Staatswesens*, i. pp. 177, 291; Sybel: *Gesch. der Revolutionzeit*, i. pp. 157; Sorel: *op. cit.* i. p. 524; Arneth: *Joseph und Katharina*, pp. 298 *et seq.* (J. to C. Aug. 30, 1787); Martens: *Traité, Autriche*, ii. p. 186; Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 80-110. It is interesting to compare the oriental plans of the present expansion party in Berlin with those of Hertzberg. Cf. Vambéry: *Germany and Turkey*, in the *Independent*, Aug. 17, 1899; *Asia Minor*, in *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 189, especially p. 529; *Deutschlands Ansprüche an das türkische Erbe*, Munich, 1896. (Publ. by the *All-Deutschen Verband*.) Cf. also Moltke: *Gesam. Schriften*, ii. pp. 279 *et seq.*, 306, 307, 313; viii. pp. 239, 257-260.

as useful to them. France "could be looked on as non-existent" as far as Russia was concerned, wrote the Russian ambassador in Paris. Austria was likewise convinced that, instead of an ally whose wishes might hamper, she had in France an enfeebled enemy, whose protests might be disregarded and whose acquiescence was not worth buying.¹ Prussia also welcomed the fall of the Bourbons, since her plans for the East might now progress without fear of France; indeed it seemed possible at one time that the new French government, in its hostility to Marie Antoinette and the Austrian alliance, might join with Prussia to attack the Hapsburgs. Encouraged by these prospects, Hertzberg negotiated a treaty with Poland by which Austria was to be compelled to return part of Galicia to the Poles, who were in turn to cede Thorn and Dantzic to Prussia. But the death of the Emperor Joseph II. and the accession of his brother Leopold were the first steps to impede Hertzberg's plans; Leopold proposed to separate the allies of

¹ Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, ix. p. 163; xvi. pp. 255 *et seq.*, 262 *et seq.*; xxviii. pp. 79 *et seq.* Martens: *op. cit.* Angleterre, ix. pp. 338 *et seq.* Allemagne, iv. p. 137; Autriche, ii. pp. 189, 190. Ranke: *Die deutschen Mächte*, pp. 330 *et seq.*, 336, 536. Beer: *Leopold II., Franz II., und Katharina*, pp. 13, 44-45. Arneth: *Joseph und Katharina*, pp. 333-335. *Revue de la Révolution*, vii. *Documents inédits*, pp. 2, 3. Beer: *Joseph, Leopold, und Kaunitz*, p. 349. Sorel: *op. cit.* i. p. 454. Wertheimer: *Marie Antoinette*, in *Revue historique*, xxv. p. 331. Mercy-Argenteau wrote, Aug. 17, 1789: "[Cette monarchie (France)] craque de toutes parts; la nation manifeste une cruauté, une sauvagerie qu'on ne lui connaissait pas jusqu'ici. Les décrets de l'Assemblée témoignent un véritable affolement, d'une complète ignorance des choses du gouvernement; ils produisent un despotisme et des injustices qui, par suite de l'émigration, de l'entière disparition du commerce et des arts, doivent mener peu à peu la France au néant . . ." Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 111, 121, 135. Wassiltchikow: *op. cit.* ii. pt. i. pp. 104, 108-110, 120, 122 (Razumovski from Stockholm, Sept. 7 (18), 1788): "Il en résulterait l'affaiblissement de l'influence française, cette véritable vermine, si j'ose me servir de ce terme, puisqu'elle se glisse dans tous les rangs, et sans la destruction de laquelle nous ne verrons jamais ce royaume [Sweden] adopter une politique conforme aux liens qui devraient assurer la paix du Nord," p. 126, and Pt. 4, p. 150, note 3. Brückner: *Russia, England, and Prussia in 1789-91*, in *Ruski Vestnik*, Oct. and Nov. 1887. (In Russian) and *Schweden und Russland, 1788*, in *Hist. Zeit.*, xxii. pp. 356-386. *Sbornik*, xv. p. 152 (Cath. to Paul, Aug. 25, 1788).

Prussia, and so worked on the British government by threatening to cede Belgium to France, that Mr. Pitt decided Great Britain could not follow Hertzberg's lead much longer; in fact the treaties Prussia had signed with Poland and Turkey were seriously objected to in Great Britain. As long as Austria would consent to a congress where the *status quo ante* should be the basis for peace negotiations with the Porte, England was satisfied. To this Leopold agreed. Thus at the congress at Reichenbach in 1790 Hertzberg was checkmated as far as his plans for Prussian expansion were concerned, and Leopold, who had been preparing for a war with Prussia, was enabled to hold his own with dignity. The English people were relieved, and upon hearing of the final treaty of peace between Austria and the Porte, signed at Sistova the year following, they felt themselves well rid of an unwelcome burden.¹

¹ Artois to King of Prussia, Turin, Feb. 14, 1790, in *Hist. Zeit.* (1895) p. 261: "V. M. veut affaiblir la maison d'Autriche, c'est le vœu de mon cœur, . . . En secourant le Roi de France, V. M. étouffe dans l'instant jusqu'aux germes des horreurs qui ravagent un si beau royaume; et s'occupant avant tout d'un objet si pressant, elle s'acquiert des droits immortels à la reconnaissance et à l'alliance de mon frère; elle porte à la maison d'Autriche le coup le plus mortel." Staël-Holstein: *Corr.* p. 153, Jan. 7, 1790. It is hard to judge what French policy will be, "mais si l'on pouvait juger les événements futurs d'après la disposition des esprits du moment, il ne serait point douteux que la nation ne rompit l'alliance avec la maison d'Autriche. Rien n'est plus marqué que l'aversion des Français contre cette alliance. Les Turcs, les Prussiens, et les Suédois sont les peuples avec lesquels on voudrait être lié et pour lesquels on ne cesse de former des vœux." Neumann: *Recueil*, i. p. 454. Clapham: *War of 1792*, pp. 72, 73. Smyth: *Memoirs of Keith*, ii. pp. 267 *et seq.* Kalinka: *Der Polnische Reichstag*, i. pp. 624 *et seq.*; ii. chaps. 1, 2, 4. Stern: *Das Leben Mirabeaus*, ii. p. 256. Buckingham: *Courts and Cabinets*, ii. p. 96. Ranke: *Die Deutschen Mächte*, pp. 407, 418, note, 548 *et seq.* Beer: *Joseph II., Leopold II., und Kaunitz*, p. 345. Sybel: *op. cit.* i. pp. 161 *et seq.* Sorel: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 22, 25, 34, 67 *et seq.* Phillipson: *op. cit.* i. p. 177. Vivenot: *Gesch'tsquellen*, i. *Kaunitz und Leopold*, pp. 3, 477 *et seq.*, 484, 491. (Spielmann and Reuss to Kaunitz, Reichenbach, June 29, 1790): "Es ist unnöthig und würde eben so zeitversplitternd als beinahe unmöglich sein, die wahre Hölle marter zu beschreiben, welche une während der bisherigen Unterhandlung die Grobheit, der Stolz, die Aufgeblasenheit, die Zudringlichkeit und die unglaubliche Irrasonnabilität des Grafen Hertsberg ausstehen gemacht hat. Wolf: *op. cit.* pp. 182 *et seq.* Beer: *Orientalische*

There could now no longer be question of pressing the larger plans for a complete partition of the Ottoman territories in Europe; since the new Emperor Leopold by his acceptance of the Reichenbach decisions had returned to the passive attitude which Austria had so often taken. The truth is, Leopold realized more clearly than Joseph that a Russian Grand Duke ruling on the Bosphorus could never be handled as an Ottoman Sultan, and that however advantageous to Austria might be the gain of Bosnia and Servia, it could not be equal to that which would accrue to the Slav peoples by the extension of Russia's political influence to the Ægean and Mediterranean. In the words of Vergennes, "Une partition de l'Empire ottoman n'est pas difficile, mais je ne vois pas la compensation pour Constantinople." This feeling, with a fear of Prussia's interference in Poland and the prospect of trouble with France, were strong motives to check Austria; yet they did not prevent her from continuing to support her ally Russia in the fresh crisis which arose in 1790-91. This was caused by Russia's refusal to accept Anglo-Prussian mediation to end the Turkish war on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*. Russia had early made known her intention to hold part of her conquests and at least to retain Oczakov and the neighboring Black Sea coast as the fruits of her war with the Turks. The demands of the Triple Alliance (Prussia, England, and Holland), that she should surrender these and accept the same conditions as had Austria, were peculiarly galling to Catherine; and her preparations for war, as well as her firm reply to the allies, showed that the integrity of Turkey could be maintained only at the cost of a European war. For a time Mr. Pitt seemed ready to meet even this eventuality; nor was this a sudden decision on his part. The English suspicions of a Franco-Russian agreement had had a strong effect in bringing about the change in British policy; and since 1788 the government

Politik, pp. 135, 144. Cf. also, Creux: *Pitt et Frédéric-Guillaume II.*, Paris, 1886.

had interested itself in Sweden as well as Turkey. With a view to the Levant trade, Catherine's Mediterranean ventures of 1789 had been closely watched; and Mr. Pitt finally took the stand that on the grounds both of the alliance with Prussia and of Great Britain's political and commercial interests the expansion of Russia at the expense of the Porte must be checked. This position is of especial interest because later it became the traditional policy during the latter half of the nineteenth century. There were indeed a few writers who then prophesied Russia's advance to the great sphere she fills to-day. Her endeavors to cultivate the good wishes of the Italian states with the hope that she might increase her influence in the Mediterranean, and her wish to extend her frontier toward Constantinople were then said to be part of her general scheme to obtain an opening to southern waters and the Levant trade; in Sweden it was thought she was preparing another Poland; and upon the prospect of war with Great Britain, an overland invasion of India in order to strike at British power in the East was discussed. It was declared that the realization of Catherine's plans involved a Russian Empire stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific, and from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. But these shrewd prophecies were not valued in London and the Opposition in Parliament attacked Mr. Pitt's proposals to enforce the British demands on Russia. There was indeed a strong pro-Russian party, among whom were many city merchants engaged in the Baltic trade; the influence of these men and of leaders such as Fox and Burke, together with the lack of interest shown by the nation at large, revealed to the government that the country was not ready to fight for the Turks. The advice of Lord Auckland that Oczakov was not worth a war, had weight with Mr. Pitt, who, convinced that Parliament would not support him, decided to moderate his demands, and finally to let the matter take its own course. This step was not as unwelcome to Britain's ally, Prussia, as might be supposed, for she was not so desirous for a war

with Russia as she had been for one with Austria. There was far less to be gained. Nevertheless, she had stood ready to support Great Britain in the event of hostilities, for the protection of the Porte. After Great Britain had thus receded before the threat of war and the protests of Parliament, it is scarcely surprising that Prussia should turn again to Russia to secure territory in Poland which all her combinations with Great Britain had failed to give her. But before sixty years should pass, the British public would change its views, and the pro-Russian speeches of Fox and Burke be recalled with a derision greater even than the approval which they had originally excited. These speeches were extreme even for the occasion; and declarations from Mr. Burke that he then for the first time heard it maintained that the Turks had anything to do with the balance of power in Europe showed a disregard both for history and geography of which Mr. Pitt was quick to take advantage in the defence of his policy.¹

¹ Martens: *Traité, Autriche*, ii. p. 194. *Angleterre*, ix. pp. 345, 353. Auckland: *Corr.* i. p. 221; ii. pp. 381, 383. Browning: *Leeds*, pp. 150 *et seq.* Herrmann: *Gesch. Russlands*, vi. pp. 278-289, 552 *et seq.* Hansard: *Parl. Hist.* xxix. 39, 44, 52-76, 170, 767, 816-838, 919, 929, 932, 940, 996. Morris: *Diaries*, ii. p. 266, Feb. 3, 1797. Elliot told Morris that "in the Russian business [of 1790-91] if Pitt had not been frightened he would have gone through. He says that in the beginning, viz., inciting the Turk to war, Pitt was the tool of Hertzberg, and afterwards was prevailed on by Lord Auckland to commit the treachery of abandoning the Turk. This, I have formerly heard, was the prime cause of coldness on the part of Prussia, who has ever since thought herself justifiable in retaliating upon England." On the possibility of Russia's taking Corsica, cf. *Revue de la Révol.* vi.: *Documents inédits*, p. 185; and Malmesbury: *Diaries*, ii. p. 409. Eton: *Survey of Turkey*, pp. xi. 501. Masson: *Mémoires*, iii. pp. 20 *et seq.* Cf. on general Russian schemes, Boulger: *Central Asian Question*, p. 40; Schuyler: *Peter the Great*, ii. p. 512; and Berkholtz: *Das Testament Peters des Grossen*, in *Russische Revue*, x. (1877) pp. 1-33. Geffroy: *Gustave III.*, ii. pp. 65 *et seq.* Hertzberg: *Recueil*, iii. pp. 50 *et seq.* Russell: *Life of Fox*, ii. p. 208. Stanhope: *Pitt*, ii. pp. 115 *et seq.* Vorontsov: *Arkhir*, ix. p. 190 (S. to A. Vorontzov, March 29, 1791); xvi. pp. 255 *et seq.*, 262 *et seq.*, 285 (Russian attitude is here very clearly shown); xviii. p. 59 (Kotchubey to S. Vorontzov, Oct. 3, 1792. The legacy of hard feeling between Russia and England); xx. pp. 13 (Morkov to S. Vorontzov, Jan. 4, 1788. The relations of France, England, and Prussia to Russia), 15 (*Idem*, March 31): "La nouvelle que vous nous avez annoncée des mauvaises

The victories of the Russian armies over the Turks had strengthened Catherine in her determination to permit no interference with her plans by Great Britain. These successes had been desperately won, however, and the Ottoman Empire, which had begun the war in a much enfeebled condition, had made a stand surprising to Europe. The Porte was fighting for existence, and managed to emerge from the war with a comparatively slight loss of land. Austria secured old Orsova and the territory of the Unna (treaty of Sistova, 1791); and Russia by the treaty of Jassy (1792) retained only Oczakov and the Black Sea coast between the Bug and the Dniestr. Guarantees were also stipulated for the favorable treatment by the Turks of the Danubian Principalities. Turkish affairs, however, could not monopolize the attention of Russia. The anarchy in France, if it spread in Europe, was bound to help the Turks, Catherine had written in 1790; her fear of liberalism was undoubtedly genuine, but she also dreaded any interference in her own plans by complications in western Europe. Her views of the French Revolution were singularly acute, yet she was destined by her policy in the East to assist that cause

dispositions des Anglais à notre égard, a causé ici l'impression la plus vive. On les regarde comme une boutade qu'à peine le caractère connu de cette nation peut excuser." 19 (*Idem*, June 6, 1791, the Russian answer to Pitt); xxviii. pp. 79 *et seq.* (Cath. to S. Vorontzov, Dec. 9, 1788); xxxiv. pp. 466 *et seq.* (The work of S. Vorontzov in 1791 to prevent English interference in behalf of the Turks.) Lecky: *op. cit.* v. pp. 273 *et seq.* It is asserted in Kalinka: *Austria's policy in the Affairs of the Polish Constitution of May 3* (Polish), p. 15, that Catherine's agents offered to pay Fox's debts in London. Kalinka: *Der Polnische Reichstag*, ii. pp. 688 *et seq.* Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, p. 146, 147. Leopold held strongly that the Russian alliance was a necessity to Austria, but the internal condition of Austria would not have let him continue in an aggressive eastern policy had he so wished. *Sbornik*: xxiii. pp. 431, 434, 437, 485, 487; xlii. p. 162. Brückner: *Katharina II.*, pp. 388 *et seq.* Castéra: *op. cit.* iii. pp. 345 *et seq.* Wassiltchikow: *op. cit.* ii. Pt. 1, pp. 58, 59, 104, 125, 137; Pt. 4, pp. 146 (Morkov to A. Razumovski, April 4, 1788). Brückner: *Russlands Politik im Mitteleuropa 1788 und 1789*, in *Hist. Zeit.* xxvii. (1872) pp. 85-115. Cornwallis: *Corr.* i. pp. 360, 361 (Grant to Cornwallis, April 6, 1788), England still hostile to Russia because of Armed Neutrality. Creux: *Pitt et Frédéric-Guillaume II.*, pp. 102 *et seq.*

in the West, which she so thoroughly detested. She wrote in November, 1790, that France had twelve hundred legislators whom no one obeyed save the King, and added later that the revolutionists who aimed to bring back the Gaul of Cæsar would in turn be laid low by Cæsar. "Cæsar will surely appear," she declared; and "if the French Revolution takes in Europe, another Jengis or Tamerlane will come to bring it to its senses; such will be the fate" of Europe. Only "a hundred thousand men and martial law" to re-establish the "power of the King" would save France "from utter ruin," she wrote in 1792. To her mind these men should be supplied by Prussia and Austria; she wrote later in 1791: "Je me casse la tête, um den Berliner und Wiener Hof in die französischen Angelegenheiten hineinzubringen;" and on March 7, 1792, to Osterman, "I wish to have them busy in order to have a free hand myself." This freedom she intended to use in Poland. She wrote to Grimm that she would fight the Jacobins of Paris in Warsaw, and protested her devotion to the cause of the allies. Yet, as Morkov wrote (May 14, 1792) to Simon Vorontzov, "the interest which we have declared in French matters will no longer seem exaggerated to you, when you know that we have thought it necessary to turn all the attention of the neighboring powers to France to leave us elbow room in Poland." As Catherine wrote to Rumiantzov, "My post is taken and my rôle assigned. I charge myself to watch over the Turks, the Poles, and the Swedes." In addition to the desire she had to see Prussia and Austria occupied in the West, Catherine was ready to see France humiliated, but not dismembered. She still hoped to fill the rôle of mediator and to end her reign by settling the affairs of Europe.¹

¹ Rambaud: *Hist. of Russia*, ii. pp. 116, 117. *Annual Register*, 1786, pp. 151 *et seq.* *Sbornik*, xxiii. pp. 503 (Cath. to Grimm, Jan. 13, 1791), 520 (April 30), 555 (Sept. 1), 567 (May 9, 1792): "Apparemment vous ignorez que la jacobinière de Varsovie est en correspondance régulière avec celle de Paris . . . Enfin, ces Jacobins de Pologne cherchent à répandre partout la confusion des langues, car tous ces arrangements polonais vont avec leur lois sur toute matière comme une selle

The situation in Poland during the years between 1788 and 1791 was in many ways a peculiar one. Earnest efforts to

à une vache, selon le proverbe russe. Et vous voulez que je plante là mes intérêts et ceux de mon allié la république et mes amis républicains, pour ne m'occuper que de la jacobinière de Paris? Non, souffre-douleur, je la battrai et combattrai en Pologne, mais pour cela je ne ni en occuperai pas moins des affaires de France, et j'aiderai à battre le ramas des sans-culotte. . . ." xlii. pp. 117 (Cath. to A. Mordvinov, Oct. 4, 1790), 126 (to Prince de Ligne, Nov. 16); 197 (to Schönberg); 229 (to de Meilhan, July 8, 1792). Forneron: *Les Émigrés*, i. p. 292. Khrapovitzkij: *Diary*, Dec. 14, 1791: March 7, 1792. Quoted in Brückner: *op. cit.* p. 413. Larivière: *Catherine II. et la Révolution*, p. 106. Beer: *Joseph II., Leopold II., und Katharina*, pp. 172-175. Sybel: *Franz. Revol.* i. p. 478. Vivenot: *Quellen*, ii. *Cobenzl und Franz*, p. 105; (Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, June 21, 1792): "Alle Umstände geben klar zu erkennen dass der russische Hof unserem und dem Berliner Hof so vielen Eifer in den französischen Angelegenheiten nur darum bezeugt hat um beide darinnen ernstlich zu verwickeln und sich in Polen freie Hände zu beschaffen. Ebenso klar est es, dass derselbe mit der angetragenen eingeschränkten Herstellung Frankreichs nicht zufrieden ist, sondern eine so vollkommene wünschte, dass der französische Hof mit der Zeit wieder zu einem bedeutenden Einfluss in dem europäischen Systeme gelange." Pallain: *Talleyrand à Londres*, p. xiv, de Noailles, French ambassador at Vienna reported on Feb. 13, 1792: "L'Impératrice de Russie cherche toujours à échauffer la Roi de Prusse pour les émigrés, mais je crois fermement que le zèle de cette princesse pour leur cause n'est qu'un voile pour couvrir et pour servir de plus grandes vues. Elle brûle d'engager l'Empereur et le Roi de Prusse dans une guerre contre nous, parce qu'alors elle serait maîtresse d'agir en Pologne comme elle le voudrait et d'y reprendre son ancienne influence. Elle craint, si la Pologne devenait puissante, de redevenir elle-même une puissance asiatique. En effet, n'ayant plus de chemins ouverts pour le passage de ses troupes, elle perdrait alors son influence en Empire; . . ." Rambaud: *Instructions, Russie*, ii. pp. 533 *et seq.* Genet to Dumouriez, St. Petersburg, July 1, 1792, tells of Catherine's plans on Poland; her intention to check partition of France, to prevent Prussia or Austria from getting too much. She is indifferent to France. "Ne croyez pas malgré cela, que la cour nous veuille du bien. Ne croyez pas non plus qu'elle souhaite tout le succès possible au projet des princes. [Comtes de Provence et d'Artois]; vous seriez dans l'erreur. Elle ne veut point que la France soit démembré; mais, comme elle se rappelle que la France a été longtemps sa rivale, elle n'a nulle envie de la voir se relever par sa Constitution ou par la despotisme. Ce qui excite son ambition, ce qui flatte son amour-propre, c'est de se venger du roi de Prusse en le librant de toute manière au mépris public; c'est de s'opposer à l'aggrandissement de l'Autriche et de finir glorieusement son règne en pacifiant l'Europe." Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, xx. p. 27 (Morkov to S. Vorontzov, May 14, 1792). Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Pt. 1, pp. 134, 137; Pt. 2, pp. 153 (Morkov to Razumowski, Russian representative at Vienna, Aug. 15, 1791), 158

promote a Polish renaissance after 1772 had been in part successful; and the Diet which met in 1788 continued its labors till it produced the Constitution of May 3, 1791. This was designed to strengthen the power of the Crown, to make it hereditary, and to do away with the *liberum veto*, the "legal anarchy" which had made Poland a prey to her neighbors. The Diet became a Confederation; the army was raised to 60,000; and the house of Saxony was declared the heirs of Poniatovski. Russia was at war with Sweden and Turkey, and at odds with England and Prussia; Prussia and Austria were alarmed by the crisis in France: might not the Poles be permitted to accomplish a revolution in favor of royalty in the East while the French in the West wrought one in favor of democracy? Anything which would tend to strengthen the central power, to make either nation once more a force in Europe, was distasteful to Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Catherine, who had guaranteed the old and inadequate Constitution in Poland was much opposed to the new one, which had been drafted without her permission, and which threatened to make Poland a nation, thus closing to Russia her road to central Europe. As soon as the Turkish war was ended Catherine welcomed the Polish party who were also against the new order of things, and at their request ordered her troops to invade Polish territory to assist these reactionaries, who wished for a feeble republic rather than a strong hereditary monarchy, and who had organized themselves into a Confederation at

(*Ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1792): "L'objet de l'expédition présente porte sur les affaires de Pologne; celles-ci sont d'un intérêt bien supérieur pour nous aux affaires françaises;" 166 (Dec. 8). Herrmann: *Gesch. Russ. Ergänzungs-Band*, pp. 15, 21, 26, 32, 225 *et seq.* Vivenot: *Kaunitz und Leopold*, p. 358 (Kaunitz to Reuss, Aug. 25, 1792); Polish affairs. The plans of Russia: "... macht es nicht die Vermuthung wahrscheinlich, dass derselbe [Russia] nur wartete, bis sein Friede mit der Pforte geschlossen sei?—bis Oesterreich und Preussen mit den französischen Händeln beschäftigt wären, um alles in Polen Geschehen auf die eine die andere Art wieder über den Haufen zu werfen?" Beer: *Leopold, Franz, und Katharina*, p. 146. (Leopold to Katharina, June 18, 1791; promising to abide by his alliance with her.) Eton: *Survey of Turkey*, p. 193.

Targowicza. At the same time negotiations at Berlin and Vienna dealt with Polish matters to a degree which was soon to show that of the three questions before Europe at this time — the French, the Polish, and the Turkish — that of Poland was at least for the moment the most interesting to the three continental powers in the north and east ; each, however, requires attention. Under the Emperor Leopold, Austria had at first showed herself unwilling to interfere in France ; he had said in 1790 that no sovereign had a right to ask another nation to give account of her own constitution : were it a good one, so much the better for her ; were it a poor one, her neighbors would profit by it. In fact a study of the historical relations of France and Austria showed clearly to the mind of Kaunitz that nothing could be better for Austria than internal complications and disorders in France. The spread of revolutionary opinion throughout Europe was, of course, to be checked, and the fear of such principles, as well as the danger to the royal house in France, did much to bring about a change in policy at Vienna. It was thought that unless Prussia and Austria should combine against France, it might be possible for France and Prussia to combine with the Porte against Austria. Furthermore the interests of Leopold as Emperor were concerned in the attitude of France toward the States of Germany, and, as a Hapsburg ruler, in the influence of France in Belgium. The old struggle for the Rhine border and the Low Countries was to be renewed. With this in view a defensive and offensive alliance was negotiated between Austria and Prussia. The strength of action of these powers against France was counterbalanced to a certain degree by the neutrality of Great Britain ; it was rightly supposed, however, that she could not but watch with relief the collapse of Bourbon power. At the same time it was just as well from Austria's point of view, bound as she was by a treaty with Russia, that Prussia and Great Britain should be separated, and that any possibility of such a situation as had confronted the two imperial courts in

1790 should be obviated. Another restraining thought was that if France should be utterly crushed there would remain no maritime power to hold Great Britain in check. Now in addition to these perplexities came the crisis in Polish affairs.¹

The death of the Emperor Leopold on March 1, 1792, and the declaration of war by France against Austria on April 20 cleared away the last obstacles to an aggressive Russian policy in Poland. On May 18, Catherine published her protest against the new Polish Constitution, and soon after Suvorov invaded Polish territory with a force of 100,000 men. While the Poles were being defeated by the Russians, negotiations were going on at Vienna for the renewal of the old alliance between the two imperial courts. The new Emperor Francis II., a pupil of his uncle, Joseph, agreed to this arrangement by a treaty of defensive alliance on July 3. On July 27, a similar one was signed at Berlin between Russia and Prussia. Austria was bent on profiting by the war with France and particularly on the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine, and the exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria; and Philip Cobenzl even told Razumovski, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, that, in order to secure Bavaria, Austria would consent

¹ Kalinka: *Der Polnische Reichstag*, ii. books 5 and 6. Rambaud: *Hist. of Russia*, ii. pp. 117 *et seq.* *Shornik*: xiii. pp. 280, 285, 288, 290; xiv. pp. 256, 263, 267; xxiii. pp. 72, 519, 534; xxvii. p. 353; xlii. pp. 126, and especially 157 (Catherine's attack on the Constitution of May 3). Brückner: *Katharina*, pp. 408 *et seq.* Wassiltchikow, *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Pt. 1, pp. 137, 138. Augeard: *Mémoires*, p. 240. Interview with Leopold at Frankfort in 1790. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution*, i. p. 258. Sybel: *Französische Revolution*, i. p. 281. Beer: *Joseph II., Leopold II., und Kaunitz*, pp. 410, 420 (Kaunitz called the Austro-Prussian treaty the second volume of the treaty of Versailles (1756)). Vivenot: *op. cit.* i. pp. 7, 187-192 (Kaunitz to L. Cobenzl, July 8, 1791); 203 (July 23); 271 *et seq.* (Nov. 12). Zinkeisen: *op. cit.* vi. p. 814. Lenz: *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Oct.-Nov. 1894, and p. 294. Arneth: *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., und Leopold II.*, pp. 130 (Marie Antoinette to Mercy, June 12, 1790); 148-150 (Mercy to the Queen, March 7, 1791), 152-156, 163 (*Ibid.*, March 29, April 5, April 21, May 11, 1791; and the Queen to Mercy, April 20), 181 (Leopold to the Queen, July 2). The Emperor here promises troops and money; 186 (Mercy to the Queen, July 28). Herrmann: *op. cit.* vi. p. 390.

to a partition of Poland which would give Prussia what she wanted there. However, until the war with France had fairly begun, Austria had trusted her new ally, Prussia, and had even suggested to her that each power should have a force on the Polish frontier to check Russian aggression there. But soon the jealousy between Berlin and Vienna broke out again; the allies were unsuccessful, and Austria began to vacillate as of old. Cobenzl saw that Russia was trying to use the mutual rivalry of the two powers to her own advantage. From the Russian side the situation was also critical. The old and feeble Polish Constitution had been restored, but the results were still uncertain. Morkov, writing to Vorontzov in London on Nov. 8, described the situation well: "We had scarcely entered on these questions, when our old ally [Austria] and our new ally [Prussia], incited by us to embark in this fine French business, came to us, the one with her old scheme of the Bavarian exchange, and the other with a new plan for the partition of this republic [Poland] which we have pretended to restore. All these proposals were made to us when it was possible to promise ourselves all sorts of victories over France. The reverses which have taken place have neither chilled the ardor of Prussia, nor lessened her appetite; on the contrary, they have increased it. On our side, we are divided between the desire for the finest acquisition that the Empire has ever made or ever can make, the inconvenience of the expansion of a dangerous neighbor [Prussia] already too formidable, the fear of (public) opinion, and conscientious scruples. Opinion is divided and nothing is as yet decided." In the mean time Austria was doing all in her power to discover what secret negotiations were going on between Berlin and St. Petersburg. In November, Spielmann had written to Philip Cobenzl that every one expected Prussia would soon leave Austria in the lurch. In reality the matter of the Polish partition was decided. In October, Goltz, the Prussian ambassador at St. Petersburg, had written most encouragingly to

his King, and finally on January 12 (23), 1793, the treaty was signed. Russia gained Volhynia, Podolia, and a part of Lithuania; Prussia gained Dantzic, Thorn, the territory of Posen, and a narrow strip of land near the Silesian frontier. Austria gained nothing; as Morkov said, she was "mired in her affairs with France." When Cobenzl was informed by Razumovski of the actual facts he seized a map and on understanding the acquisitions made by Prussia and Russia, "he could do nothing in his distress and surprise but stammer out incoherent phrases. 'The entire political system of Europe is overthrown,' he said. 'The French revolution is nothing but child's play compared with the enormous importance of this partition.'" ¹

¹ Arnetz: *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., und Leopold II.*, pp. 224 (Mercy to the Queen, Nov. 21, 1791); 249-52 (*Ibid.* Feb. 14, 1792); 262 (April 16), 264 (the Queen to Mercy, April 30). Neumann: *Recueil*, i. p. 470. Ranke: *Ursprung, etc.* pp. 165 *et seq.*, 276 *et seq.* Herrmann: *Forschungen*, iv. p. 429. Schlitter: *Briefe Marie Christinas an Leopold*, in *Arch. für Oester. Gesch.* vol. 48, p. 255 (Leopold to Marie Christine, Feb. 18, 1792). Clapham: *War of 1792*, pp. 214-217, 230, 238. Chuquet: *Première invasion prussienne*, p. 145. Massenbach: *Mémoires*, i. p. 32. Vivenot: *op. cit.* i. pp. 370, 406; ii. *Cobenzl und Franz*, pp. 55 (Reuss to Spielmann, Berlin, May 22, 1792). "Bei dem so glücklichen, guten und so vertraulichen Einverständniss zwischen unsern beiden Höfe scheine ihm auf keine Art zu besorgen zu sein, dass weder Russland zu viel alleinige Gewalt über Polen sich anmassen könne, noch einseitige Eroberungen werde machen können. Aus mancherlei Beobachtungen werde es wahrscheinlich, dass Russland grosse Lust habe, sich die Ukraine zuzueigen, und endlich mit diese versteckt liegenden Absicht wohl hervorrücken werde. Sollte sich das verificiren, so könne vielleicht durch ein solches Ereigniss das allseitige Dedommagement wegen der Unkosten für den französischen Krieg gefunden werden, in dem Preussen sich ebenfalls in Polen zu arrondiren suchte, und wir uns am Rhein entschädigten. Diesen Plan aber müssten wir freilich ganz in Geheim für uns behalten und blos unter uns einverständlich und vertraulich erwägen und festsetzen." 120-121 (P. to L. Cobenzl, Wien, July 2, 1792), 129-130 (*Ibid.* July 16): "... Die bisherige Spannung Oesterreichs und Preussens hat dem russischen Hof den unschätzbaren Vortheil verschafft, dass beide um seine Freundschaft in die Wette buhlten, derselbe immer in Ermanglung des einen auf den andern zählen konnte und dadurch alle Umstände und Gelegenheiten zu dem Ende benützte, um seine eigenen Vergrösserungsplane durch Hilfe eines aus ihnen, meistens einseitig, auszuführen. Einen ähnlichen Vortheil, obschon in einem weit minderen Grade, fand

The partition had not been accomplished save at the expense of the coalition and the gain of France. Troops sadly needed at the front had been diverted to Poland by the Prussians; and the Austrians, fairly caught at their own game, turned on their allies charging them with bad faith and ending whatever pretence of good feeling existed between the two states. Many Russians, among whom was Count Simon Vorontzov, the Russian ambassador in London, regretted the partition. He said that Russia attacked Poland because of the connection between the Republic and the Porte; and that the partition was very irritating to Englishmen, who might not have objected to the allies reimbursing themselves for the cost of the war at French expense; but who certainly looked on Polish complications as likely to divert attention from matters at Paris. In fact, as Lord Auckland expressed it, one consolation to England was that "whatever the Emperor [Francis II.] may be seeking to acquire must be more or less at the expense of the strength and possessions of France." This opinion was soon found to be mistaken, though the Bavarian exchange was still busily argued between the various courts. Austria had set about retrieving her mistakes at the beginning of the war, and was pressing the Russians, anxiously hoping to oust the Prussians from their newly won point of vantage. She had previously sounded England by a

Russland bei mehreren Gelegenheiten in der Rivalität der Kronen England und Frankreich. Letztere hat durch den Untergang der französischen Grösse sein Ende erreicht, und Russland fängt schon an zu fühlen, dass es für seine eigene Vergrößerung von England vielmehr Hindernisse als Unterstützung zu erwarten haben wird. Den empfindlichsten Stoss aber würde der Petersburger Hof erfahren, wenn die Freundschaft zwischen uns und Preussen wirklich Stich hielte, wie sie nach den geänderten Weltumständen in der That sich halten könnte." 338 (Spielmann to L. Cobenzl, Nov. 6). Vorontzov: *Archiv*, xx. pp. 28-29 (Morkov to S. Vorontzov, May 14, 1792), 31-32 (Nov. 8), 34-36 (Jan. 17, 1793). Herrmann: *Gesch. Russ. Ergänzungs-Bände*, pp. 319 *et seq.*, 335 *et seq.* Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Pt. 1, pp. 139-144 (Razumovski's despatches to Ostermann, July, 1792-Jan. 1793); Pt. 4, pp. 166 (Morkov to Razumovski, Dec. 8, 1792); and especially 167-170. (*Ibid.* Feb. 25, 1793.) Cf. also pp. 78-79 (Dietrichstein to Razumovski, London, April 6, 1802).

proposal to unite with her in preventing the aggrandizement of Russia and Prussia in Poland on condition that Austria give up the plan of exchanging Bavaria for the Netherlands. Lord Grenville had refused to commit himself, but had suggested that since Austria was so alarmed by the condition of affairs in eastern Europe, she should ally herself with the Porte, where Great Britain was profiting by the disorder in the West to usurp the place formerly held by France in the councils of the Turks. Stadion, the Austrian minister, had replied that it was impossible for Austria to break so completely with Russia. Thugut, the new leader at Vienna, continued to press Russia for some compensation and delayed the ratification of the second partition. The attempts of the Poles to withstand the mutilation of their country were in vain, and Austria soon saw that she must also accede to the business were she to gain the good-will of Russia. Thugut by skilful diplomacy finally succeeded in persuading Razumovski himself to name Italy as a region where it might be possible for Austria to find indemnification for the aggrandizement of Prussia. This indeed was a favorite scheme of Thugut's. His hopes in that direction were to bear fruit later. In the mean time the quibblings over Poland, and the disorder in that country had done their work in creating further discord between the members of the coalition. Prussia made demands for further Polish territory as the price of her services in the war. The disturbances in Poland soon became so serious as to lead both Prussia and Austria to be sparing of the troops sent against France. The King of Prussia in fact openly rejoiced at news of an Austrian defeat, and before the year 1794 had ended it was rumored that he might even make a separate peace with the French, leaving the Austrians to continue the war. Austria fretted over the possibility of a final division of Poland in which she again would be ignored, and was especially fearful lest her plans of aggrandizement in Italy should become known. The hatred felt toward the Prussians refused to be

modified by Russia's mediation, and, rather than reach an agreement with the court of Berlin, even Austria stood ready to sign a peace with France. The endeavors of the English to end this unfortunate rivalry were also useless. In truth, the English ministers suspected that Russia might be planning another war against Turkey, and wished to renew their defensive alliance with Prussia in order to forestall any such crisis in the East. Furthermore, it was imperative for England's interests that the war against France should be kept up by the allies in order that her plans for ruining French commerce and gaining French colonies might be pressed with energy and success. It is true that a treaty between Great Britain and Russia had been negotiated by which the coalition was strengthened; but Russia in turn now set about the business of separating Prussia and Great Britain. There can be no question that the aggrandizement of Prussia was alarming to Catherine, and that, though she had assisted it, the step was taken largely of necessity; and she now wished to have Great Britain on her side rather than on Prussia's.¹

¹ Herrmann: *op. cit.* pp. 340, 341 (Eden to Grenville, Jan. 16, March 2, 6, 13, 1793), 365 (King of Prussia to Goltz, Jan. 25, 1793), 383 (English representative in Berlin to Grenville, May 21, 1792), 396 (Völkersahms writes, Aug. 16, 1793, from St. Petersburg), 397 (Goltz to King of Prussia, Sept. 27, 1793). Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, ix. pp. 286 (S. to A. Vorontzov, Jan. 10 (21), 1793). England, strongly opposed to Polish partition, agrees to indemnification of the powers for the French war, but insists that it should be at the expense of France and not of Poland, 302 (May, 1793). Vorontzov thinks Polish partition is wrong, and says that Russia attacks Poland because of her connection with Turkey; xviii. p. 75 (Kotchubey to S. V., Vienna, Jan. 18, 1794). The policy of Russia is to abide by the alliance with Austria, to manage Prussia, to seek a close concert with Great Britain, and to keep peace with Turkey, she being too poor now to try to do anything else there. Instructions are to hold the Turks to their treaties. "Mais nous y tenons-nous?" xiv. pp. 253, 254 (Morkov to S. V., April 23, 1793), xx. pp. 38 (Morkov to S. V., April 12). "Elle [Catherine] s'accorde avec tout le monde dans le projet de réduire la puissance de France, mais elle voudrait qu'on n'y employât qu'un seul moyen, auquel elle donne la plus grande latitude, et non pas celle de l'abandonner ensuite à une inertie de gouvernement qui la rendit tout-à-fait nulle dans les affaires générales de l'Europe. Or, comme elle soupçonne, et non pas sans raison, et l'Angleterre et l'Autriche de viser

Events in Poland, culminating in a revolutionary outbreak on April 17, 1794, under the leadership of Kosciuszko, forced

à ce second but, elle voudrait le parer, s'il est possible," 42 *et seq.* (April 18). An important letter on the relations of Prussia and Austria to Russia, 46-54 (July 27). *Ditto*, xxiv. pp. 263, 264 (Rostoptchin to S. V., March 9 (20), 1794). "Il paraît que les affaires de France ont déjà ennuyé l'Impératrice; car on ne parle plus des événements de ce pays et on ne s'en occupe que par bien séance." Cornwallis: *Corr.* ii. p. 232. Windham reported to Pitt, Sept. 4, 1794, concerning "the dreadful duplicity of the Austrians, and the unfeeling and unprincipled indifference with which they sacrifice the greatest public interests to their private emoluments and animosities." Cf. pp. 244, 255. Ledebur: *Mittheilungen*, i. p. 155. Denkschrift betreffend die Vergrößerungs-Projekte des Wiener Hofes, etc. Lucchesini scripsit, March, 1793. Zeissberg: *Quellen zur Gesch. Oesterreichs*, i. pp. 65 (Lucchesini to Reuss, May 15, 1793), 72 (Stadion to Starhemberg, London, May 21), 85-95 (L. Cobenzl to Thugut, St. Petersburg, May 31), 102, 134 (*Ibid.* July 5); ii. pp. 65, 154, 216 *et seq.*, 355, 429 (Discussions in 1794 over Polish partition, giving Austrian policy); iii. p. 13 (Thugut to L. Cobenzl, Nov. 4, 1794). Prussia is negotiating a separate treaty with France. The infamy of this. Tell Russia of it and try to gain advantage in this matter for Austria. Malmesbury: *Diaries*, iii. p. 34. Dec. 28, 1793. King of Prussia "told me of bad news from Wurmser's army, — that he had lost two battalions and twenty-one pieces of cannon. He seemed rather pleased with this bad news, but admitted it would do harm by raising the spirits of the Jacobins." p. 73. Malmesbury to Grenville, Berlin, March 1, 1794: "The most difficult and hopeless part of the important measure now under negotiation is to keep the two courts of Berlin and Vienna on anything like even terms: extreme suspicion and envy pervade them both; and their mutual prejudices are so strong that it is impossible to believe them when speaking of each other." Auckland: *Corr.* ii. p. 432; iii. pp. 35, 36, 40, 50, 53, 55, 57. Aulard: *Diplomatie de la Com. de Salut Public*, in *Révol. franç.* xviii. p. 343. Vivenot: *Vertrauliche Briefe Thuguts*, i. p. 35 (Thugut to Colloredo, Aug. 26, 1793). . . . "Nos alliés prussiens sont vraiment insupportables dans leur intarissable chicane et surtout dans leur fureur actuelle contre Wurmser, de ce qu'il a osé chasser l'ennemi de Jockrin. Heureusement il a réussi; il faut s'armer de patience, car nous devons boire jusqu'à la lie le chalice amer de notre monstrueuse alliance avec eux . . ." pp. 85, 87, 88, 107, 116, 117, 237. The plans for Poland and Italy are here fully discussed. Cf. particularly Vivenot: *Thugut und sein politisches System*, in *Arch. für oesterr. Gesch.* xlii. pp. 363-493; xliii. pp. 103-197. Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Pt. 1, pp. 152-163, 167, 170 (the account in the text above is largely based on these despatches): Pt. 2, pp. 14 (Rosenkrantz to Razumovski, March 15 (26), 1793), 177-180 (Morkov to Razumovski, June 18, 1794), 214 (S. Vorontzov to Razumovski, Aug. 14 (25), 1794). "Mais il n'est pas de l'intérêt de la Prusse de finir ces affaires; elle entretient et recrute 40,000 hommes aux dépens des Polonais: c'est un prétexte de ne pas donner des troupes contre la France et par

the interested powers to take action. The urgency of Prussia for still another share of Poland was redoubled; the Russian troops captured Parga and entered Warsaw; and the Austrians, again panic-stricken lest Prussia should once more outwit them, threatened to withdraw their troops from the Netherlands to Poland in order to prevent Prussia from profiting there. The news of the capture of Cracow by the Prussians still further disturbed them. Defeat at the hands of the French had driven the Emperor and Thugut to look for the costs of the war in the East and not in the West; and Austrian troops were ordered to cross the Polish frontier. This step was very irritating to the Russians, who did not fail to show it. The intentions of Austria remained hid; Thugut tried to draw Russia into active operations against France, postponing action in Poland till it might be possible to oust Prussia from the present favorable position; and by his demands for the withdrawal of Prussian troops from Polish territory brought on himself a storm of anger both from Berlin and St. Petersburg. At the same time the Austrian and Russian troops in Poland were on the point of actual collision. On Sept. 16, 1794, the King of Prussia added fuel to the flame by announcing that he must recall his troops from the Rhine to use them in Poland. Thugut, who with true Austrian vacillation had returned to his old plans of getting Alsace and Lorraine and exchanging the Netherlands for Bavaria, was greatly alarmed at the thought that, deserted by the Prussians and unassisted by the Russians, the Austrians would face the French alone. He told Razumovski that Austria would consent to the immediate partition of Poland, but she must first know how much Prussia was to receive; he especially insisted that the Polish question was vitally connected with French affairs, and asked that Prussia be

la continuation de ne ces maudites affaires qu'elle prolonge exprès, elle nous empêche de donner des secours effectifs à l'Autriche et à l'Angleterre. Je ne serais pas étonné du tout, qu'elle ne fomenté encore sous mains la Porte contre la Russie et l'Autriche. En un mot, si l'Europe périt par le système français, c'est la Prusse seule, qui en sera la cause unique."

compelled to take her share again in the war. Catherine finally lost patience with Austria, and threatened to carry out the partition with Prussia. This brought Austria to terms, and at the same time the recall of the Prussian troops from the scene of disturbance in Poland to Prussian Poland showed the Empress that she could not depend even on the court of Berlin to assist her in crushing the insurgent movement. The final treaty was then drawn up in December, 1794. It was now Prussia's turn to protest; and this she did both against the evacuation of Cracow and the size of Austria's share in the partition. But Catherine, having other matters to settle in which Austria's aid was necessary, upheld her ally at Vienna. The work which began in 1772 was thus finished in January, 1795. By the final partition of Poland Russia gained the rest of Lithuania as far as the Niemen and of Volhynia to the Bug; later Kurland, old Lithuania, and Samogitia were added. Prussia gained all eastern Poland, including Warsaw; and Austria took Cracow, Sandomir, Lublin, and Chelm. The territories of the three powers now had a common point of contact.¹

The fate of Poland had barely been settled when it became certain that all the rumors regarding a peace between Prussia and France were to be verified. The treaty of Bâle was signed on April 5, 1795, and Prussia confessed to all the world that since she had profited by the territorial revolution in the East

¹ Wassiltchikow: *Les Razumowski*, ii. Pt. 1, pp. 170 *et seq.* to 195. Despatches of Razumovski to Ostermann of March 22, 29, May 10, 22, July 5, Sept. 22 (to Catherine), Nov. 25, 1794. Morkov to Razumovski: Aug. 27, Oct. 7, Dec. 24, pp. 197 *et seq.* Razumovski to Morkov, Jan. 13, 23, 1795. Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, xx. pp. 54-63 (despatches of Morkov to S. Vorontzov, Aug., Nov. 6, 1793, Aug. 15, 1794, Feb. 9, 1795). *Sbornik*, xxiii. pp. 611, 617, 620, 626, 632, 633, 647, 659, and xvi. pp. 91 *et seq.* Cf. Brückner: *Katharina*, pp. 416 *et seq.* Hüffer: *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, i. pp. 131 *et seq.*; i. *Ergänzung*, pp. 81 *et seq.*, 233. Cf. for correction to usual dates given for letters of this period. Auckland: *Corr.* iii. pp. 194 (Eden to Auckland, March 24, 1794), 200 (*Ibid.* March 31): "I have ever thought that the conduct towards Poland did more to hurt the cause of Kings than the most violent acts of the Jacobins." Page 288 (H. Spencer to Auckland, Feb. 23, 1795). Herrmann: *op. cit.* pp. 456 *et seq.*, 497 *et seq.* (the third partition). Beer: *Orientalische Politik*, pp. 149 *et seq.*

she would have nothing more to do with the social and political revolution in the West. Count Simon Vorontzov in London had recognized the inevitableness of this step in the policy of Prussia. That power felt herself relieved of all obligation to continue the war because of the jealousy of Austria and the aggressive policy of Russia in eastern Europe. In truth, the near approach of Russia to the heart of Europe had alarmed the court of Berlin; the Prussians required time and peace to assimilate their new acquisitions in Poland; the final partition of the Polish Republic had materially altered the political situation, and Prussia must needs end her half-hearted struggle with the French. It was not for love of the French, however, as Caillard, the new French minister at Berlin, said, but to accustom herself to new conditions and to profit by following the middle road in her political relations. Without a Poland to partition Prussia must learn her politics anew.¹

¹ Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, ix. pp. 337, 338 (S. to A. Vorontzov, London, April 21, 1795). Ledebur: *Mittheilungen*, i. p. 285 (Lucchesini to Hardenburg, Aug. 26, 1795). Bailleu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. pp. 18 (Bericht Hardenberg's, Basel, Aug. 26, 1795). "Sans entrer avec la France dans des liaisons offensives ou dans ses vastes plans d'aggrandissement, il faudrait toutefois se rapprocher d'elle afin d'établir, s'il est possible, un concert sur la pacification et les affaires qui vous intéressent, Sire, afin de maintenir et faire respecter la neutralité du Nord de l'Allemagne, ou d'abandonner d'un commun accord cette mesure; il faudrait du moins ménager la France et ne rien faire qui pourrait contrecarrer ses vues," p. 27 (Instruction für den Gesandten Preussens in Paris, Sandoz-Rollin, Berlin, 1795, Oct. 21). "En effet, S. M. le Roi se trouvant en alliance avec l'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie, elle est résolue de maintenir le système de ses anciennes liaisons, à moins que des événements imprévus et invraisemblables ne la forcent à agir en sens contraire. Elle compte donc en rester, au moins pour le présent, avec la France aux relations de bonne intelligence rétablies par la paix et que l'accord effectif des intérêts fondamentaux des deux empires pourra affermir de lui-même sans aucune stipulation expresse; influencer, autant qu'il dépendra d'elle, sur la pacification de l'Empire, surtout en vue du recouvrement de ses États d'outre-Rhin, et ne contracter des engagements formels avec la France que pour les rapports de commerce," p. 431 (Report of Caillard, Berlin, Dec. 5, 1795). Speaking of Prussia: "Mais un trésor épuisé, une guerre à soutenir en Pologne, des rapports politiques entièrement nouveaux amenés par le voisinage immédiat de la Russie et qui appelaient la majeure partie des forces militaires de la Prusse à son extrémité la plus éloignée de la France, toutes ces raisons ne permettaient

This formal acceptance by Prussia of the results of the French Revolution excited the greatest indignation among the other powers. It was thought possible that Prussia might now join with Sweden, Denmark, the Porte, and France in a league whose direct object would be to oppose the Austro-Russian alliance. If this had been done it would have been only a counterstroke to the important step taken by the two imperial courts in a secret treaty signed by them at the same time that a third partition of Poland had been consummated. This "secret declaration" (Jan. 3, 1795) was based on the previous defensive alliance against the Porte. Prussia was now to be placed in the same category with the Ottoman Empire, and in the event of Prussia's attacking either of the two allies the other was pledged to give all its support. Furthermore, should a new war break out between Austria, Russia, and the Porte, the two allies should endeavor to carry out the plans agreed between Joseph II. and Catherine in 1782. A Dacian Kingdom was to be created of the Danubian principalities; and Russia agreed to Austria's favorite scheme for

pas de continuer plus longtemps la guerre contre nous. La paix fut donc faite, mais ce ne fut certainement pas pour l'amour de la France. . . . Mais ce malheureux esprit d'envahissement qui avait déterminé le roi de Prusse à manquer à ses engagements les plus solennels envers les Polonais; l'invasion des palatinats en 1793; l'impossibilité où la guerre contre la France l'avait mis de résister aux progrès des Russes; la nécessité qui en résulta de les favoriser même et d'accéder au partage général de ce qui restait de la Pologne: la position topographique où la Prusse se trouve par le contact immédiat avec la Russie et la Maison d'Autriche: toutes ces circonstances amenèrent des éléments nouveaux dans le système prussien et introduisirent à Berlin une influence étrangère qui n'y avait pas été connue jusqu'à présent. La considération publique se partage donc entre le ministre de la République et celui de la Russie: et la politique prussienne, lorsqu'elle est obligée d'obéir à la fois à deux impulsions aussi différentes ne peut guère que suivre une direction moyenne, qui exprime les ménagements qu'elle veut avoir pour l'un et pour l'autre," p. 448 (Report of Caillard, Dec. 9, 1798). "Il n'y a pas à Berlin un homme de sens qui ne convienne aujourd'hui que le dernier partage de la Pologne a été une opération désastreuse pour la Prusse, et on se rappelle avec amertume la maxime connue du grand Frédéric que l'existence d'une Pologne quelconque était nécessaire à son repos." Sorel: *op. cit.* i. p. 502.

the seizure of Venetian territory in case Austria failed to secure any French provinces. Thus, while Prussia made peace with the Revolution, Austria and Russia turned their backs on it and looked for new territory in Poland, Bavaria, Venice, Servia, and along the Danube. The joy of the Austrian diplomats, Thugut in particular, was great. Austria's prestige was restored; the second partition was forgotten; Prussia was completely outplayed, and Austria might now look to desirable acquisitions in several directions. Lord Whitworth had written to his government from St. Petersburg (Jan. 4) that in the minds of the continental powers Poland stood before France. Now it was not only Poland but the entire Eastern Question that claimed the first place. As Catherine told Morkov in 1793, the peoples of the West had forgotten the Turks. Russia could never do so, and Catherine claimed she had kept them "from seizing Austria by the tail" by her policy in Poland and on the Black Sea. The Turks had been quiet for a year or so since the treaty of Jassy; but rumors had been frequent that the Porte was preparing to profit by the crisis in western Europe; and urged on by Prussia she had even offered her mediation between Austria and France. The Russian diplomats were watching the situation carefully, and pressing on the building of Odessa and the strengthening of fortresses on the Black Sea coast. Negotiations were also kept up with Montenegrins and other disaffected peoples in the Balkan peninsula. Rostoptchin believed that the Empress was bent on war, and that Zubov, the favorite in 1794, was thus to be given his chance to win military fame. She had recently said (March, 1794), that "some day she would lose patience and would show the Turks that it was as easy to go to Constantinople as to the Crimea." In fact, her explanation of her policy in Poland was a frank statement that she needed to strengthen her frontier for the next war against the Porte.¹

¹ Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, xx. pp. 55, 63, 64, 65 (Morkov to S. Vorontzov, 1793, and Feb. 9, May 5, June 1, 1795), 331 (Grimm to S. Vorontzov, March 11 (22),

The end of Catherine's reign is characteristic of the woman. Poland could no longer threaten to bar her road in the West ; and she turned again to the East, looking to increase her Asiatic domain and to hasten the day when her troops should enter Constantinople. The instructions given to Kotchubey, the Russian ambassador at the Porte, had been to preserve the peace, though insisting on the execution of treaty stipulations. In common with the British representative he watched the endeavors of the French to induce the Sultan to join with them against the coalition, and also interested himself in Persian matters ; it is evident he expected a crisis in eastern matters. He had been told to observe the treaties ; but "will we abide by them ourselves?" he questioned. With the establishment of the alliance with Austria (Jan. 1795) Catherine was ready for action. Her interest in France was confined to the formation of a new coalition against her in which Russia would have but light burdens to bear. Yet Catherine was not satisfied with the policy of her ally. The court of Vienna seemed incapable of adhering to a definite line of action for six months at a time. Should she choose this opportunity to attack the Porte, the attention of Austria would be centred in the East and South, and France would support the Turks and urge on Prussia the necessity of fomenting dis-

1798); xxiv. pp. 260-264 (Rostoptchin to S. Vorontzov, March 9 (20), 1794); xxix. pp. 334-338 (L. Cazzioni to A. Vorontzov, June 25, 1792). Vivenot, *Vertrauliche Briefe*, i. pp. 175 (Thugut to Colloredo, Jan. 22, 1795), 276 (*Ibid.* Dec. 15). Zeissberg: *Quellen*, iii. p. 79. Brückner: *op. cit.* p. 413. Häusser: *Deut. Gesch.* i. p. 584. Bailleu: *op. cit.* i. p. 123. Miliutin: *Gesch. des Krieges Russlands*, i. pp. 296 *et seq.* Martens: *Recueil, Autriche*, ii. pp. 228 *et seq.* Herrmann: *op. cit.* pp. 508 (Whitworth to Grenville, Jan. 6, 9, 1795), 516 (Eden to Grenville, April 20, and Whitworth to Grenville, July 7), 519-520 (Spencer to Grenville, April 11, May 9), 521 (Gray to Grenville, Aug. 18). *Sbornik*, xlii. pp. 317, 318 (Catherine to Zubov about the treaty of Bâle). Wassiltchikow: *op. cit.* ii. Pt. 1, pp. 196-201 (Despatches of Razumovski to Catherine and to Morkov, Jan. 13 (23), Feb. 28, April 5, 1795, and of Morkov to Razumovski, April 22); Pt. 2, pp. 38-42 (Ribas to Razumovski, April 13, 1795), 197 (Morkov to Razumovski, June 26), 229, 230 (S. Vorontzov to Ostermann, March, 1795), 240, 241 (S. Vorontzov to Razumovski, June 1 (12), 1795). Eton: *Survey of Turkey*, p. 438.

turbances in Poland. It seemed advisable, therefore, to take advantage of the attack of Persia on Georgia, a state protected by Russia, to begin a war which while not directed against the Turks would nevertheless favor the growth of Russian power in their direction. Zubov had projects of pushing the Russian frontier till it might be possible not only to attack the Turks in the rear through Anatolia, but also to gain Northern Persia and Turkestan, establishing a line of forts in Central Asia and along the Caspian, and drawing the caravans which now made their way by land from India to the Mediterranean to Russian ports on the Black Sea. This program might well have alarmed the Porte, for, as Rostoptchin wrote in respect to Persian affairs: "On veut toujours finir par aller à Constantinople; c'est là où tendent les vœux de notre Impératrice, que l'âge a transformée en conquérant." The program was that of Peter the Great.¹

Till now our attention has been directed to the attitude of the coalition to the Eastern and the Polish Questions. We must examine that of France. As far as the power of France and the success of the Revolution were concerned, the policy of the coalition toward these more eastern matters had been highly satisfactory. France had profited by the crisis in eastern

¹ Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, viii. pp. 137 (Rostoptchin to S. Vorontzov, Feb. 24, 1796), 151 (*Ibid.* Nov. 5 (16)), 132 (*Ibid.* Feb. 22). We are to have war with Persia. "Si vous me demandez pourquoi on entreprend cette guerre, on serait fort embarrassé de vous donner là-dessus une bonne réponse. Mais voilà les raisons: 1-ère, pour éluder l'article de alliance avec l'Empereur, auquel nous devons fournir 30,000 h. de troupes ou de l'argent en cas qu'il en demande (cet article est nul aussitôt que nous avons guerre nous-mêmes);" 2. Desire of Platon Zubov to become a marshal. *Idem*, xviii. The despatches of Kotchubey to S. Vorontzov from 1791 to 1797 are to be found in pp. 1-128 of this volume. Kotchubey was under appointment to go to the Porte in 1792, and finally did go in 1794. Nearly every despatch deals with matters treated above in the text. xx. pp. 68 *et seq.* (Morkov to S. Vorontzov, April 19, July 12, Aug. 10, 1796). *Sbornik*, xlii. pp. 125, 126 (Catherine to de Ligne, Nov. 16, 1790). Waliszewski: *Roman d'une impératrice*, p. 426. Brückner: *Peter der Grosse*, pp. 72, 73. Herrmann: *op. cit.* pp. 536, (Whitworth to Grenville, June 7, 1796), 599 (Eton to Grenville, Dec. 21). Auckland: *Corr.* iii. pp. 324, 347 (Eden to Auckland, Dec. 7, 1795, June 13, 1796). Wassiltchikow: *op. cit.* ii. Pt. 1, pp. 202 *et seq.*

Europe, and had turned to advantage every development in the situation in Poland and Turkey. At the outbreak of the Revolution her prestige in the Orient had been greatly injured; it became one of the earliest duties of her diplomats to restore it. The French Republic was now to carry on a direct and consistent policy as regards eastern matters. In fact, the Revolution marked a return to traditional French policy in the Orient. In the place of the Austrian alliance of 1756 the French leaders of 1792 hoped to establish one with Prussia, whereby Prussia was to attack Austria in Bohemia and help the Poles against Russia. The Turks were to be induced to declare war against Austria, moving on the same lines as in 1788. While French armies met those of Austria on the Rhine, in Piedmont, and in Lombardy, a French fleet was to support the Turks in an attempt to recover the Crimea from Russia. The entrance of Prussia into the coalition prevented the further development of this plan; but from this time on French representatives were working in Poland to incite trouble there for Russia and Austria, and in Prussia to excite jealousy over Russia's schemes against the Porte. Austria and Great Britain were regarded by France as implacable enemies for whom extermination was the only end. This was to be accomplished with the aid of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was regarded as unconsciously playing the part of a friend to France by stirring up discord between the members of the coalition; against her a league of Sweden, Denmark, and Poland was to be created. The post of French ambassador at the Porte was therefore a most important one for the success of the entire scheme. Choiseul-Gouffier, who filled this place, had acted for the two imperial courts during their recent war with Turkey, and was given over to the Bourbon cause; in his place, therefore, was appointed Sémonville, a devoted Jacobin, yet imbued with the ideas of Favier. His instructions now tallied with those which had been given time after time by the kings of France to their ambassadors at Constantinople; both Du-

mouriez and Lebrun wished to convince the Porte that the Revolution was in essence a reaction against the Austrian alliance of 1756, and that France was now ready to return to her traditional policy in eastern matters. In fact, almost an exact parallel can be drawn between these plans and the policy of d'Argenson in 1746 and of Rouillé in 1755. Both had urged on Turkey the necessity of supporting France against Austria, and both had planned intervention in Hungary to distract the house of Hapsburg from its interests in Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries. Sémonville was sent in October, 1792. Beside his instructions he was told to suggest the possibility of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Porte, which would also include Prussia, Sweden, and Poland. As might have been expected, when the representatives of the other European powers in Constantinople received news of Sémonville's commission, they united in protests to the Porte against his reception. Under this pressure, and with the connivance of Choiseul-Gouffier, the Porte refused to receive Sémonville. Shortly after he was officially recalled; and a secret agent, Descorches, formerly the Marquis de Sainte-Croix, was sent, under the alias of Daubry, to prepare the way for a second attempt to secure reception for a French ambassador. Sémonville was in fact reappointed May 11, 1793, and started for his post, hopeful that he might overcome the hesitations of the Turks. Unfortunately he and his papers were captured by the Austrians; and the allies, thoroughly alarmed by what they had discovered of French plans, now endeavored to secure decided action by the Porte against France. In this they failed, for the Sultan would pledge nothing save neutrality. Even that soon seemed doubtful; by September Descorches had so far overcome the prejudices of the Grand Vizier that an outline treaty had been drawn, pledging joint military action between France and the Ottoman Empire. The representatives of Russia, Austria, and Great Britain again took the matter in hand, and by vigorous protests prevented further progress.

With the fall of Robespierre Descorches was succeeded by Verninac. This representative was assisted by the fact that Prussia was about to leave the coalition and sign the treaty of Bâle (April, 1795). He proposed a quadruple alliance of Prussia, Sweden, Turkey, and France, and strengthened his assertions of French interest in the welfare of the Ottoman Empire by introducing a number of French officers to reform the Turkish military system. This matter brought to light the oriental dreams of Napoleon Bonaparte, then a young artillery officer. The extreme Jacobinism of Verninac had impeded his success, however, and within the year he was succeeded by Aubert Dubayet. He died in December, 1797, and was in turn succeeded by Ruffin, as secretary; he remained till the Egyptian expedition aroused the anger of the Porte, who, as usual on the outbreak of war, imprisoned this diplomat in defiance of all comity. The work of these later agents was helped by Knobelsdorf, the Prussian minister, who hoped to see Austria humiliated, though he also dreaded the effect of Revolutionary opinion on the internal politics of the Empire. By this renewal of friendly relations with Prussia, France had materially changed her position as regards Poland. Though in 1794 she had instructed Parandier, the French agent in Poland, that she was working with the Porte, Sweden, and Denmark to maintain the independence of Poland, by her treaty with Prussia she had tacitly acknowledged the validity of the Polish partitions; and in the instructions to Caillard, who was sent to Berlin in 1796, there was no longer serious mention of guaranteeing the integrity of Poland, but only of that of Sweden, Denmark, and the Ottoman Empire; Poland had ceased to exist. The failure of the committee of Public Safety to consent to the end of Polish integrity may, in fact, be regarded as one reason why French diplomats at Constantinople were not more successful. At that time Prussia had great influence with the Porte, and could the French have come to terms earlier with Prussia, recognizing the inevitableness of Poland's extinction

they might have profited by Prussia's prestige to create a counter demonstration against Austria in eastern Europe. On the whole, French influence at the Porte, though it almost suffered annihilation under Choiseul-Gouffier, was strengthened during the closing years of the century, and at the time when Turkish spies were working in Poland, it excited great alarm in Austria and Russia. In fact, after the final Polish partition, the plans had been drawn up in St. Petersburg and approved by Catherine for a third war against the Ottoman Empire.¹

¹ Masson: *Dépt. des affaires étrangères*, pp. 27, 267. Dumouriez: *Vie*, liv. iii. c. 6, 7; iv. c. 1. Roland: *Mémoires*, i. p. 169. Lescure: *Corr.* ii. p. 613 (Aug. 4, 1792). Thürheim: *Mercy-Argenteau und Stahrenberg*, pp. 38, 39 (M. to S., Jan. 19, 1793). Anon.: *Diplomatie révolutionnaire*, in *R. de la Révol.* iii. p. 114. Bailieu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. pp. 450, 474 (Instructions and reports of Caillard and Sieyès at Berlin, 1796-97). De Testa: *Recueil*, i. p. 542; ii. pp. 202-252. (These despatches of French representatives at the Porte are useful.) Daru: *Hist. de Venise*, v. p. 168. Zeissberg: *Quellen*, i. p. 340 (Thugut to Cobenzl, Oct. 21, 1793). Vivenot: *Vertrauliche Briefe*, i. p. 35 (Thugut to Colloredo, Aug. 27, 1793). Cf. pp. 380, 381. And *Quellen*, ii. *Cobenzl und Franz*, pp. 224 (*Mémoire* of Choiseul-Gouffier to the Porte, Sept. 24, 1792), 225 (Herbert to P. Cobenzl, Sept. 25). Aulard: *Documents inédits*, in *Révol. franç.* xiv. pp. 1111 et seq. P'ingaud: *Choiseul-Gouffier*, pp. 175 et seq., 200, 215, 217 et seq., 246 et seq. Bonneville de Marsangy: *Vergennes*, i. pp. 229 et seq. Brückner: *Katharina*, p. 422. Cf. *Russ. Arkhiv*, 1876, i. p. 218. Farges: *La Pologne*, ii. pp. 326 et seq. Instructions to Parandier, 1794. "Le gouvernement de la République se dispose à agir auprès de la Porte, et même auprès de la Suède et du Danemark, d'après un système dans lequel le soutien de l'indépendance de la Pologne sera l'un des principaux objets des opérations politiques et militaires dans l'est de l'Europe." Eton: *Survey of Turkey*, p. 193. Grosjean: *Sémonville*, in *Révol. franç.* xiii. pp. 888-921. This is a long and satisfactory article. Masson: *Diplomates de la Révolution*, p. 165. Zinkeisen: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 846 et seq., 859, 862 et seq., 875 et seq., 881. Aulard: *Dipl. du Comité de Salut Public*, in *Révol. franç.* xviii. p. 237 (a plan drawn up in Lebrun's office, Oct. 1792): "Les Turcs s'avanceraient également du côté de la Pologne ainsi que dans le bannat de Temesvar et en Croatie en suivant le plan de leur première campagne de 1788 et à l'aide des Valaques, qu'il ne serait pas impossible de faire insurger. . . . Notre flotte de la Méditerranée entrerait dans la mer Noire et faciliterait un débarquement des Turcs dans la Crimée." Page 345 (Soult to Barère and Danton, April 24, 1793): "Celles puissances qu'on ose appeler neutres sont les amies naturelles de la France, des amies de tous les temps, des amies sûres, des amies qui ont pris les armes pour la France, toutes les fois qu'elle l'a voulu: Savoir, la Turquie, la Pologne, la Saxe, la Suisse, la Danemark, Gênes, etc., etc." Pages 434, 435, 456, 437: "La

The diplomatic aspect of the Eastern Question has been treated; we must now turn our attention to the economic situation which in large part constituted the importance of this diplomacy. It will be possible to show the commercial interests of France and England in the Levant, and to trace the development of sea power as a modern factor in the history of the Eastern Question. The evolution of this problem to a marine stage was largely due to the French policy aiming at control of the Mediterranean. This policy was not a new one, but its connection with the great problem of Asia was now shown for the first time; the Mediterranean became the scene of combat between rival powers whose interests were world-wide, and whose antagonism then seemed implacable. This struggle between France and Great Britain was in turn given a new character by the introduction of Levantine questions;

Suède, le Danemark et la Turquie formaient les éléments principaux du système d'alliances que la France voulait, en 1793, opposer aux puissances coalisées, en vue d'opérer une diversion puissante sur leurs derrières ou tout au moins de maintenir la Russie dans l'inaction." Sybel: *Propagande révolutionnaire*, in *Rev. Hist.* xl. p. 112. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révol.* iii. pp. 301 *et seq.*, 396, 403, 435 *et seq.*; iv. pp. 67 *et seq.*, 247 *et seq.*, 393. Auckland: *Corr.* iii. pp. 200, 201 (Eden to Auckland, Vienna, March 31, 1794): "It is a most alarming business [Polish insurrection] for this country [Austria], as Galicia is not without its malcontents, and there are not 1,000 troops left in the whole province, of which old Wurmser is the commander. Indeed, it may be fatal to us all if it be, as is suspected, connected with Descorches' intrigues at Constantinople. . . . Perhaps the desire of keeping Poland in subjection, a jealousy of Prussia's aggrandizement, and the apprehensions of the machinations carrying on between the French and the Swedes, with the increasing influence of France and Denmark, may show her Imperial Majesty [Catherine] the expediency of at least deferring the execution of her designs against Turkey. Should this be the case, the uneasiness of this court would be removed." Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, xviii. pp. 53-63, 67-79, 83, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94-96, 103, 105-108, 110, 113, 115, 117-120, 130, 132. (Despatches of Kotchubey to S. Vorontzov: Oct. 3, 12 (23), 1792; Jan. 18, July 10, Sept. 10, 14 (25), 29 (Oct. 10), 1794; May 30 (June 10), July 30 (Aug. 10), 1795; Dec. 29 (Jan. 9), Jan. 14 (25), Oct. 10, 30 (Nov. 10), 1796; Feb. 10, 14 (25), 1797.) These letters are invaluable for this period. Wassiltchikow: *op. cit.* ii. Pt. 1, chaps. xi, xii. Pesenti: *Diplomazia Franco-Turca*, pp. 15-66. This very interesting pamphlet (1898), based on the despatches of Venetian diplomats, throws light on several important points. Further use will be made of it.

the prestige of each nation at Constantinople and their respective commercial interests in the nearer East became important to their general welfare, and to their success as world powers. The alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire was a matter of history. The combinations of European politics had made it valuable to both countries; tradition and ambition had fostered it; geographical situation had given it permanence. From the economic point of view, the Levant played the part of a colonial empire to France; and the zenith of her influence in the East was reached at the treaty of Belgrade in 1738-39, when Villeneuve, the French ambassador to the Porte, so successfully negotiated the treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Russia and Austria. As a direct result of this, the capitulations of 1740 gave France a pre-eminence that lasted till after 1756.¹ The Republic clung to the traditions of the Ancien Régime in the matter of Levantine trade. Indeed the adoption of the principles of war against Great Britain, and the permanence of the underlying causes in foreign policy required that the protection of French commerce in the Levant should follow as a corollary to the assumption of the obligations of monarchical France in the duel against her maritime rival for world empire and colonial trade. Henry IV. had placed French Mediterranean commerce in the front rank; and Francis I., Louis XIII., Vaubans, Chauvelin, and d'Argenson had followed in the footsteps of Charles VIII. in the endeavor to free Italy from German domination that a road to the Orient might be opened to them. Under the numerous capitulations with the Porte French mercantile interests had prospered

¹ Vandal: *Villeneuve*, pp. ix, x, 16, 31, 50 *et seq.*, 416 *et seq.* Saint-Priest: *Ambassade de France*, pp. 269 *et seq.* De Testa: *Recueil*, i. pp. 186 *et seq.*, 525, notes. D'Argenson: *Mémoires*, i. pp. 190, 361 *et seq.* Hammer: *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, viii. p. 1. Ségur: *Politiques de tous les cabinets*, i. pp. 18, 88 *et seq.*, 140 *et seq.*, 195, 344; iii. pp. 115, 116, 119, 126. Boutaric: *Correspondance de Louis XV.* i. p. 386; ii. pp. 182 *et seq.* Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révolution*, i. pp. 246, 307 *et seq.* Delaville de Roulx: *La France en Orient*, i. p. 514 *et seq.* Lavallée: *Les frontières de France*, p. 119.

greatly; but under Louis XIV. there was no very even development.¹ About 1740, thanks to Villeneuve, the figures began to rise. The importations from the Levant increased by five million livres during the fifth decade of the century, and a total French trade of over forty million (nineteen export and twenty-one import) grew to forty-eight million livres just prior to the treaty with Austria in 1756. Though the political influence of France waned thereafter, the commercial losses of Austria in Italy, the suspension of Russian trade by the closing of the Black Sea by wars, and the steady decrease in Venetian and Dutch mercantile power left the markets open to her in a way of which she soon took advantage. England's trade in the Levant had suffered greatly between 1735 and 1745, and her representatives and agents were withdrawn from many ports; ten French ships were seen to one British. The total exchange between France and the Ottoman Empire and dependencies was estimated at seventy million in 1788, and a year after the Revolution it had suffered but little, though French political prestige was at its lowest point. From 1715 to 1789 the imports to France from the Levant had grown thirteen fold, and the exports twelve fold; and in 1787, of the total trade of Smyrna, the largest port of Western Asia Minor, over forty-two per cent was in French hands, a figure which is twenty-five per cent above that of 1885. In 1700 it had been supposed by Savary that the English and Dutch held seventy-five per cent of the total trade of the Levant, and the French only twelve and one-half per cent. The enormous gain of France is thus

¹ Fagniez: *Le commerce extérieur de la France sous Henri IV.*, in *Rev. Hist.* xvi. pp. 1-48. Pouqueville: *Commerce de la France*, in *Mém. de l'Acad. des inscriptions*, x. pp. 573, 574. Saint-Marc Girardin: *Les origines de la question d'Orient*, in *R. de D. M.* li. pp. 40-72; liii. pp. 709-739; lv. pp. 671-711. Phillipson: *Heinrich IV. und Philip III.* i. pp. 239, 279, 284 *et seq.*, 290, 296; iii. p. 353. Charrière: *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, i. pp. 69 *et seq.*, 283 *et seq.* De Testa: *op. cit.* i. pp. 22 *et seq.*, 43, 99 *et seq.*, 113, 175. Saint-Priest: *op. cit.* pp. 29 *et seq.* Pingaud: *op. cit.* p. 2. Flassan: *Hist. de la dipl. franç.* i. p. 360; iii. p. 402; iv. p. 57. Seeley: *British Policy*, i. p. 147.

apparent. The Greek trade with Europe amounted, in 1798, to 8,821,320 piastres exports, of which France took sixty-five per cent and England not quite seven per cent, and 4,970,670 piastres imports, of which France supplied about twenty-two per cent and England sixteen per cent.¹

The interests of English trade in the Levant were not large in 1789, though they had greatly increased during the past few years. In 1783 imports from Turkey and the Levant had figured in the customs reports at £48,983 and the exports to those regions from the United Kingdom at £42,666. By 1789 the imports were £223,424, and the exports £136,207. In 1792 they had risen to £290,599 and £273,785 respectively. These figures, however, are the highest in a period of nearly twenty years, from 1783 to 1800. The average is much lower, and for Turkey is less than two per cent of the corresponding annual average of the French trade; the proportion for the entire Mediterranean, however, is only a little over three to one in favor of the French. There are, furthermore, frequent fluctuations of such a character as to show that the British trade was by no means so firmly established as the French. The influence of war naturally was great, and in the years when Bonaparte was fighting for dominion on the Adriatic and

¹ Favier in Ségur : *op. cit.* iii. p. 303. Saint-Priest : *op. cit.* pp. 269 *et seq.*, 327 *et seq.*, 335, 342. Vandal : *op. cit.* pp. 416 *et seq.*, 430, 442. Arnould : *Balance du Commerce*, i. pp. 240 *et seq.*, 249, 254. Georgiadès : *Smyrne et l'Asie Mineur*, pp. 220 *et seq.* Zinkeisen : *op. cit.* v. pp. 872 *et seq.* Beaujour : *Commerce de la Grèce*, ii. pp. 162 *et seq.*, 229. Beer : *Geschichte des Welthandels*, 3te Abth. ii. Hälfte, 1. Th. p. 508. Jackson : *Commerce of the Mediterranean*, pp. 3 *et seq.*, 48. Holland : *Travels in Greece*, pp. 21, 36, 84, 149, 288. Macpherson : *Annals*, iv. p. 135. A much smaller figure for French commerce is here given. Beausobre : *Politique*, i. pp. 330 *et seq. Dict. du Commerce*, pp. 637, 638. In 1778 Holland had 100 ships in the Levant trade, and in 1779, 111 ships. Mayer : *Considérations politiques et commerciales*, pp. 41-43. The author (1790) gives the annual trade of the Port of Marseilles as follows :—

Exports to Levant	30,000,000 francs.
Imports from Levant	50,000,000 francs.
Exports to West Indies, etc.	17,000,000 francs.
Imports from West Indies, etc.	21,000,000 francs.
Commerce of East Indies	3,500,000 francs.

Mediterranean, British trade in those waters was lower than at any time since 1783. Nelson's victory in Abukir Bay effected a corresponding increase, the imports to Great Britain rising from £42,285, in 1798, to £199,773, in 1800, and the exports from £62,168 to £166,804. It is also fair to say that the exports for 1797 were £23,532, and for 1799, £226,078, and that the imports for 1799, when the results of the victory had not been sufficiently realized to affect trade in Turkey, were only £33,091. The attempt of the English to improve their Mediterranean commerce and to utilize the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez as a route for their Indian trade, had met with serious opposition from the Porte. A decree had been issued (1779) declaring that the Red Sea was the sacred highway of Islam to the holy city of Mecca, and was therefore barred to all infidels. With these facts in mind, it can be clearly seen that the extent of the British interest in the Levant was not due to the economic value of that trade, at least on its positive side. On the negative side, however, the Eastern Question became a matter of great significance, for when Great Britain expected to renew the struggle with France, as in 1785-87, the importance of the Mediterranean trade to France aroused British endeavors to injure that lucrative source of their rival's wealth. The work of Saint-Priest, the French ambassador at the Porte, in stimulating trade between France and Russia via the Black and Mediterranean Seas, had excited alarm in the ports of northern Europe. The conquests of Catherine, at the expense of the Turks, had given her a southern littoral, and there was a prospect that she might gain ports in the Ægean and open the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to whom she would. This possibility is, in fact, the secret of French vacillation at Constantinople. Should a trade route be established between Russia and the south of Europe, in waters where English shipping was comparatively weak, a serious blow would be struck at that most profitable branch of the British commerce, the Baltic trade. Austria had declared that she considered free access

to eastern markets a necessity, and was expecting to share with Russia a sudden development in her Adriatic and Black Sea trade. Under these circumstances, France was not prepared to oppose Russian expansion by force. On the other hand, Frederick the Great had already established a Levant Company, and Prussia was determined that she would utilize her prestige at the Porte to further her commercial interests, while at the same time she increased her trade with Russia in the North. The Dutch states were influenced by similar considerations; and Great Britain's interest was larger than both. That France should secure the major part of Russian trade was a bitter possibility to Great Britain. These views had in all probability an appreciable effect on the formation of the Triple Alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, and Holland (1788). In the event of war against Russia and Austria, the Turks could be counted on to injure Russian commerce in the Black Sea, and thus to aid the three Northern powers, who could, in addition, expect help from Sweden. Such a war would have a disastrous effect on French trade, for it would check the development of that very branch of commerce, — the exchange with Russia via the Black Sea, — which Saint-Priest and Ségur had labored so hard to encourage. France, therefore, opposed the outbreak of hostilities in the East, and while Prussian and British diplomats strengthened the Turks to resist the demands of Russia, Choiseul-Gouffier, then at Constantinople, was instructed to persuade the Porte to yield to the desires of the imperial allies, surrendering some small portion of territory rather than risk the fate of the Ottoman Empire as a European state in a war, which, it seemed certain, would drive the Turks back to Asia.¹

¹ For English trade statistics, cf. App. ii. For English Levant Company in 1720-40, cf. Plumard de Dangeul [Nickolls]: *Remarks on the advantages and disadvantages of France and Great Britain*, pp. 173, 174; Dearborn: *Black Sea*, i. pp. 107, 116; Bonnassieux: *Grandes compagnies*, p. 467, quoting *Gazette de France*, July 1, 1765; Beer: *Oesterreiche Handelspolitik*, p. 396; Favier, in Ségur: *Politique*, i. pp. 288, 326, 365 *et seq.*, and Vergennes in *Ibid.* iii. p. 154. Cf. Antoine:

The proposal to increase French trade in the Mediterranean, and thus to indemnify the losses of France in America and India, was practically a plan to make Levantine commerce a national monopoly and to close the Mediterranean to English ships. Favier had expressed this idea as a redressal of the balance of economic power; it had been the policy of Francis I. and of Henry IV. when engaged in their struggle with Spain; and it found its most eager exponents in men like Arnould, whose book was cited on every hand during the days of the First Republic. The Revolution then seemed destined to be coincident with the solution of the Eastern Question. It had been welcomed by the great Powers of Europe before they realized that it was to become a movement of such widespread importance and danger to them; each had hoped that under cover of the Revolution it might be able to deal with oriental affairs, whether in Poland, Turkey, India, or in Eastern waters, so as to gain in territory or trade. The people of France, however, far from obliterating their country as a political factor in Europe, handled the affairs of the world with enthusiastic patriotism and successful genius. Realizing the vital connection of sea power and commercial progress in the Mediterranean with the Eastern Question, with dominion in Asia, and with control of the world's trade routes, they set themselves to the task of creating a greater France abroad, while trying to create a new France at home. The city of Marseilles, in whose harbor was concentrated the French trade of the Mediterranean, demanded that France should secure the major share of commerce or an equable proportion of territory in the coming struggle over the spoils of the East; and that, above all, English predominance in the waters which that rich city

Commerce de la mer Noire, and Ferrières-Sauvebœuf: *Mémoires historiques, politiques et géographiques des voyages faits en Turquie, en Perse et en Arabie depuis 1782, jusqu'en 1789*, Paris, 1790, 2 vols.; *Chattischerif ossia Rescritto Imperiale di Sultan Abdul Hamid emanato l'anno 1779 per proibire agl'Inglese ed altre nazioni Europee il commercio dell' mare rosso*, in Hammer: *Fundgruben des Orients*, i. pp. 429 et seq.

had so long regarded as tributary to her merchants, should become an impossibility. The belief in France was that Great Britain aspired to the commerce of the whole world; that of the Levant, which was so peculiarly French in its economic and political history, must, therefore, be preserved to France at any cost. In respect to the fate of the Ottoman Empire opinion was divided. It was felt that the realization of any plan for the destruction of that power would be a serious blow to France; but in case the day had come when a final partition of Turkish territory was to be accomplished, it was essential that France should receive a just share of that territory; or, to be more definite, that she should take possession of Egypt and several Greek islands, — a share which diplomats, scholars, and travellers had tentatively assigned to France in the past. If, however, it should appear that more was to be gained by a firm support of a weakened ally, it behooved France to become a bulwark to protect the Porte from the aggression of the rest of Europe. In the mean time greater power on the Mediterranean and along its coasts was necessary, whichever policy France might eventually decide to follow. The pamphleteers discussed these points and debated the character of Turkish rule and the vitality of Islam. Yet, however they might differ as to the method, they united as to the object. France had interests in the Orient which must be cherished and protected from Great Britain. It was the opinion of Frenchmen, therefore, that by increasing her influence and trade in the Levant France would thwart Great Britain, would follow the policy which history and tradition had marked for her, and would best realize the ideal of a Roman imperial republic; in the words of Chenier:—

“ En vain vous [England] prétendez encor
 Appesantir sur l'onde un sceptre tyrannique
 Rois, ministres, guerriers, vainqueurs avec de l'or,
 Triomphant par la foi punique !
 L'univers s'élève : il remet en nos mains

Le soin de recouvrer le public héritage;
 Et les bras des nouveaux Romains
 Renverseront l'autre Carthage.

“ Sur ton sein [the sea] généreux porte-nous des trésors
 De l'onde adriatique et des mers de Bysance
 Appelle et conduis dans nos ports
 Les doux attributs de l'abondance ! ”¹

¹ Arnould : *Balance du commerce*, i. p. 258: “Ce commerce du Levant, réunit, comme l'on voit, tous les avantages. Il devient une école de matelots ; il soutient de nombreux ateliers ; il encourage l'agriculture ou le nourrissage des bestiaux, en favorisant l'emploi des laines récoltées dans nos provinces méridionales ; il fait valoir le sol de nos colonies d'Amerique ; il apporte l'abondance des subsistances dans le midi de la France ; il grossit par les bénéfices de la réexportation, les capitaux destinées à la reproduction du revenu annuel ; enfin, il met perpétuellement de nouveaux poids dans la balance de l'industrie françoise, en alimentant sans cesse nos manufactures de matières premières.” Barral-Montferrat : *op. cit.* i. pp. 325 *et seq.*, 346. Beaujour : *op. cit.* i. pp. 4 *et seq.* ; ii. pp. 305 *et seq.*, 321, 331. Dubroca : *Politique du gouvernement anglais*, pp. 67, 69. Delafonte : *Lettre à M. Herault*, pp. 3, 4, 12, 18, 19, 21, 24-31. Bailleu : *op. cit.* i. pp. 54, 102, 113, 123. Mayer : *Considérations sur l'ordre de Malte*, pp. 6, 7. “Que le clef du Commerce du Levant et de la Méditerranée est dans les mains de l'Ordre, Qu'un nouveau souverain placé sur ce point [Malta] central des deux continens, ouvriroit et fermeroit à son gré le passage à nos vaisseaux : que par la prépondérance absolue que l'alliance de l'Ordre nous assure, le Commerce du Levant enrichit six de nos Provinces, soutient nos Manufactures, occupe une infinité d'ouvriers, alimente notre Commerce d'Amerique, entretient Marseille dans l'état le plus florissant, que par cette prépondérance, la France conserve une alliance intime avec la Porte, et par elle jette des contrepoids toujours surs dans la balance de l'Europe,” p. 43. He closes with an appeal for a Franco-Turkish alliance directed against England in the Levant. Russia and Austria could also be checked in their plans for the despoilment of Turkey, and Russia could be induced by trade to coöperate with France against England. A number of other pamphlets of a similar character to those above cited are to be found noted in the bibliography. Chenier : *Œuvres*, iii. p. 362, “*Hymne — La Reprise de Toulon.*” (Dec. 30, 1793.)

CHAPTER III

NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE AND THE ORIENT : THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION

The New Factors in Politics — Tendencies of the Period : the Classic Revival, the Oriental Revival, the Revolutionary Spirit, the Legend of Charlemagne — Their Influence on Napoleon Bonaparte — His Early Training ; his Books and Notes — Raynal — Analysis of the *Histoire philosophique* — Colonies, Commerce, and Sea Power ; the Trinity of the New Politics — Bonaparte and Charlemagne — The Condition of the Ottoman Empire, 1797 — France and Venice — Bonaparte in Italy — His Interest in the Orient — The Ionian Islands — The Fall of Venice — Malta — Bonaparte and the Directory — The Partition of Turkey — France *versus* England — The Mission of Poussielgue — The Invasion of England — Bonaparte in Paris, 1798 — The Discussion of Plans — The Egyptian Expedition is decided, March — The Authorship of the Plan — Bonaparte's Information about Egypt — Motives for the Expedition — Sketch of the Events — Bonaparte's Policy toward the Porte ; toward the Peoples and Rulers of Egypt, Syria, Greece, and the Barbary States ; and toward the Directory — Bonaparte and Islam — The Mahdi — Egypt and India — The Situation in India, 1793-98 — Tipú-Tib of Mysore — The French in India — Tipú and the Directory — British Opinion regarding the Egyptian Expedition ; its Menace to British Power in Asia — The Khalif, Tipú, and the British Authorities — The Last War with Mysore, 1798 — Tipú and Bonaparte — The French at Suez and on the Red Sea — The Death of Tipú — British Policy in India, in Persia, and toward the Far East — The Evolution of Asiatic Politics — The Situation in Europe — The Second Coalition — Success of the Allies — Their Jealousies — Bonaparte's Return to France — The Reasons for the Failure of the Expedition — Its Influence on the Eastern Question.

WE have followed the diplomatic and economic development of the Eastern Question during the last quarter of the eighteenth century ; we have seen how great an influence oriental affairs had on the policies of Europe ; and we have observed that Asiatic problems themselves changed in character under pressure from the political expansion of Europe and the econo-

mic demands of the West. Each of the great Powers of Europe had now become interested in oriental matters; colonial and Asiatic questions were now to be linked in a vast world-problem. Statesmen could no longer depend merely on land power; they must recognize in sea power a factor unknown to the Eastern Question since the sixteenth century; and they must perceive that dominion in Asia was both a prize worth fighting for and an important element in the history of European nations. It was the fate of France at this juncture to be both served and led by Napoleon Bonaparte, a man whose interest in the Orient were deep and lasting. He touched the Eastern Question and the colonial problem, as he did all the nearer questions of Europe, with a touch which is felt to this day. The ideas which he brought to his task and the conditions under which he was trained for his career thus had much to do, not only with his own personal treatment of these matters, but also with their historical development. For a better understanding of these things, therefore, it is necessary to glance at certain tendencies of the period in which he was born. First among these is the classical revival. The eighteenth century was marked by the heralding of a new propaganda in philosophy and by a return to the ideals of the ancient world. Rome exerted an incomparable influence in the midst of an essentially modern society. The French, made familiar through wonderful translations with the best of classic authors, absorbed the spirit of a literature that was imperial — Augustan — in its mission. The classicism reproduced in French writings may have been false; but politically the revival was of great importance. Every device which strengthened the impression that the new Republic was but continuing the mission of the old, received joyful and passionate acclaim. The great struggle of the ancient democracy had been with Carthage, the mistress of the sea; the mighty empire of the Phœnicians had fallen before the insignificant naval power of Latium. That in such and such a year of the French Republic, England, the modern

Carthage, the second queen of commerce and trade, should fall before the successors of the Scipios seemed not impossible to French ambition.¹

The progress of oriental studies was a cognate movement. The missionary work of the Jesuits, the commercial and colonial development, the expansion of the Russian Empire, the numerous explorations in Asia, Africa, and Oceanica, and the growth of a scientific spirit of investigation had all combined to make the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an epoch in oriental philological and historical investigation. France had played no small part in this movement. Her writers were authorities, and her government and people were in sympathy with the advancement of knowledge regarding the East. Both the Peyssonnels, de Tott, Volney, and many others were busy preaching the new evangel of the Orient. The star of the French Empire was to be seen moving eastward, and French travellers and scholars were the new astronomers. The political developments in eastern Europe and in India at once stimulated interest in the peoples and institutions of Asia and led to the rehabilitation of ancient and oriental history, both as a subject for serious study and as a text for contemporary events. Catherine's "Greek Plan" and Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition undoubtedly led to a scientific revival of the study of Ancient Greece and Egypt; but they were also directed themselves in large measure by the scientific and literary interest which was part of the spirit of the age. The importance of the Orient and the necessity for knowledge concerning it were manifested by the establishment in Paris of a "School for the Study of Modern Oriental Languages." Langlès was largely instrumental in accomplishing this; and he was placed at the

¹ Texte: *Rousseau et le Cosmopolitisme*, pp. 418 et seq., 423. A short list is given of some of the works published. Paulin Paris: *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, in *Bibliophile française*, i. pp. 228 et seq. Masson: *Dépt. des aff. étrang.* pp. 330, 410. Malmesbury: *Diaries*, iii. p. 544. Chenier: *Œuvres*, iii. pp. 186, 187, 362, 391. Pingaud: *Choiseul-Gouffier*, pp. 18 et seq., 67 et seq., 137 et seq. Renard: *L'Influence de l'antiquité classique sur la littérature française (passim)*.

head of the institution for which he had appealed, almost entirely on political and diplomatic grounds (1795). Volney, the scholar and traveller, was attached to the foreign office; and ten thousand copies of his "*Simplification des langues orientales*" were distributed by order of the Committee of Public Safety. The School was of the greatest value to the French people; its pupils became the emissaries of Napoleon, and its history is intimately connected with that of a diplomacy which has operated in India, Persia, Egypt, Algiers, and Turkey. The intimate relations existing between politician and philosopher, statesman and scholar, make these intellectual movements of still greater importance. The Frenchman reading his Cæsar, his Livy, his Plutarch, or his Strabo, was a practical politician. He was guided by geography and history.¹

Geographical situation has given permanence to the political genius of France. Even before Charlemagne, her kings were summoned to redress the balance of power in lands beyond her eastern border. The subsidies drawn from the Emperors at Constantinople for this and like services and the trade developed with the Levant became a source of steadily-increasing income to her people. The great personality of Charlemagne, whose shadow reaches across the centuries to Philip Augustus and Napoleon, was used as a lay figure, about which were twined the ideals and ambitions of a nation. It is the legend of his work and policy which impressed the minds of men. It was he, according to the story, who received an embassy from Harun-al-Rashid, presenting the titles to the shrines of Christendom. He was the first royal Crusader and pilgrim. After leaving an army in the north to ward off any attack of the Normans, he set sail for the Orient with

¹ Benfey: *Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft*, pp. 239, 263, 326. E. Charavay: *L'Orientaliste Langlès, in Révolution française*, xvi. (1889), p. 136. Masson: *Aff. étrang.* pp. 314 (note), 331, 412. I have included in the Bibliography the titles of a few of the works on oriental subjects which appeared at this time in France, which either exerted any influence in directing public attention to the East, or which were of political significance.

a fleet collected in the harbors of Venice and Ancona. He fought the Saracens, destroying their false gods, conquered England for the Church, and received "*Costantinoble*" at the hand of Roland. He achieved in story and song that which every ruler of France since his day has hoped to realize in fact.¹ These ancient traditions, old as France herself, were not obliterated by the Revolution; rather were they enlivened till they became political ideals for guidance in coming crises. Though it is impossible to discuss here the spirit of the Revolution, one fact must be pointed out, that the Revolution itself made no break in the course of French foreign policy. It is true that the Revolutionary spirit became for a time a kind of new religious faith, yet its propagation was carried on by applying old political principles, by maintaining the traditions and the system of the France of history.²

¹ Procopius: *De bello gothico*, lib. i. c. 5 in Niebuhr: *Corp. Scrip. Byz.* xix. p. 27. Agathias: *Historiarum*, lib. ix. c. 20, 62. Barbeyrac, in Dumont: *Supple.* i. part 2, art. 179. Mezeray: *Hist. de France*, i. p. 238. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révol.* i. p. 246. Poeto Saxo: *Ann. de Gestis B. Caroli Magni*, lib. iv. ind. 9. Pertz: *Mon. Ger.* iii. p. 710. Leibnitz: *Alberici*, Ann. 802, ii. p. 133. Tudebodus; *Hist. de Hierosolymitano Itinere*, in Du Chesne, iv. p. 777. Eginhard: *Vita Carol. Mag.* ann. 797. Graetz: *Gesch. der Juden*, v. pp. 184, 185. Dubois: *De recuperatione*, pp. 5, 8, 18 (cf. Lebœuf in *Hist. et mém. de l'Acad. des inscrip.* xxi. p. 126, and in Leber: *Collection*, xviii. pp. 86-106. Foncecagne in Leber: *Ibid.* xviii. pp. 107-116). Auracher: *Pseudo-Turpin*, p. 24. Paris: *Hist. poetique de Charlemagne*, p. 295. Michel: *Chanson de Roland*, p. 15 (str. xxvii. v. 8), p. 90 (str. clxix. v. 16). Roland, dying, tells of his conquests for Charlemagne.

"Jo l'en cunquis Baiver e tute Flandres
E Burguigne e trestute Puillanie
Costentinoble, dunt il ont la fiance,
E en Saisonie fait-il ço qu'il demandet;
E Engleterre que il teneit sa cambre."

Cf. Förster: *Christian von Troyes sämtliche Werke, Cligès*, v. 30-44.

² Burke: *op. cit.* iii. p. 394. Stern: *Das Leben Mirabeaus*, ii. p. 246. De Tocqueville: *L'Ancien Régime*, l. i. c. 3, p. 15. Taine: *L'Ancien Régime*, l. iii. c. 3, p. 267, and *La Révolution*, ii. p. 67. Mallet du Pan: *Corr.* ii. p. 135. Montégut: *La Démocratie et la Révolution*, in *R. d. D. M.* cc. pp. 425 et seq. Aulard: *Dipl. de la Comité de Salut Public*, in *Révolution franç.* xviii. p. 130. Lavallée: *op. cit.*

What then of the training of the Corsican lad who was to bridge the gulf between an artillery subaltern and a French Emperor? His boyhood was spent by the shores of the Mediterranean, where the world's trade passed by, rich with supplies from the mysterious East; his youth was occupied with study, especially that of history, and his mind was fascinated early by things oriental. Born again of the spirit of the Revolution, its child and heir by right of that birth to the history and traditions of which it was a part, Napoleon Bonaparte was destined to become a rival to Alexander and the Cæsars. Nature had done her share in moulding the boy; the printed page stimulated and guided the youth. Thus the man spoke from a full mind, yet as no pedant, but as a well-trained workman in politics. There is indeed no study of any part of Bonaparte's career which is so self-revealing as the examination of the books he read and the notes he wrote while in school and as a young officer. General works on practical politics and philosophy and the principles of artillery tactics form a group by themselves; they are greatly outweighed by the vast amount of purely historical literature which he made his own. Plutarch's Lives, Strabo, and the Republic of Plato, were books he loved. Among more modern volumes, history of every description ranks first, and in his own notes it again takes the major place. The classical and oriental revivals and the colonial and economic questions of the day had their influence with him and guided him in his choice of books. An examination of his notes, based on his reading, reveals much. Masson's edition of Bonaparte's notes has fifty-two printed pages on the Republic and Rollin's Ancient History. On the latter there is a detailed syllabus treating of Persia, Assyria, Scythia, Thrace, Greece, Crete, Greater Greece, and Egypt. Bonaparte comments: "It is at Alexandria, founded by Alexander on the Nile, that the commerce of the Orient is

pp. 1, 2. Sorel: *L'Europe et la Révol.* i. pp. 238, 258, 321 *et seq.*, 334, 545; ii. pp. 532 *et seq.*; iii. p. 144.

carried on.”¹ The most careful analyses are those regarding the Persians, Greeks, and Arabs. Seventy-four pages are devoted to an outline of English history and a brief minute on the finances of the French East India Company. At Brienne he read and committed to memory long passages of Vertot’s History of the Knights of Malta. Baron de Tott, whose travels in Central Asia, Turkey, Syria, and Egypt were famous at the time, was a favorite author, and his book was carefully digested and annotated. Such passages as this, “Egypt is so situated as to combine the commerce of Europe, Africa and the East Indies” apparently made an impression on the mind of the reader, as did the generally favorable description of that country.² Volney is another writer on the same general subject, and at a later period he was enabled to influence Bonaparte more directly by personal intercourse along a line distinctly sympathetic with the Egyptian Expedition. The history and government of Venice were also matters which he thoroughly investigated.³ Sixteen pages of Masson are occupied with notes on Marigny’s History of the Arabs; and we also find a story of oriental adventure by Bonaparte himself, entitled “Le Masque Prophète.” St. Helena is mentioned among various notes on geography, and an estimate of the earnings of the British East India Company gives the figure at 79,874,872

¹ Masson: *Napoléon Inconnu*, i. pp. 285 *et seq.*, 318, 319. Bonaparte writes: “Le commerce de la Perse, de l’Inde, de l’Arabie s’est fait pendant plusieurs siècles par la voie de la mer Rouge et du Nil. Le passage par le Cap de Bonne-Espérance que les Portugais ont découvert a fait négliger absolument l’ancienne voie.” Notes on Charles Rollin: *Histoire ancienne*, Paris, 1734-40, 13 vols. Du Casse: *Mémoires de Joseph*, i. p. 32.

² Masson: *op. cit.* i. pp. 340 *et seq.*, 431, 433 *et seq.* John Barrow: *Histoire d’Angleterre* (translation), Paris, 1771, 10 vols. Chuquet: *Jeunesse de Napoléon*, i. pp. 105, 129, 136. De Tott: *Mémoires*, ii. pp. 251, 274 *et seq.* (on the Suez canal); 287 *et seq.* (Egypt is described as possessing a rich soil, salubrious climate, a wretched people, and a weak government.)

³ Masson: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 20 *et seq.* Amelot de la Houssaie: *Histoire du gouvernement de Venise avec des notes historiques et politiques*, Lyon, 1740, 3 vols. Sainte-Beuve: *Causées de Lundi*. (Berger: *Volney*) vii. pp. 408, 427.

livres. Voltaire's writings on China, India, Babylon, and Muhammad received greater attention than did his philosophy; though the preaching of the political and social reformers of the time did not fall on deaf ears. A mass of notes on almost every conceivable subject is remarkable in that over half of them treat of matters east of the Adriatic. Cyrus, Alexander, and Muhammad were the three men who most appealed to him from the pages of oriental history.¹

There is one work, however, which at that time ranked among the great productions of a great age. If Favier's famous book, "*Les conjectures raisonnées sur l'état de l'Europe*," deserves to be called "the Bible of the true diplomat," the Abbé Raynal was its inspired interpreter. The *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*, was to the *Conjectures raisonnées* what the fiery eloquence of the *Contrat social* was to the measured power of the *Esprit des Lois*. Sorel calls Raynal "the prophet of the diplomacy of the Revolution." He applied geography and political economy to history and turned the study of statistics and descriptions of the tropics into a manual of practical politics. He invoked Peace, but caused War; he was among the first writers of economic history, world-wide in its plan, recognizing the new conditions which made war a struggle for bread, and commerce and colonies the pledges of power. Yet he was not the sole representative of this point of view; the very fact that edition after edition was exhausted shows the great demand which the public were making for an interpretation of the new politics of the world. His views on India were shared by many other writers; his clearness of thought and power of expression drove them home to the hearts of

¹ Masson: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 1 et seq., 17 et seq., 49 ("Ste. Hélène, petite île"), 51, 52, 258 et seq., 268 et seq. Marigny: *Histoire des Arabes*, Paris, 1750, 4 vols. Lacroix: *La Géographie moderne*, Paris, 1747. Voltaire: *Les annales de l'Empire depuis Charlemagne*, and *L'Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*. These were naturally the two works which appealed to Bonaparte peculiarly.

men. It is, then, but natural that the young Napoleon should have received this book with the greatest eagerness, read it with the closest attention, annotated it and pondered over its pages, dedicated to their author in youthful, yet sincere flattery his own literary production, the *History of Corsica*, and finally, possessed by the theories which Raynal had propounded, endeavored to realize in the history of the next quarter-century the ideas he had received in the unforgotten student days at Valence.¹

The general scheme and argument of Raynal's work are as follows: The author surveys in an introductory chapter the history of colonial enterprise in the past, and then treats in turn the establishments of each European nation in both hemispheres, concluding with a general discussion of the underlying causes for the present situation and of the methods in vogue. Here he says with regard to England's success and its causes: "It is not, as has been hitherto imagined, war alone that settles the superiority of nations; for the last half-century commerce has had a much greater influence in it. While the continental powers measured and partitioned Europe into unequal shares, which diplomacy balanced by its leagues, treaties, and combinations, a maritime nation formed, as it were, a new system, in which by their industry the land was made subject to the sea, as Nature herself has decreed by her laws. They created or developed this exten-

¹ Masson: *op. cit.* i. pp. 334 *et seq.*; Grosjean: *Mission de Sémonville*, in *Révolution française*, xiii. p. 891. Sorel: *L'Europe et la révolution française*, i. pp. 308, 309. Arnould: *Balance du commerce*, i. p. 48. Gomel: *Causes financières*, ii. p. 27. Ségur: *Mémoires, souvenirs et anecdotes* i. p. 150. Legoux de Flaix: *L'Indoustan*, i. pp. 395 *et seq.* Breton: *Notice sur Raynal*, in *Mém de l'Institut*, i. p. xv. *et seq.* Raynal was not the real author of the entire work. Diderot was responsible for much of the philosophy, and Raynal's position was in some respects only that of a compiler. Diderot: *Œuvres*, i. p. xvii; iv. p. 107; xx. pp. 103, 104. Jung: *Bonaparte et son temps*, i. p. 162. Mallet du Pan: *Mémoires* (ed. Sayous, Eng. trans.), i. pp. 45 *et seq.* G. T. Raynal: *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*. Geneva, 1780-81. 10 vols. 8vo.

sive commerce, founded upon an excellent agriculture, flourishing manufactures and the richest possessions in the four quarters of the globe. It is this sort of universal monarchy that Europe ought to wrest from England, thereby restoring to each maritime state the liberty and power that it ought to have upon that element which surrounds it."¹ The fundamental principle of the book is that commerce is power, and that the strength of a nation lies in a colonial empire supported by trade. Trade routes and strategic positions are discussed. The English had strengthened the Cape of Good Hope route to the East by fixing upon St. Helena as a port of call. The French, if guided by La Bourdonnais, would have taken two of the islands off the East coast of Africa, and, on the outbreak of hostilities, with the Île de France as a naval base, could have cut England's communications with India.² The routes to India from the eastern end of the Mediterranean are described at length. Two in particular are mentioned: one, from some Syrian port across the desert to Persia via Aleppo and Baghdad, and thence either by land to Malabar, or down the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf, and by sea to India; and the other, via Egypt and the Red Sea. Especial attention is paid to the latter; and a glowing description of Arabia and Arabian trade, together with a discussion of the strategic value of the Red Sea, give it peculiar interest. It appears to have attracted Bonaparte, for he comments at length on this chapter.³ As regards

¹ Raynal: *op. cit.* x. p. 152.

² Raynal: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 184, 185.

³ Raynal: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 48-155, p. 61. "The situation of its [Aden] harbour, which opened an easy communication with Egypt, Ethiopia, India, and Persia, had rendered it for many ages one of the most flourishing factories in Asia." Masson: *op. cit.* i. pp. 334, 335 (Bonaparte's notes on Raynal): "Sous les Ptolémies, l'Égypte fit le commerce par la mer Rouge, mais les uns passaient par le Golfe Persique et les îles de Madagascar, les autres s'arrêtaient à l'île de Ceylon; quelques-uns allaient au Coromandel pour remonter le Gange. Leurs voyages duraient six ans, tandis que nous le faisons en six mois." Here follows a list of commodities carried by the Egyptians. "Toutes les nations commerçantes

access to India from the north, the statements are also well worth consideration, for the writer shows with great clearness the invulnerable position of Russia and the natural advantages which would accrue to her, at comparatively little expenditure of men or money, as soon as the plans formulated by Peter the Great should be pushed to completion. The history of the rise of Russia is perhaps the most suggestive piece of work in the book, and reveals a master hand. It was claimed that Russia and China were united in a natural way, which must, in the end, be for the advantage of the European power. In this region, also, the trade-routes were partly by water. The connection by them between east and west is shown to have been of ancient origin, and, according to the writer, they formed a series of avenues for approach to the southeast either for trade or war.¹

allaient dans les ports d'Égypte prendre les marchandises des Indes. La naissance de l'Empire mahométan affaiblit le commerce d'Égypte, et le commerce des Indes prit deux autres routes : la première par Constantinople, la mer Noire par l'Euphrate jusqu'à Serapana ; de là, par le moyen de quatre ou cinq jours de voiture, ils arrivaient au fleuve Cyrus, puis à la mer Caspienne, où l'on remontait l'Oxus ; ensuite, par l'Indus. L'on revenait par le même chemin. L'autre moyen était moins compliqué ; le golfe Persique, l'Euphrate, de là à Palmyre par terre où des caravanes allaient jusqu'aux bords de Syrie. Lorsque Palmyre fut détruite, les caravanes prirent la route d'Alep et du port d'Alexandrette. Dans les derniers temps, les Vénitiens avaient persuadé aux Mamelucs, souverains d'Égypte, moyennant une rétribution, à leur laisser tenter le commerce de l'Inde. Les Gênois, les Pisans, les Florentins, les Catalans en profitèrent. Tel était l'état du commerce lorsque les Portugais découvrirent le passage du Cap de Bonne-Espérance."

¹ Raynal: *op. cit.* iii. pp. 129 *et seq.*, 147. It is fair to suppose that passages such as these may have had some influence upon Napoleon in directing him to invade Russia, with possibly India as an ultimate destination. At a time but little subsequent to the reading of this book he did endeavor to secure his transfer to the Russian service. Waliszewski: *Autour d'un trône*, p. 62. Masson: *op. cit.* ii. p. 526. Mention must be made here of Bonaparte's attempt in 1795 to enter the Turkish artillery service. Napoléon: *Correspondance*, Nos. 56, 61, 64, 65. Jung: *Bonaparte et son temps*, iii. pp. 58 *et seq.*, 408, 409. It was the age when the peculations of Anglo-Indian officials were the theme of parliamentary discussions. Napoleon himself broached the plan of entering the English service in order that he might return from the Indies "rich as a nawab." Jung: *Lucien*

From the conflict between France and Great Britain which began in 1744, Raynal drew several lessons. In India the English had previously defeated the Dutch and Portuguese, and against France their methods of attack were the same. Everywhere they aimed at their enemy's commerce, while the French exhausted all their strength in a struggle to seize territory from which they could not hope to profit. At the conclusion of peace in 1763, the English were practically in control along the coast of Arabia, on the Persian Gulf, in Malabar, Coromandel, and Bengal, while the French had everywhere sunk into inactivity. The stakes for which France and England had waged a war upon so wide a field were those which in the past had "tempted the first conquerors of the world." The Empire of the Great Mughal, it was alleged, exceeded in wealth and luxury the wildest dreams of western kings. As regards the future, Raynal was hopeful. He recalled the fact that France still had a number of possessions in the East; her defeat had been due rather more to chance, and to lack of co-operation at home, than to the prowess of English arms. In fact, since 1763 the oppression of the victors had already alienated the Indian princes. "A fatal reverse of fortune" threatened the English. At the sight of French standards the afflicted native sovereigns of India would gladly spring to arms, and the present tyrannical foreign rulers would be assailed by land and sea, did France but accept the opportunity offered to her. With victory, the French would emerge from their present humiliating condition; "they would become the idols of the princes and peoples of Asia"; and profiting by past mistakes the great rival power might at last be overthrown.¹

Bonaparte, i. p. 74. Lucien, the same year in which this happened, tried to secure a place with Sémonville, then under appointment for his second attempt to reach Constantinople. Jung: *op. cit.* i. p. 100. The Orient apparently had strong attractions for the entire family.

¹ Raynal: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 46, 196, 382, 389, 493. The Île de France was a con-

The opening proposition of the work is that commercial nations are those which have civilized the world. The conclusion is an eloquent apostrophe to sea-power as a force which has revolutionized history, and made tributary to the harbors of Europe the richest and most distant lands of the globe. The position which Great Britain occupies, the writer continues, is due to her navy, which she regards as her rampart, "the source of her riches," and the pivot of her hopes. The balance of power has departed from the continent; it rests with the maritime nations, and upon their fleets depends the destiny of many peoples.¹ Bonaparte acquired from this book a share in that community of French thought whose development we have traced. He learned to consider England as the most dangerous rival of France, to regard her as injured when India, the alleged source of her riches, had been wrested from her; and as conquered only when, shorn of sea-power and colonial possessions, her empire of trade had passed across the channel to the ports of France. In his own words many years later, — to win he must have sea-power, and that only as the result of an attack upon England at home and abroad. It was the task of a new Charlemagne.²

Bonaparte had read also in Voltaire that "Charlemagne, le plus ambitieux, le plus politique, et le plus grand guerrier de son siècle, fit la guerre aux Saxons trente années avant de les assujétir pleinement. . . . Enfin, Charlemagne, maître d'Italie, comme de l'Allemagne et de France, juge du pape, arbitre de l'Europe, vient à Rome à la fin de l'année 799.

stant menace to England's line of communication, and at the outbreak of war France must expect an attack upon that important position, p. 483.

¹ Raynal: *op. cit.* x. pp. 197 *et seq.*

² Vandal: *Napoléon et Alexandre I.* i. p. 6: "Napoléon avait tout conquis, sauf la paix. Derrière chaque ennemi vaincu, il retrouvait l'Angleterre en armes, préparant contre lui des nouvelles coalitions." Napoléon: *Commentaires*, iv. p. 441: "Qui [la République] était en 1800 tout aussi inférieure sur la mer qu'en 1798. Si l'on eût été maître de la mer, on eût marché droit à la fois sur Londres, sur Dublin, et sur Calcutta, c'était pour le deviner que la République voulait posséder l'Égypte."

. . . Léon III. le proclame empereur d'Occident pendant la messe, le jour de Noël."¹ Napoleon I. wrote to Cardinal Fesch: "Pour le Pape, je suis Charlemagne, parceque, comme Charlemagne, je réunis la couronne de France à celle des Lombards, et que mon empire confine avec l'Orient."² Repudiating the rights and position which belonged to the Kings of France of the second and third dynasties, he dated his heritage back to the time when the Pope was only the Bishop of Rome, and the spiritual power rested on the temporal. Bonaparte crossed the Alps before his "thirty years" of war against the descendants of the Saxons had barely begun. He reversed the search of Columbus, who had sailed into the West to secure the wealth of the East, and marched to the East to reach the power of France's rival in the West. The propaganda of the Revolution changed in his mind to the mission of a Pro-consul carrying with his legions the rule of Rome, upon his eagles the law of a conquering republic.³ They likened him to Epaminondas, to Miltiades; he in turn proclaimed to his soldiers that, in conquering Italy they had struck at England; in defeating the army of Austria they had beaten its ruler, the imperial employee of London store-keepers; and in seizing Ancona, that they were within twenty-four hours' sail of Macedonia. The image of Alexander of Macedon, encamped on the banks of the Indus, may have risen before his eyes. He received the Italian bishops with friendliness, as befitted one who was to become the "Sword of the Church," "Her eldest Son," "the protector of Christianity in the Orient," the successor to the "Most Christian Kings."⁴ By the treaty of Pressburg

¹ Voltaire: *Essais sur les mœurs*, ch. xv., xvi.

² Napoléon: *Correspondance*, No. 9656, Jan. 7. 1806; cf. No. 9805 (to the Pope, Feb. 13, 1806).

³ Napoléon: *op. cit.* Nos. 10237, 10399, 9831, 9971.

⁴ Napoléon: *op. cit.* Nos. 1511, 1552, 9762, 9929, 6273 (to the Pope, Aug. 28, 1802. The position of France as protector of Oriental Christianity is to be restored); 6274 (to the Archbishop of Paris): "J'ai réunis sous notre protection

the dream of Francis I. of France was to be realized. Austria had not an acre of ground in Italy; but the time had not yet come for that. The "war to the death" was with England, whose fleets ranged the Mediterranean. The Spaniards had been won over, as has been told. They were to receive Gibraltar at one end and France was to secure Egypt at the other; then indeed the Latin lake of Louis XIV. would be a reality. In the meantime the Venice of which Napoleon had read in the pages of Amelot de la Houssaie demanded his attention. Her ancient sea-power might be restored, and, in his giant imagination, her insular possessions became stepping-stones to the Levant. As we shall see, he knew nothing of Leibnitz and his *Consiliacum ægyptiacum*; but he had read Raynal, de Tott, Marigny, and Rollin. Their histories had been his nourishment. His military power he had gained independently from his politics; now they were combined in the mind of the successful leader.¹

He was a leader, because as a student he had recognized the new conditions of political success. The policy of economic aggrandizement, which had found its expression in the political writings of the eighteenth century was based on the maxim that the commercial progress of a nation depended on the extension of its political system to the territory from which it was to draw its supplies, and to the markets in which it hoped to sell. The doctrine of the natural boundaries of political sovereignty expanded at the command of this economic system. It was the age when trade followed only the flag, and when the flag was welcomed only in the harbors which recognized it as the emblem of political sovereignty. Trans-marine possessions had entered into the

speciale le Saint Sepulcre et tous les chrétiens de l'Orient"; 6495 (Chinese missions). Sorel: *Bonaparte et Hoche*, pp. 31 et seq., 73, 86. Metternich: *Nachgelassene Papiere*, i. p. 280.

¹ Masson: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 506 et seq. Metternich: *Nachgelassene Papiere*, ii. p. 4. Pisani: *La Dalmatie (1797-1815)*, pp. 145, 146. Ségur: *Hist et mémoires*, ii. p. 478. Lumbroso: *Napoleone I. e Inghilterra*, pp. 456 et seq.

sphere of the old system. The legend of Charlemagne had come down across the centuries, but if France were to have an emperor he must be greater than Charlemagne; he must build an empire which should take into consideration modern conditions and ideals. The science of war had changed; printing had succeeded writing; the new astronomy had made the radius of politics a circle of latitude; the obligation to protect commerce and to foster industries had supplanted that of bearing the crusader's emblem. The new empire must claim oriental potentates as vassals; it must have a navy to drive the enemy from tropical harbors, and ships to bring home the gold and spices of the Indies. History itself had expanded, and Napoleon recognized it when he said: "Vivre sans commerce, sans marine, sans colonies, et soumis à l'injuste volonté de nos ennemis, ce n'est pas vivre en Français." It was the voice of a new Charlemagne.¹

Such was the training of Napoleon Bonaparte. We must now turn to examine the condition of the Orient whose empire he coveted, and to follow the preparations made by him for his first attempt to realize his early hopes. The Ottoman Empire was in a most critical condition. The plans for its partition had not been accomplished; but the treaty of Jassy, signed January 9, 1792, had ended a bloody and exhausting war with Russia by a further increase of Russian territory, which now extended as far as the river Dniestr. The accession of Selim III. in 1789, and the conclusion of hostilities with a foreign foe had been the signal for widespread internal dissensions. The new Sultan was bent on reforming the government, introducing European methods and ideas, and practically abolishing the entire feudal system with one decree. Many provinces were practically independent of Constantinople; every Pasha, who felt himself strong enough, refused either taxes or tribute to the Sultan; and the corruption and oppression of irresponsible

¹ Napoléon: Corr. Nos. 9216, 9929.

local officials increased the sufferings of the people tenfold. It was the anarchy of tottering feudalism without a strong central power to absorb and control. As regards religious affairs the Druze and Matawali sects were in rebellion in Mount Lebanon; and all Arabia, save Mecca and Medina, was practically subject to the Puritan Wahhabis, who fought with the traditional courage and dash of early and uncorrupted Islam. It was the period when the empire would have been most vulnerable to foreign attacks; but Bonaparte's Italian campaigns had called all the forces of Austria to the west, and Russia was not prepared to move alone, until her last acquisitions in Poland were more thoroughly amalgamated with the Empire. The hope of freedom from Turkish rule which the "Greek plan" of Catherine II. had aroused in the minds of the subject population south of the Balkans had been almost extinguished by her abandonment of those who had risen as her allies in rebellion against the Porte. The poorer Greeks, influenced by the religious ties which united them to the great northern power, had looked to her for help in the struggle toward a national existence. The educated and commercial classes, however, under the inspiration of the Revolution, were ready to turn to France, as the founder of republics in Italy, and as a possible deliverer from Ottoman rule in Greece. There were, therefore, in Turkey three elements, with which any power having an oriental policy in view, must reckon, and which she might use to her own advantage: the weakness of the central government, which exposed it to foreign intervention thrust upon it in the guise of friendship to terminate the internal disorders; the strength of certain rebellious Pashas such as Passwan Oglu of Widdin, Ali Pasha of Janina, or Djezzar of Acre, who might intrigue with a foreign force to secure their own complete independence even at the expense of the destruction of the Empire; and the disaffected and revolutionary spirit in the entire Balkan peninsula, which was ready to burst into

open rebellion with the slightest encouragement. Bonaparte and his agents availed themselves of all these methods in turn. He invaded Egypt with the excuse that the Mamelukes were in rebellion against the Sultan, and that he was about to restore Egypt to her rightful ruler; he intrigued with Ali, encouraged Passwan Oglu, and tried to seduce Djeddar; he sent revolutionary agents into Greece, used, among others, the poet-patriot Rhigos, and allowed himself to be hailed as the future liberator of Greece. It was a masterly use of every tool at a period when Ottoman power was at its nadir.¹

In 1793 the French had warned Venice that the realization of Austria's schemes for expansion on the Adriatic must be the death blow of that republic; we have seen that the secret

¹ Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, xviii. pp. 134-140 (Kotchubey's despatches in the winter of 1797-98). Pisani: *La Dalmatie*, pp. 41, 49 *et seq.*, 114, 115. Rodocanachi: *Bonaparte et les îles ioniennes*, pp. 68, 91. Stephanopolos: *Voyage en Grèce*, i. pp. 3, 69 *et seq.*, 75, 111, 185, 188-194; ii. pp. 138 *et seq.*, 150 *et seq.*, 213. Napoléon: *Corr. Nos.* 2104, 2105 (to Pasha of Scutari); 2047, 2056 (to Chief of the Maniotes), 2061, 2106, 2196, 2684 (to Ali Pasha from Malta, June 19, 1798), 2719. Swanton-Bélloc: *Napoléon et les Grecs*, pp. 54, 56, 64-102, 373. Eton: *Survey of Turkish Empire*, p. 495 (a very instructive passage). Antonopoulos: *Bonaparte et la Grèce*, in *Nouvelle revue* (1889), ix. pp. 254-261. Wilkinson: *Dalmatia and Montenegro*, ii. pp. 361 *et seq.* Buckhardt: *Notes on the Wahabeyes*, pp. 273 *et seq.*, 277, 425. Arnold: *The Preaching of Islam*, pp. 153, 158 *et seq.*, 230, 265, 299, 345 *et seq.* Hughes: *Albania*, ii. pp. 149 *et seq.* Holland: *Travels*, pp. 66, 103-133, 274. Hobhouse: *Travels*, i. pp. 101-112; ii. pp. 46 *et seq.* 388. Coquelle: *Hist. de Montenegro*, pp. 249, 255. Mendelssohn: *Griechenland*, i. pp. 70 *et seq.*, 92 *et seq.* Zinkeisen, *Gesch. des osman. Reiches*, vii. pp. 3-17, 34-45, 84-94, 194 *et seq.*, 318-328. Juchereau de St. Denys: *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman*, ii. pp. 59 *et seq.*, 387 *et seq.* Finlay: *Hist. of Greece*, vi. pp. 33 *et seq.*, 39, 97. Hertzberg: *Griechenland*, iii. pp. 255 *et seq.*, 287, 299 *et seq.* Rhizos: *Hist. de la Grèce moderne*, pp. 137 *et seq.*, 241, and *Cours de la littérature grecque*, pp. 45, 157, 179. Rangabé: *Hist. littéraire de la Grèce*, i. pp. 104, 114, 187. Legrand: *Chansons grecques*, pp. 105-116. Byron: *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, pp. 223 *et seq.*, 273. Fauriel: *Chants de la Grèce*, ii. pp. 15 *et seq.* Lübke: *Neugriechische Lieder*, pp. 317 *et seq.* Leake: *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. pp. 54, 463, 507, and *Travels in Morea*, i. p. 314, and *Researches in Greece*, pp. 83 *et seq.*, 92, 140, 153. Raybaud: *Mémoire sur la Grèce*, pp. 488 *et seq.* Pouqueville: *Voyage en Morée*, ii. pp. 176 *et seq.*, and *Régénération de la Grèce*, i. p. 124; ii. pp. 388 *et seq.*

treaty of January, 1795, between Austria and Russia included such plans. In time the intention of the Directory became more earnest; they wished to draw Venice from her neutral position. Sandoz-Rollin, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, spoke of an alliance with Venice in order to check Austria; and with similar views the French representative at the Porte, Verninac, suggested a defensive alliance of France, Spain, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire. This matter was urged on the Venetian diplomats at Madrid, Constantinople, and Paris; but Venice still declared her desire to maintain her neutrality. The offer of a defensive alliance with France was also refused, in the summer of 1796; and though, on May 29, Bonaparte had assured Venice that her neutrality would be respected, he soon made demands for supplies to be furnished the French armies. A little later the general wrote to the Directory of the weakness of the ancient city, of her potential naval strength, and of the importance of her port to English trade. Other events also had effect in the matter. The evacuation of Corsica by the English a few weeks later aided the plan for French domination in the Mediterranean; and the French in Italy hastened their efforts to gain control of the Adriatic. The Directory in the meantime, while considering terms of peace with Austria, had suggested the abandonment of Italy and indemnification for France on the Rhine and in America. This, however, was by no means Bonaparte's plan. He talked of marching on Vienna and inciting rebellion in Hungary. In any event the economic, political and naval decadence of Venice, her importance strategically, and the value of her transmarine and insular possessions, had marked her for a sacrifice to either French or Austrian greed. It had become a matter of purely political expediency. The Venetian territories and Dalmatia and Albania were open roads to the heart of the Ottoman dominions; they outflanked Austria, strengthened the control of Italy, and, with the Ionian Islands,

formed an unrivalled approach to the Levant.¹ The capture of Ancona by the French revealed the train of thought in Bonaparte's mind. He wrote that, after Venice, it was the only harbor of importance on that coast; that a sail of twenty-four hours ended in Macedonia; that Constantinople was but ten days distant; and that the possession of Ancona was essential to France, giving her power on the Adriatic, increased influence with the Porte, and a strong military position. The people of France, however, cared more for the left bank of the Rhine than they did for the coast of the Adriatic; and, realizing this, the victorious and politic general insisted as a *sine qua non* in the peace negotiations with Austria that the theory of the natural boundaries should receive its practical accomplishment. Nevertheless, though at first glance sacrificing much in Italy, he kept a line open to the Adriatic along the River Po, secured the Ionian Islands, and pillaged Venice before abandoning her to Austria.²

At the same time that the fall of Venice was preparing, a similar scheme for seizing Malta was maturing in Bonaparte's mind. Indeed, the young general, victorious in battle and council, was seeing oriental vistas open before him; there were those about him who even suggested for him an independent rule in Italy, including the domination of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean and the restoration of

¹ Pesenti: *Diplomazia franco-turca*, pp. 45 *et seq.*, 65, 66, 78 *et seq.*, 100, 102. Bonnal: *Chute d'une république*, pp. 89, *et seq.*, 359, 363. Gaffarel: *Bonaparte et les républiques italiennes*, pp. 115-117. Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 514, 582, 889, 926, 1060, 1061, 1096, 1099, 1235. Daru: *Hist. de Venise*, v. pp. 227, 245, 250, 264, 433 *et seq.*; vii., pp. 269 *et seq.* Pisani: *La Dalmatie*, pp. xiii., 18, 22, 127 *et seq.*, 136, 145 *et seq.*

² Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 1475, 1494, 1497, 1544, 1686, 1691, 1703, 1712, 1714, 1715, 1735, 1743, 1744, 1745, 1765, 1766, 1791, 1793, 1797, 1799, 1803, 1804, 1814. Du Casse: *Mémoires du Prince Eugène*, i. pp. 34, 460. Daru: *Hist. de Venise*, vii. pp. 349, 355, 356 (Direct. to B. May 19, 1797, ordering him to secure naval supplies from Venice, repeating Bonaparte's language to them of some months earlier). Cf. also Bonnal: *op. cit.*, and Gaffarel: *op. cit.*

the ancient commercial power of central southern Europe. Thus would he hold Austria and France in balance. But Bonaparte had become a Frenchman; the iron crown was not for him, save as an appanage of the Imperial. In Italy his mind was big with plans; the genesis of that against Malta may be assigned to the early spring of 1797. The Order of Malta had fallen into decadence during the latter half of the eighteenth century, but the strategic value of the island gave to the policy of the Order an importance greater than its real power and condition would have warranted. The diplomatic intercourse between Valetta and Paris had been impaired by death and by the Revolution. When finally a representative of the Directory was established in Malta during the winter of 1796, it was with the intention of preserving French influence and of preventing the island from becoming a point of vantage for the allies. The suppression of the French commanderies of the Order by decrees of the *Assemblée constituante* (June 30, 1791, Sept. 19, 1792) had involved the fortunes of the Order and injured the prestige of France. Through this situation the various continental powers endeavored to profit, and on January 4 (15), 1797, a convention was signed with Russia for the transformation of the old priory in Poland to one for all Russia. This close relationship developing between the Knights of St. John and the Tzar was revealed to Bonaparte by the capture of some despatches in February; he then proposed to excite the fear of the Porte at Russian intrigue in the Mediterranean, and to draw the Turks toward France. Within two months the signature of preliminaries of peace at Leoben between France and Austria (April 18), was to give an unexpected importance to these negotiations of the various powers at Malta. The proposed sudden increase of Austrian power by the fall of Venice necessitated for France the possession of islands such as the Ionian in the Adriatic or Malta in the Mediterranean, in order to protect her commerce and to support her policy.

In a letter of May 26 Bonaparte expressed these ideas, and suggested the capture of Malta. His letters clearly showed his appreciation of the value of both Malta and Corfu to France. With regard to the latter island a decision had already been reached. Ancona and Corfu were to be kept by France, and Admiral Brueys with his fleet was hurried from Toulon to complete the control of the sea. Bonaparte's letters of this period are a curious compound of classical and oriental phrases, revolutionary catch-words and political and economic maxims, all showing the strong influence exerted on him by the tendencies of the period. In August was despatched that well-known series of wonderful letters, which in graphic language repeated the personal and national longings of all Frenchmen, — the policy was outlined which Bonaparte was to follow for the next two years. The Ionian Islands were worth all Italy to France, so Bonaparte wrote, and as the Ottoman Empire was soon to fall, France should be ready to seize her share of the spoils. England could be destroyed only if Egypt were in French hands, and the trade of the Levant preserved to the Republic. The power of the Pashas of Albania and Bosnia, the weakness of the Sultan, and the value of the Ottoman domain had been impressed anew upon Bonaparte's mind. He believed that the day destined for the downfall of that Empire was at hand, and the struggle of a few Greeks for independence revealed to him the agent he had to his hand should the time come when France, abandoning her traditional attitude of friendly alliance with the Porte, would claim the richest portion of the Levant. The Directory, reversing its previous propositions, now talked of the total expulsion of Austria from Italy, the union of Venice to the "*République italique*," under French protection, and in every event the absolute possession of the Ionian Islands by France. Talleyrand in much the same language that Bonaparte himself had used, wrote, on August 23, "Nothing is more important than that we should gain

a good footing in Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and other provinces of the Turkish Empire in Europe, and even all which border on the Mediterranean, such as Egypt in particular, which may some day be of the greatest value to us." ¹

On September 13, Bonaparte made his second proposition to seize Malta. Once in possession of that island, of St. Pierre, already ceded by the King of Sardinia, and of Corfu, France would be mistress of the Mediterranean. In case at the next peace with England, the Cape of Good Hope should pass from French control, it would be necessary to secure Egypt, which could be held by twenty-five thousand men sailing from Italy. He asked Talleyrand to inform him what effect the invasion of that country by the French would be likely to have on the Porte; and curiously enough he stated that Egypt did "not belong to the Grand Seignior." At about this time Desaix visited Bonaparte at Passeriano, and his notes of the conversations are suggestive of what was absorbing the mind of the great leader. The resources of Egypt were discussed; the results of the travels of Savary and Volney were talked over; a plan was outlined for an expedition to Egypt of eighteen thousand men, sailing from Venice; and the advantages of Egypt as a permanent French

¹ De la Jonquière: *Expédition d'Égypte*, i. pp. 19-21, 22 (France and Malta in 1794, Arch. étr. France, vol. 652): "Lorsque Toulon fut pris, l'Ordre de Malte parut vouloir se déclarer. Il est ni ami ni ennemi. Si l'on eût recherché la conduite de l'Ordre de Malte, peut-être eût-on trouvé qu'il inclinait d'avantage du côté de nos ennemis que de notre; mais il importe de ne pas multiplier les ressources des Anglais et de conserver en état de neutralité une île que l'on doit considérer comme le clef du Levant." pp. 23-31, 651, 653-56 (Doublet to Lafont, Malta, May 12, 1796). Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 1475, 1816, 1828-32, 1835-36, 1852, 1854-55, 1867, 1871, 1912-16, 1949-50, 1980, 1990-92, 1998-2000, 2020, 2047, 2050, 2053, 2056, 2061, 2072-75, 2103, 2106, 2135-36, 2186, 2235, 2247, 2339. Daru: *op. cit.* vii. pp. 369 *et seq.*, 392 *et seq.*, 398 (Carnot to Bonaparte, Aug. 17, 1797), 399 (Talleyrand to Clarke, Aug. 19), 408. Rodocanachi: *op. cit.* pp. 60 *et seq.* Marmont: *Mémoires*, i. p. 182. Miot de Melito: *Mémoires*, p. 133 (at fault as to Bonaparte's intentions in 1797). Pallain: *Talleyrand et le Directoire*, pp. 117, 124, 145 *et seq.*, 159, 207. Doublet: *Mémoires*, pp. 12 *et seq.* Cantu: *Hist. de cent ans*, ii. p. 105. Mayer: *Considérations politiques* (pamphlet), *passim*.

possession were detailed. Desaix was informed of the intrigues which Bonaparte was carrying on with Turkish Pashas in the Balkan peninsula and with the Albanians. With regard to Malta Bonaparte wrote: "An island which sooner or later will belong to the English, if we are stupid enough to let them forestall us." From these statements and from the letters of this period, it is easy to see that Bonaparte's plan in 1797 was quite different from his final project in 1798. He had been impressed with the weakness of the Porte; he had learned that Russia wished to win the holders of Malta to her side; he saw the eagerness with which Austria grasped the opportunity of strengthening her position on the Adriatic; and he made up his mind that under his guidance France must outwit the other Powers by anticipating them in a partition of Turkish territory. Above all and behind all stood Great Britain, who must be vitally injured, preferably in the Orient. Yet these Egyptian schemes were, in 1797, nothing more than further applications of the same sort of intrigue which he was then carrying on in Greece and Albania. The grand plan had not been developed, although he had written to Paris for information regarding the East, and had questioned the men about him. The *mémoires* of Monge, who had been in the Orient in 1787, of Truguet (1784), of de Castries on commerce with India via Egypt (1785), of Consul-General Mure, of de Tott on the Isthmus of Suez, and of many others, together with various maps, were furnished him by Admiral Rosily. In the meantime the Directory had responded promptly that it approved the plan of seizing Malta, attributing to Austria rather than to England or Russia the most ambitious schemes for control of the Mediterranean, though it was believed France would also earn the gratitude of the Porte by checking the Anglo-Russian plans for exploiting the weakness of the Turks. The Directory also wrote protesting against the cession of even Venice to Aus-

tria, declaring the intentions of that power, as shown in Italy, pointed toward a too dangerous expansion in the Levant. It seems probable, however, that they knew the fate of Venice was already decided, and wished to throw the onus of this deed on Bonaparte. At all events, the treaty of Campo Formio was signed before the letter reached him; and its terms were his own. Shortly before, Talleyrand had written him that his plans against Malta were authorized by the Directory, adding later, "Quant à l'Egypte, vos idées, à cet égard, sont grandes." He said that "Egypt as a colony should in time replace the productions of the Antilles, and as a trade route should give us the commerce of India;" he also inserted a statement of his views regarding Malta, which he feared would soon fall into English or Russian hands. Bonaparte, in reply to these letters, and in order to defend his policy in regard to the treaty with Austria, declared that that power could not harm the French Republic, — England alone was the foe. "Our government must destroy the English monarchy, or else expect to be destroyed itself by the corruption and intrigues of these active islanders. The present time gives us a good chance. Concentrate all our activities on the navy, and we will destroy England. That done, and Europe is at our feet." To Talleyrand he wrote that he saw no limit to the possibilities of the future; as France had the Rhine border, the city of Mayence in the northeast, and Corfu in the Levant, what more was to be expected for the present? The reply of the Directory to the news of peace was the appointment of Bonaparte as general commanding the army destined to invade England. Of these plans it will be possible to speak later; at present we must examine the proposals to secure Malta for France.¹

¹ De la Jonquière: *op. cit.* i. pp. 31-41. Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2195, 2212, 2240, 2244, 2292, 2296, 2303-09, 2312, 2318, 2338, 2386, 2395. Rodocanachi: *op. cit.* p. 61. Pallain: *op. cit.* pp. 154 *et seq.* Boulay de la Meurthe: *Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Egypte*, pp. 275 *et seq.* (Talleyrand to Bonaparte, Sept. 27, 1797).

Bonaparte's plan for the surprise of Malta in the autumn of 1797 had been criticised by Pléville de Pelley, the minister of marine, who doubted the success of bribery and declared that the neutrality of the island was all for which France could hope. Nevertheless, Bonaparte felt certain that Malta was for sale to the highest bidder; and in October he had been authorized by the Directory to take steps to secure the island for France. The Directory was fully cognizant of these plans and the statements of La Revellière-Lepeau to the contrary are at fault. The sum of 600,000 francs was then named as the price. He despatched Poussielgue, secretary of the French legation at Genoa, to complete the bargain for the betrayal of the island to a French force, and, though, in December, he countermanded these orders, Poussielgue had already left for Malta; and Bonaparte's hesitation on this occasion, owing to the preparations for the invasion of England, was unavailing to prevent the completion of his intrigues with various members of the Order. Poussielgue arrived at Malta on December 24. It is hard to say just why this *coup de main* was not then attempted; it is possible, as Jonquière thinks, that the Directory feared its effect on the negotiations at Radstadt. It now seems certain that Austria did not have serious intentions of profiting both by the German nationality and the venality of Hompesch, the new Grand Master of the Order, and that the plans of Russia to this end have also been exaggerated; but Great Britain was not so doubtful a factor in the case. English diplomats appear to have dreaded a French attack and to have asked both de Rohan and his successor, Hompesch, to commit the defence of the island to British forces, a step which would undoubtedly have anticipated by several years the permanent British occupation of Malta. Returning to the examination of Poussielgue's mission we find that the wretched condition of Bruey's fleet at Corfu would have made impossible

Daru: *Hist. de Venise*, vii. pp. 412, 413, 418 *et seq.*, 432, 436 *et seq.* De Clercq: *Recueil*, i. pp. 335, 336.

the endeavor to seize Malta in January, 1798, even if Bonaparte himself had not been backward in pressing the matter to the end. It is now possible, however, to read the published report of Poussielgue's mission, dated from Milan, February 8, 1798. In this long document he discusses the personal characteristics of the leading Knights, the strength of the various parties on the island, and the international intrigues which were being carried on. He also describes at length the resources of the Order, the fortifications, and the chances of success in an attempt to capture the island. The importance of the position to France he states in the strongest terms; and he concludes by saying that the financial embarrassments of the Order and of Hompesch were such that the Government could not long continue without assistance from the outside. These facts, he pointed out, could be utilized by the French, as the other Powers were already endeavoring to profit by them, each in its own interest. This report was made to Bonaparte and not to the Directory. It served as the basis for action in May of this year, when the final move was made.¹

The plan for an invasion of England was in the meantime engaging the attention of all classes of society. Bonaparte himself had first mentioned the possibility of such a scheme to Bernadotte in May, 1797, and again, a few days later, to Berthier; throughout the summer his thoughts had centred on the south and east; and it was only when, as victorious dictator of peace at Campo Formio, he received his new commission from the Directory that he again turned his attention to the matter. A few days later Sandoz-Rollin, the Prussian minister in Paris, reported that the appointment of Bonaparte to the command of the "*Armée d'Angleterre*" was regarded either as a means to destroy that general's power and prestige,

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2354, 2355. De la Jonquière: *op. cit.* i. pp. 35, note 1, 39, note 3, 50, 51, 73, 74, 125 *et seq.* (Poussielgue's report), 136-38, 656-58. *Chronique* in *La Révol. franç.* iii. p. 89. La Revellière-Lepeaux: *Mémoires*, ii. p. 367. Barras: *Mémoires*, iii. p. 63.

or to cause alarm in England. Bonaparte himself, while accepting the commission, wrote that, to invade England with any probability of success, a strong naval force, a large army well-led, perhaps by Desaix, and thirty millions of livres were indispensable. He would not refuse to fulfil his duty to his country, though sorely in need of rest. The distribution of troops in Italy and the Ionian Islands required twenty-five thousand men; thirty-six thousand would be needed for England; and the remainder could stay in the south of France and in Corsica. The plan for the invasion necessitated the movement of troops to the Channel coast, and this was rapidly carried on, while elaborate preparations were being made at various points to equip the expedition. Bonaparte, however, did not abandon the fortification of Corfu, nor did he fail to report in full to Talleyrand the intrigues and negotiations with various Turkish officials which he had carried on while in Italy, and which are recorded but here and there in his letters. Talleyrand himself early showed Sandoz-Rollin that he did not expect Bonaparte to attempt the invasion of England,—all the preparations being designed to frighten that Power into a peace. Metternich, at Radstadt, prophesied failure if the scheme were attempted, and sneered at the wild schemes which filled the mind of the populace at Paris. This populace, always ready for a new hero, was already beginning to question Bonaparte's long stay at Paris. That general was no longer a sensation, and his popularity was on the wane. A failure in any great venture, if accomplished before the eyes of all Paris, meant annihilation to his hopes; his politics, or "calculation of combinations" as he termed them, showed him this, and, further, all the chances he would run in following the orders of the Directory. His quarrels with that body were already known to many; and an open break between the Government and the general seemed imminent. Such was the situation when, in February, Bonaparte decided to investigate the preparations which were being made on the coast and at the naval arsenals.

A week's trip showed conclusively that the demand he had made in the preceding November for good officers, plenty of men, and many ships, could not be met; the French navy had not recovered from the disorder and weakness for which the Revolution was largely responsible. The inefficiency of the Directory had become more apparent. Bonaparte, therefore, ordered Najac to recall all the ships of the Mediterranean squadron to Toulon, and sent a report of his trip to the Directory, in which he made an elaborate exposition of the difficulties and dangers which blocked the way to an invasion of England. The time was passed, he declared; nevertheless, with that affectation of modesty which was his wont at this period, he stated the amount of money needed, the naval stores, the sailors, and the ships, knowing full well that to supply them was beyond the power of the weakening Government. There were, however, two other means, he said, of harming England,—an invasion of Hanover and the seizure of Egypt; or else, if all three plans proved impossible, peace must be concluded. This, again, he knew was past accomplishment; the Directory must stultify itself by renewing the negotiations at Lille, which it had so recently terminated with the declaration of war to the bitter end. Bonaparte presented this dilemma on February 23; but Pléville de Pelley, minister of marine, had for days previous, made no secret of the fact that the navy was inadequate to any such operation as the invasion; and Talleyrand, directly on Bonaparte's return to Paris, had told Sandoz-Rollin that an expedition was to be made against Egypt. The latter welcomed the idea and drew the analogy of Leibnitz's advice to Louis XIV. to quit his Dutch war and strike in the Levant. In reality, Bonaparte was not finally determined on the Egyptian expedition. The principle of alternatives in action was one that he had adopted early in his career; and this was the period when he was balancing carefully the chances of success in each of the various plans. By March 5, however, he appears to have told the Directory that he had

decided for Egypt. People gossiped of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Constantinople, and every point that French imagination might fancy a weak spot in England's armor; constant in one thing they remained. The cry still was, *Delenda est Carthago*. Bonaparte had estimated thirty thousand troops as needful for Malta and Egypt; and the plans for mobilization show the usefulness of the stepping-stones to the Levant which he had garrisoned and fortified along the northern Mediterranean and in the Adriatic during his Italian campaigns. Rollin had guessed, as early as March 24, that Malta was included in the plan; and the secret negotiations begun by Poussielgue were now to be utilized.¹

Before continuing, however, with the history of the Expedition we must consider two matters of importance: first, the author of the plan; and, secondly, Bonaparte's sources of information regarding Egypt. We have seen that Bonaparte during his youth had been greatly interested in the Orient, that he had been subject to those influences which not only made him a Frenchman, but a Frenchman alive to all the possibilities of

¹ Napoléon: *Corr* Nos. 1808 (first mention of the invasion of England) 1881, 2320, 2321, 2325, 2326, 2343, 2362, 2364, 2371, 2377, 2388, 2391, 2396, 2397, 2400, 2409, 2418, 2419, 2426. Pallain: *op. cit.* pp. 41 *et seq.* Rodocanachi: *op. cit.* p. 77. Marmont: *Mémoires*, i. pp. 213, 215 *et seq.* Bailieu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. pp. 156 (report of Sandoz-Rollin, Paris, Nov. 2, 1797), 162 (ditto, Dec. 8), 172, 173 (ditto, Feb. 18, 1798), 174 (Feb. 28), 176 (March 10), 179 (March 18), 180 (March 24). Hüffer: *Dipl. Verhandlungen*, ii. pp. 372 *et seq.*, 376. Metternich: *Nachgelassene Papiere*, i. pp. 357 (Radstadt, Dec. 22), 364 (March 27, 1798). Ségur: *Hist. et mémoires*, i. pp. 392 *et seq.* De Testa: *Recueil*, i. p. 519. Mahan: *Sea Power and the French Revolution*, i. pp. 35 *et seq.* Jurien de la Gravière: *Guerres maritimes*, i. pp. 329 *et seq.* Boulay de la Meurthe: *Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Egypte*, pp. 4, 9, 13, 23. Troude: *Batailles navales*, ii. pp. 252, 264. Michel: *Corr. de Mallet du Pan*, ii. p. 416 (Feb. 26, 1798). "Ce général [Bonaparte] décline rapidement; Merlin et Rewbell vont achever de l'enterrer dans l'expédition d'Angleterre." Millon: *Histoire des descentes qui ont lieu en Angleterre, Ecosse, Irlande et isles adjacentes, depuis Jules César jusqu'à nos jours*; and Tardieu: *Notice historique des descentes qui ont été faites dans les Isles Britanniques, depuis Guillaume le Conquérant jusqu'à l'an VI. de la République française*. Both are Paris, l'an VI. 1797-98. De la Jonquière: *op. cit.* i. pp. 17, 43 *et seq.*, 69 *et seq.*, 87 *et seq.* to 123, 172 *et seq.*

French control of the Mediterranean, and French prestige and dominion beyond the Alps and the Adriatic. We have studied his career in Italy, and have seen how, early in his conquering progress, he himself suggested a French occupation of the Ionian Islands and a French expedition to Egypt. In view of these facts, and of the failure which he predicted for an invasion of England, it has been the habit of some writers to assign to Bonaparte alone the first conception of a conquest of Egypt, and the final decision to carry out the scheme. Such a theory is not only oblivious of the facts of the case, it is also burdened by a view of history which makes the genius of one man, however remarkable, responsible for a marvellous attempt to anticipate history by nearly a century, and to demonstrate political and economic problems which were as yet unknown to the vast majority of people. In the first place, we have seen in a previous chapter that the diplomats of the Ancien Régime were in the habit of tentatively assigning Egypt to France in the event of a partition of Turkish territories between the European Powers. Expansion in the Mediterranean basin was recognized as a wise and natural policy for French statesmen to follow. Even if we go no further back than the middle of the eighteenth century, we find Choiseul suggesting the occupation of Egypt to Louis XV. as a compensation to France for the losses of the Seven Years' war; similar ideas inspired the acquisition of Corsica (1768), a step which was to make Bonaparte a French citizen. Saint-Priest, the French ambassador at the Porte from 1768 to 1784, wrote two *mémoires* in which a French occupation of Egypt was discussed; in one as late as 1789 he said that France had a choice between either supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire or letting it go to pieces, — “ En s'appropriant le débris le plus à la convenance de la France, donnant en ce cas la préférence à l'Egypte, à raison de sa fertilité, de la facilité de la conquérir et ensuite de la défendre, finalement à cause de la courte communication aux Indes par la mer Rouge, dont

elle a le clef." French travellers and officers who journeyed in the Levant on various errands all spoke to the same purpose. Any man who had ever been connected with the French foreign office was, therefore, familiar with at least the idea of such an expedition, and some had studied the practical details involved. Talleyrand, among others, had followed the plan with interest, and had written of it in 1796. He also went further, and in July, 1797, presented three *mémoires*, based on information at the foreign office regarding the condition of India, the power of the British there, and the means of expelling them from that region. A little later it was suggested that, while continuing the preparations for an invasion of England, the troops should in reality be equipped for an Asiatic campaign. The difficulties of the passage from Suez to India by sea were either ridiculed or greatly exaggerated in the various *mémoires*. One proposed the seizure of Egypt, an alliance with the Porte, and a land invasion of India via Persia by a force of twenty thousand French troops assisted by native allies. Jourdan was familiar with, and advocated, the idea of an expedition to India which would arouse the Indian princes against the English. All of these ideas were embodied in a report, "*Sur la conquête de l'Égypte*," made by Talleyrand to the Directory on February 14, 1797, while Bonaparte was absent from Paris. This document, which De la Jonquière publishes for the first time, does not seem to have received the attention which it deserves from students of the period. After summarizing the history of Egypt in the past, the government of the Mamelukes is described, and the injuries done to French citizens by the Beys are enumerated. Next the commerce and produce of Egypt receive attention, and the immense importance of its geographical situation is emphasized. "N'oublions jamais que les nations anciennes et modernes qui on eu le commerce de l'Inde sont toujours parvenues au plus haut degré de richesse." The opposition of the Porte and of the Powers of Europe is lightly treated; and it is declared that French

diplomacy will do much at Constantinople. The actual conquest of Egypt, it was estimated, could be safely accomplished by twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand men, and with but the slightest loss of life. The despatch of fifteen thousand additional troops from Egypt to India is then discussed. They were to operate with Tipú Tib of Mysore against the British, but were not to attempt a regular conquest of India. General observations end the paper. They are to the effect that two or three persons serving on a commission should be in charge of the expedition; generals need expect no glory as the campaign would be an easy one, and military talents would be wasted; the native population would welcome the invaders with delight. In fine, the conquest would be a just punishment for wrongs inflicted on Frenchmen; it would be easy, failure was impossible; it would be inexpensive, of immense value to the Republic, and presented many other favorable aspects. Reference is made to Magallon, for many years French Consul at Cairo. It is clear from a comparison of this report, signed by Talleyrand, and the writings of Magallon that many of the latter's ideas were utilized by the French statesman. This document was annotated by Bonaparte after his return from Egypt with the most bitter and sarcastic expressions, which, while not proof positive, points to the fact that he was not in Talleyrand's confidence when the *mémoire* was being prepared. The contradictions of each of the characters on the stage at Paris regarding the authorship of the plan render this matter still more puzzling. The question as to whether Bonaparte seriously intended at any time to attempt the invasion of England is another complication. The truth seems to lie between the extremes of the various conflicting statements. The idea of a French expedition to Egypt occurred to Bonaparte while in Italy; he wrote of it to Talleyrand, who sympathized with any movement which would tend to realize for France the ideal of empire based on sea power and oriental dominion. Talleyrand thus continued in the policy which the tradition of his office had outlined for

French statesmen. Bonaparte, returning from Italy, pressed matters on for the invasion of England, being unable to usurp the supreme authority and fearful to cross the determination of the Directory and the passionate desire of the French people. The insufficiency of the means supplied him for the attempt gave reasonable excuse for him to oppose its execution; in the meantime the Directory, already informed of the backwardness of the preparations, aware of their own growing weakness, and urged on by Talleyrand, who advocated the conquest of Egypt, agreed to give up the plan against England and to unite with Talleyrand in stimulating the ready imagination of Bonaparte for oriental ventures. Bonaparte was thus enabled to return to his true ambition, and to realize more fully than ever before the wishes and ideals of French foreign policy by deciding on a conquest of Egypt.¹

The next matter to consider is the information which Bonaparte secured regarding Egypt. We have already noted his own wide reading, the documents sent to him in Italy by Rosily, and the *mémoires* presented to the Directory during the years 1797-98. All of these, except perhaps Talleyrand's *mémoire* of February 14, he had in his possession by March 10. He then made requisitions upon the "*École des langues orientales*" for interpreters of Arabic, Persian, and Greek, and for type to issue proclamations in these languages: the war office furnished him maps; Monge was his right-hand man at this time, and at Rome secured the Arabic printing outfit of the Propaganda. Say collected a library of

¹ De la Jonquière: *op. cit.* i. pp. 147 *et. seq.* Numerous documents are here printed *in extenso*. Saint-Priest: *Mémoire militaire et politique sur l'Égypte*, in *Revue d'Égypte*, April and May, 1896. The statements in Botta: *Hist. d'Italie* (Fr. trans.), iii. pp. 160-162, are refuted by De la Jonquière, pp. 152, 153. Talleyrand's *Mémoire* is to be found pp. 154-68. Without accepting De la Jonquière's conclusions as to Bonaparte's intentions with regard to the English invasion, his work presents in many aspects the most satisfactory, and certainly the most complete, book on the Egyptian Expedition. It is a matter of regret to the writer that at the date of writing the succeeding volumes had not appeared.

Bonaparte's selection, which was taken to Egypt, and which included the Vedas, the Old and New Testaments, and the Kuran. Talleyrand examined the archives of the foreign office, and gave Bonaparte the reports of Choiseul, of Lazousky, French political agent in the Levant, of Prix-Réal, a French merchant resident at Cairo in 1796, and of many others. Magallon, Consul-General at Cairo for many years, had been summoned home by Delacroix a short time previous, and had submitted a long report on Egypt. These documents Bonaparte read, supplementing them by books of travel and history, with many of which he was already familiar. Thus he formulated his ideas and developed his plans. Magallon told him that the Porte had not the shadow of authority in Egypt, and drew no revenues from that province. The rule of the Mamelukes was hated by the population; the French had suffered greatly in the matter of trade and of personal safety; and a French invasion would find ready support from all classes save the Beys. The consul drew a flattering picture of the richness of the country, its unique and valuable situation, and the probability that under French control it would resume its ancient office of gateway to Indian commerce, by drawing to the Red Sea the trade that then followed the Cape of Good Hope route to Europe; he unconsciously quoted the words of old William of Tyre regarding Egypt: "*forum publicum utrique orbi.*" The threatened rebellion in the Balkans and Greece, properly stimulated by French agents, would, in his opinion, effectually prevent any serious opposition by the Porte. Magallon thought success almost certain. A book suggestively entitled "*Route de l'Inde*," published shortly after Bonaparte had sailed, enforces the favorable descriptions.¹ Sir John Seeley is the

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2452, 2454, 2458, 2471, 2473, 2479, 2500, 2731, 2784. Reybaud: *Histoire scientifique*, iii. pp. 21 *et seq.* Mason: *Aff. étrangères*, p. 428. Jomard: *Souvenirs sur Gaspard Monge*. De Testa: *Recueil*, i. pp. 521-535. Merruau: *Égypte contemporaine*, pp. 197 *et seq.* (Magallon's report is given here). Magallon accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt. *Intercepted Corr.*

most recent writer who is in error regarding the influence upon Napoleon Bonaparte of Leibnitz' book, the "*Consilium Aegyptiacum*." The philosopher had endeavored to divert Louis XIV. from renewing a devastating war in Europe by urging the conquest of Egypt. Bonaparte never saw the complete original work of Leibnitz, nor was it published until 1864. The *Summa*, or abridgment, of this book has been repeatedly referred to as the real memoir presented to Louis; but neither did Bonaparte see even this abridgment, which is only some twenty-five printed pages in length, until August, 1803, when it was forwarded to him by General Mortier, then in Hanover, who had secured a copy from Feder, the librarian of the State Library in that city. This was then read by Bonaparte and sent to Paris with the comment "très curieux." Fourier, in the "*Description de l'Égypte*," referred to the work, but understood that only the shorter manuscript was in existence.¹

i. p. 104. Henry: *Route de l'Inde, ou description géographique de l'Égypte, la Syrie, l'Arabie, la Perse, et l'Inde*. Paris, an VII, 8vo, pp. v-viii, 6 ("L'Égypte étoit le grenier de l'Empire romain"), 31 *et seq.*, 42 ("Les Mamlouks ne connoissent rien de notre art militaire . . . Le luxe des M. est extrême. Il n'y en a point dont l'entretien ne coûte 2500 liv. par an"), 139 (Suez), 141 *et seq.* (The commerce of Egypt is rich. The income from its exports has made it a gold mine. The author draws a marvellous picture of its future prosperity), 153 *et seq.* (The routes to India. That *via* Suez and the Red Sea is very easy). Cf. *Aegypten-was es war-ist-und sein könnte*, Berlin, 1799, 12mo. Boulay de la Meurthe: *op. cit.* pp. 169, 230, note 2 (Distinguish between several Magallons). Cf. Pongerville: *Gaspard Monge et l'expédition d'Égypte*. Heyd: *Gesch. des Levanthandels*, i. p. 417. Guil. Tyrensis. lib. 19, c. 27. De la Jonquière: *op. cit.* i. pp. 148 *et seq.* It is interesting to note that Dubois de Thainville, French agent in the Levant, reported to Verninac at Constantinople in September, 1796, that "l'Égypte est dévorée par l'anarchie. Le moment du révolution ne semble pas éloigné. . . Si jamais le commerce de l'Inde s'ouvre par la voie de Suez, le Caire deviendra la plus importante place du monde. Les Anglais profitent déjà de cette voie."

¹ Seeley: *British Policy*, ii. p. 168. Foucher de Careil: *Œuvres de Leibnitz*, v. pp. xiv-xix, 65. It is interesting to note the mention of Malta made by Leibnitz as an "island of great value, connected with France by many ties," pp. 345, 346. A letter of Leibnitz to Louis XIV. in 1671 contains the following: "*Ægyptus omnium regionum ad dominum non maris tantum sed et orbis opportunissima, et ipso situ incredibilique fertilitate et populositate gentis mater scientiarum, mirac-*

It will be wise, now at the actual start of the expedition, to summarize, even at the risk of being repetitious, the personal motives which actuated Bonaparte in undertaking the expedition. In the first place it was necessary for him to leave Paris and to accomplish some successful feat of arms. Secondly, he wished to realize his own oriental ambitions by following in the footsteps of the great world-conquerors. The imperial vistas had been opened to him in his youth; Bossuet's description of the passing of the empires had torn the veil before him; he had seen the mysteries; now he was to become an Alexander. Thirdly, as a French statesman he felt that the peace with Austria left no adequate means of harming England save by a direct blow at London, the heart, or at India and Ireland, the limbs, of the mighty sea-monster. He believed with all Frenchmen that England's stability lay in her trade, which fattened on her foreign possessions. A move toward the Orient would call the British naval forces from the Atlantic and scatter them to various points, so that, in case a more direct attempt to attack her should appear wise, the Channel might be par-

ulorum naturæ materia, asylum perfidiæ Mahometicæ, cujus solius neglectio effecit, ut Christiani terram sanctam amiserint; Asiæ et Africæ vinculum. Oceani et Mediterraneæ maris agger interjectus, horreum Orientis emporium commune Indiæ et Europæ." (The original larger work covers 300 printed pages.) It was a repetition in more modern language of the appeal of Pierre Dubois. Fourier: *Description de l'Égypte*, p. ii. Napoléon: *Corr.* No. 6976 (Aug. 4, 1803). Cf. Gührauer: *Leibnitz, Eine Biographie*, i. pp. 93 *et seq.*, and *Mémoire sur le projet d'expédition en Égypte présenté en 1672 à Louis XIV. par Leibnitz*, in *Mém. de l'Acad. des Sci. morales et politiques. Savants Étrangers*, i. pp. 679-767. The following passage is so remarkably prophetic that it deserves quotation. Leibnitz: *Œuvres*, v. p. 47: "Il y a d'abord l'isthme principal du monde qui sépare les plus grandes mers, l'Océan et le Méditerranée, qu'on ne saurait éviter sans faire le tour des sinuosités de toute l'Afrique. C'est le lien, la barrière, la clef, la seule entrée possible de deux parties du monde, l'Asie et l'Afrique. C'est le point de contact, le marche commun de l'Inde d'une part, de l'Europe de l'autre. Je conviens que l'isthme de Panama, en Amérique pourrait rivaliser avec lui, si cette partie du monde était aussi fertile et si les autres richesses lui étaient prodiguées avec la même abondance."

tially unprotected. He believed that the capture of Malta and Egypt would make possible a French Mediterranean, and that the possession of Egypt would be of great value to France intrinsically and potentially. It would recompense her for the loss of her American possessions; it would restore to Levantine trade its former position, and add to it the commerce of Asia; it would widen the political view at home, by checking that passionate promulgation of revolutionary principles on the continent of Europe which made every monarchical government the secret if not the open foe of the Republic, and inevitably postponed the day of final peace. Fourthly, it would appeal to every Frenchman who had read history, who had been influenced by the renaissance in classic and oriental studies, or who believed in the economic and political principles which required the resurrection of a French Empire on land and sea as the incarnation of the spirit of French traditions and ambitions.¹

The Directory forwarded his plans, and gave the final orders in a series of secret despatches during the second week of April, 1798. The "*Armée d'Orient*" was to be, as in Bonaparte's words, a wing of the "*Armée d'Angleterre*;" to seize Malta and Egypt was to injure England in a vital spot, to make France supreme on the Mediterranean, to add to her colonial empire, to increase her trade, and to open the door to India. Kléber was to be second in command; the delay which the events at Radstadt and Vienna necessitated was

¹ Bailleu: *op. cit.* i. pp. 183 *et seq.* (Despatches of Mar. 28, Apr. 7 and 19). Marmont: *Mémoires*, pp. 216 *et seq.* Mathieu Dumas: *Notes sur le précis des événements militaires*, ii. p. 171. Though not of direct value as evidence, the passages in the *Commentaries* form interesting parallels. Napoléon: *Comm.* ii. pp. 184, 285, 330, 360, 362; iii. pp. 20 *et seq.*, 144. Of the same nature is the work of Fourier in 1809, eleven years later. Champollion gives the corrections which Bonaparte himself suggested at that time. Fourier: *op. cit.* pp. i, xxiii. Champollion: *Fourier*, pp. 83, 88-172. Napoleon: *Corr.* No. 2502. *Intercepted Corr.* i. p. 137 (Letter of Boyer, July 28, 1798). Cf. ii. p. ix, note. Dubroca: *Politique, etc.* pp. 90-92. Fonvielle: *France et Angleterre*, pp. 183-186. The question of India as a possible ultimate destination will be considered later.

not long; and the circumstances only showed more clearly the strained relations between the Directory and the General. The former desired to be rid of a too successful soldier; the latter foresaw the ruin of the present government, and wished to be neither a direct accomplice to it nor a victim of its fall.¹

As this is an historical study of motives, methods, and effects, it is without its scope to trace the course of events in any detail. In particular it is unnecessary to record the history of a period so well known as is the one under discussion. It will be the object of the latter half of this chapter to treat the schemes of Bonaparte in the East, the means he used to forward them, especially the political and religious agencies employed, the ultimate effect that these had upon the course of events, the evolution which the Egyptian Expedition engendered in the political character of the Eastern Question, the results in India and their significance for the future, and the reasons for the failure of the expedition to accomplish the objects assigned to it. The fleet with the army on board set sail from Toulon May 19. The great secrecy as regards its preparation and destination aided the success which attended its first moves. Malta yielded to the combined forces after a perfunctory struggle, and the design which Brueys had not been able to realize in the previous February was easily accomplished. Malta, the strongest fortified position in the Mediterranean, with perhaps the exception of Gibraltar, was in French hands. It seems scarcely possible to doubt that intrigue and bribery had prepared the way for the capture, and that it was no reckless chance of war which made Bonaparte risk so much on its

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2491-2496, 2502, 2533, 2547, 2548, 2562, 2570, 2608, 2710. *Intercepted Corr.* i. p. 99. De Testa: *Recueil*, i. p. 535 (Directory to Bonaparte, March 5, 1798, giving him the orders "pour remplir le grand objet de l'armement de la Méditerranée"). Pajol: *Kléber*, p. 269. Hüffer: *Dipl. Verh.* ii. p. 377. Masson: *Dipl. de la Révol.* pp. 211 *et seq.* Boulay de la Meurthe: *op. cit.* p. 23.

fall.¹ Proceeding to Egypt, Alexandria was captured with ease, and some days later Cairo fell before Bonaparte's army. The succeeding months were occupied in extending French control toward Upper Egypt, in the Delta and toward Syria. Nelson destroyed the French fleet in Abukir Bay on August 1; and in September the Porte joined the coalition of European powers against France. In February Bonaparte set out to invade Syria, marching rapidly toward Acre, where the defence of that city by Djézzar Pasha, assisted by the English, who had captured part of Bonaparte's siege artillery, forced him to return to Egypt. A Turkish army was routed in the early summer of 1799 at Abukir, but the blockade of Alexandria, defeats, unproductive victories, plague, and lack of reinforcements completed the tale. On receiving confirmation of the success of the allies in Europe, and of the weakness of the Directory, Bonaparte stole away from Egypt and, barely escaping capture by the English, landed at Fréjus on the Mediterranean coast in November, accompanied by only a few officers. The army had been left under the command of Kléber in Egypt. Such is the bare outline.

Returning now, we must consider, first, Bonaparte's policy toward the Porte; second, with regard to the native populations and rulers of Egypt, Syria, and Greece; third, with regard to the Barbary States, and lastly, toward the Directory. On landing in Egypt Bonaparte announced that he had come to restore the enfeebled authority of the Sultan, and the insignia of that ruler were preserved on every hand. The Mameluke Beys, he declared, were his only enemies,

¹ Vivenot: *Briefe von Thugut*, ii. pp. 46, 106, 109. Hüffer: *Dipl. Verh.* ii. pp. 384 et seq. Reumont: *Letzten Zeiten des Joh. Ordens*, pp. 24 et seq., 28, 32, 36, 175 et seq. Doublet: *Mémoires historiques*, pp. 370, 372. Ballou: *Story of Malta*, p. 307. Villeneuve-Bargemont: *Monuments des Grand-Maîtres*, ii. pp. 277, 280, 283 et seq., 321, 391, 400 et seq. Marmont: *Mémoires*, i. pp. 220, 221. De Clercq: *Recueil*, i. p. 361. Convention for the surrender signed, June 12, 1798. Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2629, 2634, 2636-2638, 2641, 2642, 2645-2647, 2667. Jurien de la Gravière: *Guerres maritimes*, i. p. 359.

the oppressors of a people whom he professed to protect and guard. The French, who had destroyed the Pope, the enemy of Islam, and captured Malta, the stronghold of those who were sworn to war against all Muhammadans, believed in complete religious tolerance, and came to Egypt as allies of its rightful lord, the Khalif of all true believers. "I love the Kuran," he told the people, "and my armies are at the service of the Sultan." Before leaving Paris Bonaparte had understood that Talleyrand would proceed to Constantinople as French ambassador. He sent a ship from Malta to convey him to this important point, where his talents would be strained in the endeavor to appease the alarm and anger of the Porte at the invasion of Egypt. Talleyrand, however, recollecting that the Sultan did not recognize the immunities of diplomats, concluded not to go. Descorches was under appointment when the Sultan declared war. Ruffin, secretary and chargé at the embassy, was imprisoned by the Turks, and all French consuls throughout the Empire were arrested. Ignorant of this, Bonaparte wrote to both Talleyrand and Descorches at Constantinople. His letters to the Grand Vizir proclaimed his cordial relationship to the Sultan and the traditional friendship of France; the common enemies of both, he said, were Austria and Russia; there was a basis for an amicable arrangement in this situation. When he learned of the co-operation of the Russian and Turkish squadrons at the siege of Corfu, he warned the Porte that the advent of the former in the Mediterranean could only mean danger to the integrity of the Empire. The Sultan, after hearing of Nelson's victory, had yielded to the pressure of Russia and Great Britain, and had issued a proclamation in September, 1798, declaring a *Jihad*, or Holy War, against the French incumbent upon Muslims the world over. Upon the invasion of Syria a second was promulgated, and a *Hatti-Sharîf* regarding the French operations at Suez and on the Red Sea, renewed the statement that that sea was

a sacred highway of Islam. The burst of Muslim fanaticism throughout the Levant brought serious loss to many Frenchmen; their persons and property were seized, and French trade was almost annihilated. In vain Bonaparte wrote repeatedly to Constantinople, even to within a few days before he left Egypt; the Porte, provoked by the invasion, at the mercy of its enemies, with French diplomatic prestige at an end, and fearing its allies as much as it did the French, had become an unwilling combatant in the gigantic conflict which stirred all Europe.¹

With regard to the people and local rulers of the Levant, Bonaparte's policy is very interesting. It reveals the great value of scholarship to public policy, the intimate relations existing between religion and politics in the East, and the use of methods of oriental diplomacy which were mentioned in the opening pages of this chapter. The proclamations issued on landing in Egypt were translated into Arabic by the oriental scholars who accompanied the expedition. The religious observances of Islam were protected and maintained in the hope that a political ascendancy might be gained; Menou and some of the French officers accepted Islam; and a French tricolor inscribed with a sentence of the Kuran was given to a native officer who took service with the French. Small bodies of Egyptian troops were organized, and mild

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2608, 2674, 2703, 2719, 2721, 2723, 2734, 2761, 2767, 2777, 2778, 2785, 2819, 2824, 2878, 2880, 2934, 3075, 3076, 3127, 3183, 3206, 3280, 3281, 3373, 3436, 3561, 3562, 3573, 3594-3596, 3744-3748, 3928. Cf. Napoléon: *Comm.* ii. p. 330. *Intercepted Corr.* i. pp. 235, 244. Broglie: *Mémoires de Talleyrand*, i. p. 268. Pouqueville: *Voyage en Morée*, ii. p. 219. De Testa: *Recueil*, i. pp. 548 *et seq.*, 572 *et seq.*, 583. The proclamation of the Porte to all Muslims (Feb. 15, 1799) contained passages such as the following: "Purify your hearts, that your thoughts may be worthy of praise; unite yourselves to our brother-believers against the evil infidels; work for the triumph of Islam, for by the help of the Almighty you will be the conquerors of your enemies, who are also the enemies of God," ii. p. 73, Hatti-Shereef of 1799; cf. Boulay de la Meurthe, *Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Égypte*, pp. 36 *et seq.*, 64, 65. Masson: *Aff. étrang.* p. 428.

terms were offered to those who would submit. The Arabic printing-press which Bonaparte had imported issued accounts of the pomp with which Muhammadan feast days were celebrated by the French; and in the *Courier d'Égypte*, a French newspaper published at Cairo, there appeared the story of an alleged revelation received by a Muslim Holy-man of Egypt. Muhammad and Fate are supposed to be conversing together; while standing on the shores of the Mediterranean, they descry the French fleet approaching. The prophet is filled with dismay at the sight. Fate reassures him by foretelling the conquest of Egypt by this force, the establishment of a strong government, and the acceptance of Islam by every Frenchman. Muhammad then expresses himself as completely satisfied.¹

¹ Napoleon: *Corr.* Nos. 2710, 2723, 2765, 2817, 2818, 2834, 2837, 2840, 2858, 2880, 2902, 2907, 2921, 3045, 3127, 3151, 3157, 3176, 3221, 3243, 3244, 3284, 3478, 3484, 3669, 3672, 3850, 3951. Cf. Lumbrose: *Miscellanea Napoleonica*, ii. p. 333. The long rule and remarkable position which the Mamelukes maintained in Egypt are in themselves striking phenomena. This community of slaves, ruling a rich land distant from their own original home, reinforced from time to time by additions to their numbers, slaves who were destined to become sovereigns, preserved their identity and power for several centuries in a country in which all races and interests mingled. The rise of the race was due to the weakening Khaliphate of Egypt, which followed the example of the Abbassids at Bagdad in calling Barbarian peoples from the north to support their tottering rule. This system was adopted by Saladin and the Ayoubite dynasty in order to protect themselves from the servile community which had already been created in Egypt. These late comers overthrew the Ayoubites, and formed an oligarchy which remained in its singular isolation and dominant position even after an Ottoman Sultan, in 1517, had usurped the title of Khalif from its unworthy titular holder. Crushed but not extinguished by the establishment of Turkish rule, the wane of that power was marked by the lessening influence of its representative, the Pasha of Cairo, and the corresponding ascendancy of the Mameluke Beys. They imported their slaves from Central Asia, and made those slaves the rulers over the oppressed indigenous population. A few years before Napoleon invaded Egypt, their chief, Sheik Ali Bey, had taken advantage of the war between the Porte and Russia to dismiss the Ottoman Governor, after increasing his own force of Mamelukes, then defeating the Arabs and conquering Syria, he received the title of Sultan and Protector of the Holy Places from the Sharif of Mecca. He had died, and Ibrahim, the ruling Bey in 1798, was by no means as powerful. The "Demo-

An Arabic poem in honor of Bonaparte was also written about this time, praising the destruction of the Mamelukes, and hailing him as the "favorite of victory" and "the right eye of God the Exalted." In some of the letters to the Sheiks of Palestine certain vague powers of *Kismet* were attributed to Bonaparte; fate directed his armies, and opposition was useless. It was an idea common throughout the East. In the proclamation of December 21, 1798, to the people of Cairo after their brief revolt there is a strong suspicion of Messianic language. Bonaparte claimed in it divine inspiration and prescience. Whoever wrote the document perhaps recalled that the Fatimide dynasty of Egypt had been Alyite, and of the transcendental Shiah sect, and it is possible that he desired to insinuate the idea that the French general might be called to fill the position of Vicar to the Mahdi, which, it was believed by the Muslim, Jesus was to occupy at the coming of the former; or it is even possible that he wished to pose Bonaparte as a Mahdi himself. He certainly claimed that his arrival and conquests had been prophesied in writing, which in the Muhammadan East can only mean that they were mentioned in the Kuran or the Hadith. Though the Kuran does not speak of the Mahdi, tradition has ascribed to Muhammad the promise of a leader who should establish a just rule and banish oppression; and the mission of Jesus as a prophet and co-worker with the Mahdi is recognized. It is very interesting to compare the language of this proclamation with that of any of the famous Mahdis of Islam.¹

cratic slave-soldiery" still existed. Though redoubtable enough to an Asiatic enemy, it was totally unable to meet the French upon an equal footing. Muir: *The Mameluke or Slave Dynasty*, pp. 215, 223, 225 (App. II., a valuable memorandum by Yacoub Artin Pasha). Müller: *Die Beherrscher der Gläubigen*, p. 45.

¹ Kermoisan: *Recueil*, i. p. 241. *Mémoires sur l'Égypte* (edition of 1800), i. p. 118. *La Décade Égyptienne* (Proceedings of the Institute of Cairo), i. pp. 83 *et seq.* *Courier d'Égypte*, No. 21. Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 3785, 4020, 4022, 4096, 4188 (Mention of the alleged Mahdi who appeared at this time, June, 1799). Darmstetter: *Mahdi*, pp. 13 *et seq.* In Islam Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and

Bonaparte also wrote several times to the Sharíf of Mecca, the Imam of Muscat, and the Sultan of Darfur. The great annual pilgrimage to Mecca is a religious, political, and commercial event of the first rank in the Muhammadan world. From every quarter the little knots of pilgrims gather until they unite in several immense caravans; those from Northern Africa and Damascus are among the most important. The start of the pilgrims from Cairo is a great occasion; and the nomination of the *Emir-al-Hajj*, or leader of the Pilgrimage, for that year is an important function. Bonaparte appointed a man to this office the year after he reached Egypt; and a letter was sent to the Sharíf of Mecca by the Divan of Cairo asking that the nominee be accepted. He was accepted, and the reply of the Sharíf addressing Bonaparte as the "Protector of the '*Ulcma*' and the Friend of the Holy Ka'aba" was published. In addition to the religious influence of such conduct the trade of the Red Sea was important to the French; it was their only channel of communication with India. Bonaparte promised the caravan from the Barbary States that there should be no interruption to its passage through Egypt; but after proceeding some distance on its way, it dispersed, not trusting his assurances. He also wrote to the *Mullah* at Damascus to the same effect; but fanaticism was rife, a *Jihad* had been declared, and it was no longer possible for the French to win over to their side

Jesus are prophets, each greater than his predecessor, and having a fuller revelation from God to man. Muhammad supersedes all. In the great day of final conflict Jesus will be the helper of the Mahdi, or "well-guided one," who is to end the fight by leading the hosts of Islam to victory. He must be of Muhammad's family, and possess certain special characteristics. There have been many who claimed to be such. Among the Shiabs or followers of Ali, the idea is still more complicated (p. 57). In May, 1799, a Mahdi did arise who came from Tripoli. He was probably in Turkish employ, and his campaign against the French was of short duration (p. 78). It appears to me somewhat forced to say with Darmstetter that "the revolutionary idea among the French, and the idea of the Messiah among the Mussulmans spring from the same instinct, the same aspiration." Cf. Hughes: *Dictionary of Islam*. Article: *Mahdi*.

wholly on religious grounds any large body of Muslims. A marked change, therefore, is to be noticed in Bonaparte's policy as the year 1799 wore on. He continued writing to Constantinople of his friendship to the Porte, but it was an unprofitable business; and he resumed the endeavors, which he began soon after his capture of Cairo, to win over Ahmad Pasha of Acre from his titular allegiance to the Sultan. That governor had deluged Syria with blood and earned the surname of Djezzar, or Butcher. Bonaparte wrote him that Islam was to be protected; that the Mamelukes, his enemies, were destroyed, and that if he would support the French his own personal authority would be increased. To the Pasha of Damascus a letter of the same tenor was sent. These incitements to treason were neglected, and Ahmad with the support of the English met the French in most determined manner at Acre, and effectually stopped the progress of Bonaparte's army. Failing this, overtures were made to all who had suffered despoilment at the hands of Ahmad, promising revenge. To the Druze and Matawali sects in Mount Lebanon, at enmity alike with Sultan and Pasha, Bonaparte extended his protection, and guaranteed complete independence from the Porte, with an increase of territory, giving the former the seaport of Beirut and nearly all Lebanon. The Christian population probably supported a nation which had been their protector for centuries, but the Greeks may have been directed by their clergy to oppose the French; the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople, under Russian guidance, had issued a virulent document against the French Republic in the autumn of 1798.¹

With the capture of Malta the perusal of an agreement between the Tzar and the Knights which pointed to a re-

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 3050, 3077, 3078, 3110, 3136, 3138, 3148, 3205, 3215, 3644, 3899, 4020, 4022, 4026, 4041, 4044-4047, 4049, 4063, 4077-4080, 4096, 4235, 4268. *Courier d'Égypte*, Nos. 6, 24, 35. Marmont: *Mémoires*, i. p. 155. De Testa: *Recueil*, i. pp. 572 *et seq.*

newal of Catherine's Mediterranean plans had assured Bonaparte that he would have Russia to reckon with in the future. When therefore the alliance between the Sultan and the Tzar was consummated, he turned his fulminations upon the Russians, as polytheists, the traditional and implacable enemy of every Muslim; then, continuing the campaign of letters and documents sent throughout the Levant and into Arabia, he reversed his attitude toward the Porte, and impeached the orthodoxy of a ruler who was in alliance with other Christian nations against a general who had always protected Islam. He declared that Selim III. had betrayed the faith, that Osmanly rule in Egypt was at an end forever; he questioned his title as Khalif, stirred up the ever latent jealousy of the theological doctors of Cairo against Constantinople, and appealed to the Sharîf of Mecca, as the "Head of Islam," the Descendant of the Khalifs," the "greatest and best of Princes." Egyptian nation there was none; but such an appeal which asserted the religious and political supremacy of Mecca over the Porte could find a large audience. The Muslim of Muhammad was an Arab; the Muhammadan of Amurath was an Ottoman Turk. Jealous of the prestige of Constantinople, recalling the glories of the Arab Khalfate of Baghdad, united in an Islam which was far purer than that of the Ottoman, the Arab tribes of the South, under the leadership of the Sharîf of Mecca, would have been fit tools for Bonaparte's use. Race, religion, and politics were on his side. The success of the Wahhabi rebellion showed the possibility of a purely Arab Islam, fighting with puritanic zeal and godly courage; it was a movement that could well be likened to the Protestant Reformation in the West. But Semitic fanaticism would have prevented their alliance with the French; and an agreement between Bonaparte and the Sharîf to raise the Arab tribes in opposition to the Turks was probably also impracticable; yet the idea was undoubtedly in the mind of Bonaparte; and such a scheme under

different circumstances is not solely of speculative value, as students of the Eastern Question and of Islam will recognize.¹

The potential value of the ports in Italy and the Ionian Islands, which attracted Bonaparte's attention during the campaigns in 1796 and 1797, becomes evident when we consider his policy with reference to Greece and the Balkan peninsula. The propaganda of revolution which he began while still in Italy was carried on by the Directory after he sailed for Egypt. One of the cleverest political and religious documents which has appeared in connection with the history of the Eastern Question was published in October, 1798. It was an appeal to the Greeks to support the French; it recalled the abandonment of the Greeks by Catherine in 1791, and cited the alliance between Paul and the Sultan as proof that the only hope of Hellenic freedom lay in France. The intrigues with Ali Pasha were also continued by Bonaparte while at Malta; and French agents encouraged Passwan Oglu to rebel against the Porte. The betrayal of the French by Ali, and the failure of demonstrations in that region to detract from the strength of the coalition was a bitter disappointment, as was the siege and capture of Corfu by the combined Russo-Turkish forces. In the early stages of the expedition Bonaparte had depended for supplies and information on that island; he urged later that a second French squadron be formed with Malta and Corfu as bases, that the Spanish and Dutch fleets be used to decoy the English ships to the Atlantic, and that in case the Irish expedition had failed, an invasion of the Morea should be attempted. The haste with which the allies moved to the attack of both these

¹ Napoléon: *Corr. Nos.* 2676, 2687, 4224, 4238, 4265, 4296, 4297, 4359, 4362. *Courier d'Égypte*, No. 16. Villeneuve-Bargement: *op. cit.* ii. pp. 267, 277. *Moniteur*, Jan. 30, 1803. *Annual Register*, 1803, p. 746. Torrens: *Wellesley*, i. p. 172. Selim III. to Tipú Tib, Sept. 20, 1798: "from intercepted letters it appears that the design of the French was to break up Arabia into separate republics. . . ."

islands shows how invaluable their possession and free intercourse would have been to the French.¹

Upon the capture of Malta letters were sent to the French consuls at Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis with news of the release of the Barbary slaves owned by the Order. In Algiers the destruction of the Knights was hailed with joy, until it was learned that Bonaparte was bound for Egypt. The news of Nelson's victory on August 1, the outbreak of open war between the Porte and France and the direct command of the Sultan to his vassal provinces that all Frenchmen were to be treated as enemies, worked wide-spread disaster to French interests in that state. All the Frenchmen in Algiers were arrested in December, 1798, and their property seized. This possible ally or agent of communication with France was thus rendered totally useless to Bonaparte. Yussuf Pasha, of Tripoli, on the contrary remained friendly; and Beaussier, the French consul, was enabled to send provisions to Malta, and to communicate with Egypt and with Italy. The English soon interfered, however, seized the consul, and forbade the Pasha to assist Bonaparte, who had been sending many letters via Derne to Tripoli. In Tunis there had been no such outbreak as at Algiers, but the English acted there as they had at Tripoli. Morocco had also refused to obey the instructions of the Porte; but distance prevented it from being of service to France.²

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2615, 2662-2663, 2683, 2687, 2960-2964, 3034, 3036, 3056, 3063-3065, 3146, 3245, 3749-3750, 3764, 3774-3775, 3777. *Intercepted Corr.* i. p. 242; ii. p. 232. Rodoconachi: *op. cit.* pp. 86, 92, 98, 102. De Testa: *op. cit.* i. pp. 557 *et seq.* Zinkeisen: *Gesch. Osman. Reiches*, vii. pp. 42, 84 *et seq.*

² Mercier: *Hist. d'Afrique*, iii. pp. 448 *et seq.*, 452 *et seq.*, 468, 489. Berbrugger: *Alger sous le Consulat*, in *Revue Africaine*, xv. pp. 258, 324, 329 *et seq.*, 401, 411 *et seq.* Devoulox: *Rais Humidou*, pp. 35 *et seq.* (The denunciations of the Porte against the French were bitter). Cf. *R. Afric.* xix. p. 24. Ferand: *Ephémérides d'un secrétaire*, in *R. A.* xviii. pp. 305 *et seq.* Extract from the Arabic diary of a secretary to the Dey of Algiers (1775-1805): "The French enemies of God, captured by treason the city of Alexandria during the month of Muharrem 1213. . . . Islam has suffered a blow, and the enemy of God has won

So much attention has been centred on the history of the relations between Bonaparte and the Directory that it is unnecessary to dilate upon them; the situation of the army in Egypt and the work accomplished by it have also been thoroughly discussed by many writers. When approaching Egypt, Bonaparte had addressed his soldiers as Frenchmen, representatives of a country whose interest in the East was a corollary to its national existence. The reports he sent home were for the most part exaggerated and fancifully colored accounts which magnified a skirmish into a battle and changed a retreat into strategy. Distance lent enchantment, and the "great desertion" ended with a triumphal progress across France. The disaster which cut the communications with France was the annihilation of the French navy in the Mediterranean. Prior to this battle Napoleon had written despondently to his brother Joseph, speaking of a possible sudden return to France. Before sailing, October had been mentioned in Paris as the date when he expected to come back; but the defeat of August 1 instead of hastening his departure confirmed him in the intention to remain longer in Egypt. It is unfair to say, therefore, that Bonaparte foresaw disaster soon after his arrival, and desired to desert his army for months prior to his stealthy departure. He was supreme on land, and for some months his losses continued to be insignificant. There was in war and politics an uncertainty; and either in East or West there might have arisen at almost any time contingencies which would have deprived the coalition of its strength. These chances Bonaparte took. In Egypt he declared that "if the English continue to hold

a victory. May God in his omnipotence free his children from this calamity." This is an interesting illustration of the solidarity of Islam. Ferand: *Annales Tripolitaines*, in *R. A.* xxvii. p. 219. Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2665, 2966, 3043, 3050, 3183, 3504, 3730-3732, 4349, 4358, 4359. Pajol: *Kléber*, p. 303. Nelson: *Despatches*, iii. pp. 293, 301, 338; iv. p. 125. The English also posed as the friends of Islam and the Porte, and declared they fought against the French as atheists and robbers.

(*inonder*) the Mediterranean they will perhaps compel us to do greater things than we intended." Early in the campaign he recurred to the position which had been taken by some with regard to the projected invasion of England in 1798, and suggested that if the war showed no sign of coming to an end the evacuation of Egypt might be the price of peace. He asserted from first to last the great value of that province to France as a menace to Great Britain. From another point of view it is no exaggeration to say that the invasion of Syria was a radical move toward a settlement of the Eastern Question. It is useless to discuss the possible results if Acre had fallen; yet it seems probable that the immediate effects of a successful campaign in Syria with all that was bound to follow would have done much to alter the history of Europe and Asia at least for the succeeding quarter-century.¹

Turning now from West and North, we must examine conditions and plans in the further East; the Egyptian Expedition loses its true significance if it be treated wholly as European history; indeed the study of the eighteenth century is not complete if the contemporary history of Asia be neglected. The present Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, has well expressed the inherent fact in the history of Asiatic dominion: "The possession of India is the inalienable badge of sovereignty in the Eastern hemisphere. Since India was

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2710, 2765, 2874, 3045, 3051, 3059, 3065, 3083, 3084, 3091, 3365, 3528, 3538, 3886, 3897, 3938, 4012, 4021, 4035 (the grandiloquent announcement — On Feb. 23, "nous couchâmes en Asie"), 4086, 4087, 4091, 4092, 4101, 4102, 4124, 4136, 4138, 4156, 4323, 4329. Marmont: *Mémoires*, i. pp. 261, 278. Ségur: *Hist. et Mémoires*, i. pp. 439, 440 (the famous passage in which Bonaparte speaks of marching on Constantinople, establishing a new Eastern Empire, overthrowing Austria and returning to Paris across Europe). *Intercepted Correspondence*, i. p. 137; ii. p. ix, note. Du Casse: *Mém. et Corr. du Roi Joseph*, i. p. 189. Napoleon to Joseph, Cairo, July 25, 1798: "Egypt is a rich country, but there is no money to pay the troops. I can be with you in two months. I desire to retire from public life and live in the country. For me at 29 glory has faded." There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this letter.

known, its masters have been lords of half the world. The impulse that drew an Alexander, a Timur, and a Baber eastwards to the Indus was the same that . . . all but gave to France the Empire which England" won. Annihilation or Empire was the principle that governed the struggle which decided that there should be English and not French dominion in India. Whichever won, the victorious side could not remain either a trading company or a band of military adventurers; it must become a political sovereign. The Egyptian Expedition was an important factor in the conclusion of that struggle; and its results were in fact more important than the events themselves.¹

The works of Colonel Malleon have rehabilitated the history of the period; but it is still common enough among some students to regard the struggle between France and Great Britain in India as ended by the time of the Revolution. It appears, however, that if France had almost abandoned the contest, Frenchmen were by no means so ready to withdraw from the field. The military adventurers who served in India at this time were a continual source of anxiety to the British; and their presence, in command of strong native and European forces, together with the connection which some of them maintained with the states most antagonistic to Great Britain; whether in Europe or Asia, sufficed to call forth the energies of the men who directed the affairs of that country in the East, in a determined effort to exclude all persons of French blood from the service of native princes, to cripple the power of the greater Indian states, and to extend the political ascendancy of Great Britain over an ever increasing area.²

¹ Curzon : *Persia*, i. p. 4. Rapson : *Struggle between France and England*, pp. 3 *et seq.*, 11, 106. Seeley : *Expansion of England*, pp. 40 *et seq.*

² Malleon : *French in India*, and *Final French Struggles in India*, pp. 158, 175 *et seq.*, 195 *et seq.*, 241, 244 *et seq.* Compton : *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, pp. 7 *et seq.*, 15 *et seq.*, 221 *et seq.* Malcolm : *History of India*, i. p. 195. Barbé : *Le Nahrab René Madec*, *passim*. Kirkpatrick : *Select letters of Tippoo Sultan*,

The weakness of the French navy has also led many to suppose that the English flag was supreme on the Indian Ocean; yet prior to the Revolution the contest on sea between the rival powers had been by no means unequal. Some of the English naval historians have suppressed and distorted the history of this period; and it has only been of recent years that research and fairness have secured to French sailors their meed of praise. At the outbreak of war in 1793 the regular naval forces of France were undoubtedly inferior to those of her enemy; but the privateers which were despatched from the Îles de France and de Bourbon made this preponderance avail English Asiatic commerce but little; between 1793 and 1797 they captured 2266 English merchant ships as against 375 French, taken by the English. The profits were enormous, and while the French home ports suffered greatly during the war, these colonies grew rich. Thus it will be seen, that if the Republic were herself weak in India, the possible united strength of the

Appendix L. An outline of Tipû Sultan's military establishment. During the last years of the century Tipû Tib, an inveterate Anglophobe, seemed about again to attack the English establishments; French soldiers were in power with the Nizâm and Sindhia. The court of Pûna was under the control of the latter chief, and the Raja of Berar was certainly not friendly to the English. Tipû could bring into the field in Mysore between 50,000 and 75,000 men, including the "European or French force" of nearly 600 officers and men. The Nizâm of Haidarabâd, Ali Khan, had some 70,000 irregular infantry and a trained body of 14,000 men and guns under Piron, who had succeeded the famous Raymond in the Nizâm's service; and Daolat Râo Sindhia had 40,000 disciplined infantry, 380 guns, and 300 European officers under Perron, who had taken command of this splendid fighting machine, which the talents of De Boigne had created for his predecessor Mâdhajî Sindhia. The dream of the last named ruler had been to unite all the native princes of India under Marâthâ leadership against the English. He had disapproved of Tipû's first war against them, for he realized that no native sovereign could successfully fight them alone. The total strength of the Marâthâ powers under the Peshwa had amounted to 140,000 men at the battle of Kardlâ in 1795, of which 23,000 horse, foot, and artillery were officered and trained by Europeans, for the most part Frenchmen. Teignmouth: *Life*, i. pp. 261, 267, 285, 319, 327-329, 333, 334. Cornwallis: *Corr.* ii. pp. 53 *et seq.* Castonnet des Fosses, in *Rev. de la Révol.* i. p. 387.

enemies of England offered to the French a strong weapon for attack, while at sea the trade of their rivals suffered serious injury.¹

In 1798, of the three strong native powers of India, each possessed bodies of well disciplined troops under the command of French officers; the Sultan of Mysore, Tipú Tib, was the one most relied on by the French to create a diversion in the far East, thus assisting the French cause in the Levant, and threatening English dominion in Asia. Indeed, Bonaparte's imagination may have carried the plan still further; before leaving Paris he had asked for a copy of Rennell's work and for maps of the River Ganges; he had ordered Piveron, formerly in the employ of Tipú to accompany the expedition; and the naval forces of the Île de France had been directed to report at Suez and await his orders, with as large a number of transports as could be gathered in those waters. Previous to this, Tipú, who had been on intimate terms with the French in the past, as has been noted in a preceding chapter, had written to the Directory and expressed a desire for the cementing of their "ancient alliance." Tipú was a fanatical Muslim, and his call to the other princes for a *Jihad* against all infidels, together with the arrogant tone he often assumed even toward his allies, the French, show that his union with France against England was only a stronger sign of his intense hatred of the latter power. The tentative draft of a treaty of offensive alliance between Mysore and France was sent with the above letter to the Directory. At this time, April, 1797, there existed in his capital, Seringapatam, a French Jacobin Club, which held ecstatic meetings, discharged cannon, and swore

¹ Villèle: *Mémoires*, i. pp. 86 *et seq.*, 92, 101, 107. Malleison: *Final French Struggles*, p. 81. D'Epinay: *Renseignements pour servir à l'histoire de l'île de France*, pp. 369 *et seq.* The daily entries from June 3, 1793, on in this curious and otherwise very faulty book, show beyond a doubt that the damage inflicted on English commerce was enormous. The figures given in the text, however, are from *English* sources.

allegiance to Tipú and the French Republic, but eternal hatred toward the British. Some months later Ripaud, one of the leaders in the club, was sent to the Île de France with ambassadors bearing letters from Tipú. Three days after their arrival, January 18, 1798, Malartic, the Governor, forwarded the despatches to France. They were in the main identical with the letter of the previous April, and reached Rochefort on September 5, 1798. On January 30, Malartic issued a proclamation setting forth the intentions and desires of Tipú Tib, calling on all Frenchmen for aid; enlistment in the Sultan's service was urged, and liberal pay promised; war against the English was to be carried on until the latter were expelled from India. On the receipt at Paris of Malartic's enclosures the Minister of Marine presented a report on the situation (September 18, 1798). It recounted the celebrations under the auspices of the Jacobin Club at Seringapatam and stated the proposals of Tipú Tib "to make joint war with France until no English remain in India." The report then went on to review the offers previously made by the Sultan. In October, 1794, and in April, 1796, identical proposals had been presented by that Prince. The minister advised acceptance of the plans as given, and suggested a demonstration by the forces of Spain and the Batavian Republic in the Indies to assist him, "whose only object is to destroy the power of England in India. It is to the interests of the French Republic to second him in his designs." On October 26, the Directory approved instructions given to Louis Monneron to send a ship from the Île de France to the Red Sea in order to open communications with Bonaparte, and to secure information regarding the course of events in India, particularly of the position of Tipú Sultan, and also to take steps to maintain the present friendly relations with that Prince. He was to assure Tipú that the Directory would count upon him when the time came to act effectively against the common enemy, and that

he would be informed when to prepare for this. On November 4, the Directory attempted to communicate to Napoleon what had occurred, and to lay before him several plans of action. They pointed out that since the control of the Mediterranean was in the hands of the English, a return to France would be difficult. The critical situation of Turkey seemed to indicate the speedy dissolution of that Empire and the consequent partition of its territories; Russia, Austria, and Prussia were intriguing at present to profit by such an event, and if France were to secure her portion, a march on Constantinople would be necessary. A treaty with Tipü Sultan had been negotiated but not yet signed, and if Napoleon's eye had turned toward India, Citizen Louis Monneron would be able to assist him. With the General alone, however, rested the decision. Three plans suggested themselves: To remain in Egypt, establishing there a position secure against the attacks of the Turks, though remembering that certain seasons of the year were very injurious to Europeans; to penetrate into India, where he would doubtless find men ready to join him in overthrowing the rule of the British; or finally to march toward Constantinople to meet the enemy who menaced him. This letter reached Bonaparte in March. In India Tipü had received letters from many French officials at the Île de France promising aid and urging an attack on the East India Company; on July 20 he had written again to the Directory, outlining a treaty of eleven articles, and appointing Dubuc, a Frenchman, his ambassador at Paris. That officer proposed a union of native forces in India to oust the English; it was a plan such as Máhadjí Sindhia had dreamed of; the possibility of its realization was a nightmare to British officials.¹

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 2473, 2498, 2509. (Piveron did not reach Egypt. Boulay: *op. cit.* p. 227.) Henry: *Route de l'Inde*, pp. 386, 404 *et seq.*, 431 (the French had exaggerated ideas regarding the strength of Tipü). Wellesley: *Despatches*, i. p. viii. (proclamation of Malartic, Jan. 30, 1798), p. 710; ii. pp. 57, note (Dubuc to Tipü, Dec. 16, 1798), 740 *et seq.*; v. pp. 1 (Tipü to the Direc-

Returning now for a short time to trace the course of public opinion in Great Britain, we find that a French expedition to India did not appear impossible to the English ministry in 1798, nor to the East India Company. The effect of this feeling has a value in history independent of the fact whether it appears to-day that Bonaparte did or did not plan to attack India. The military and naval experts may or may not consider it possible for him to have suc-

tory, April 2, 1797), 6 (Tipú to French officials at Île de France, April 21, 1797), 8 *et seq.* (replies to the above, March 1798), 14 (Tipú to the Directory, July 20, 1798, enclosing a treaty of eleven articles. This did not leave Tanquebar till Feb. 1799). Salmond: *War in Mysore*, pp. 52 *et seq.*, 56; Appendix A, Document No. 1 (Tipú to Directory, Oct. 9, 1797); Appendix A, No. 15; Appendix B, No. 1 (treaty of 20 articles proposed by Tipú, April 2, 1797). He engaged on his part to provide with food all French troops immediately upon their arrival on his coast, to advance money for equipments on land and sea, to secure bullocks and camels for the artillery train and baggage, to supply lack of gunpowder and ammunition, and to co-operate in all campaigns with the French with 30,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry, fully equipped. They, on the other hand, were not to make peace to his exclusion or without his consent, he was to be a party to every treaty made by them, and the French generals were not to take the initiative in any action without his approval. France was to reimburse him at the termination of the war for expenses into which he had entered, and an equal division of territory and spoil should be faithfully carried out, except in the case of such lands as were formerly his. Goa should be his, but the Directorate was to have Bombay. The French were to supply between five and ten thousand regular troops, and twenty-five to thirty thousand "new citizens," or free native colonial militia for the war, which was to be directed against the English and Portuguese, and if necessary against the Máráthás and the Nizám. Pledges were to be immediately exchanged to carry out this treaty. As Ripaud did not leave India till the autumn, these articles were probably not forwarded in April. Salmond, Appendix B, No. 12 (Gen. Cossigny to Tipú's ambassadors, Pondicherry, March 5, 1798); Appendix B, Nos. 22, 23. *Asiatic Annual Register*, 1798-99. *Supple. to the Chronicle*, pp. 246 *et seq.* Mill: *Hist. of India*, vi. pp. 70 *et seq.* (an unsatisfactory account). Miles: *History of Tipú Sultan*, pp. 252 *et seq.* Boulay de la Meurthe: *op. cit.* pp. 59 *et seq.* (Bonaparte had received letters of credence addressed in blank for the Indian princes, April 22, 1798), 227 *et seq.*, 281, 283 *et seq.* (Some of the letters are given from the French sources.) To secure a good understanding of Tipú's feeling toward the French and English it is well to read some of his other letters. Cf. Kirkpatrick: *Select Letters*, pp. 13, 139, 178, 291, 369, 376, 395, 435, 456, 462. See also, *Asiatic Annual Register*. Col. Kirkpatrick has given 44 more letters. Rennell: *Carte générale de l'Inde, etc.*, trans. from Eng. by J. Bernoulli.

ceeded if he had tried it; but in this matter as in many others, it is as important to note what one power thought its opponent might do as to record the actual events which took place. Mr. Udney had written to Lord Grenville from Leghorn on April 16, 1798, saying that he had certain information that Alexandria or some port in the Black Sea was the destination of Bonaparte's expedition, which was to number fifty thousand men. The Ottoman Empire would not oppose it, for the blow was eventually to strike at the power of the East India Company in India. Whether access to that country should be obtained by the Gulf of Persia, by land from Egypt, or by the Red Sea, troops could be forwarded now or later; for with Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez in French hands, even in time of peace, opportunity for hostile alliances and rebellions in India could be greatly increased and English control weakened. In May Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Commissioners for Affairs in India, had received like information with the more definite statements that the Ottoman Empire was reported to have consented to a plan which included the seizure of Egypt; the French army was to march north to Persia, and on to the Indus, "crossing near where Alexander did, and from thence advance into British territories." His correspondent continued that French agents had been at work throughout the East for some time past, securing concessions from several princes, and had concerted with Tipú Tib for a joint campaign. Bonaparte's personal ambition, and the prospect of establishing himself in a more independent position than was possible in Italy, were thought to be prime factors in this attack on England. Mr. Dundas wrote to Lord Grenville forwarding a brief memoir in which he portrayed the advantages which the possession of Egypt held forth to the French; and he analyzed in his own letter the various reports current concerning Bonaparte's plans, rejecting the Black Sea route to India as impracticable unless with the co-op-

eration of Russia and pointing out that the strength of the English squadron in Indian waters rendered the sea passage from Suez too hazardous for the French to attempt; but he acknowledged that the land route was traversable, and that it presented no insuperable obstacles. To meet an attack from this quarter a rapid increase of the English forces in India was urged. He recalled the fact that the possession of Egypt had been for a long time an object in French politics, and that Baron de Tott had been sent several years before to survey the levels and report on the roads practicable across the Isthmus of Suez. To his mind the belief on the part of the French Government that a seizure of Egypt would be the most effectual means of undermining the British power in India, was at the root of the matter. Mr. Dundas wrote on June 16 to the Earl of Mornington (Richard Wellesley), the new Governor-General of India, that if Bonaparte's expedition were actually destined for Egypt, he considered it "to be a great and a masterly stroke, and if successful [one that] would be attended with very pernicious consequences to the interests of this country." Jacob Bousanquet, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the Company, wrote to the Governor of Bombay that while he doubted the success of Bonaparte, he was greatly alarmed for Egypt and India, for the projects did not seem wholly impossible to him. Nelson, while searching for the French fleet in the Mediterranean, had also expressed his anxiety by writing Earl Spencer on June 15, 1798, that if the French fleet had gone east of Sicily he should believe that they were bound for Alexandria, and were set on "getting troops to India—a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by no means so difficult as might at first view be imagined." The last week of June he was firmly convinced that such was the plan, and wrote inquiring if any transports had been collected in the Red Sea to carry the French troops. His thought, after the destruction of the French fleet on August 1, was to despatch news of the victory

to India, for he reasoned that Bonaparte's Indian schemes would be spoiled by the loss of his Mediterranean squadron.¹

In India directly upon the receipt of this news the Earl of Mornington wrote to Tipú reporting the complete defeat of the French. The news of Malartic's proclamation of January 30, had reached India some months previous, and a protest had been sent to the Sultan of Mysore; but that ruler had declared his friendship for the English while at the same time he continued his correspondence with the French. The British representative at Constantinople had influenced the Sultan, Selim III., as Khalif of the Muslim world, to write to Tipú warning him that the French were bent on "effacing the religion of the Prophet from the face of the earth." This letter was forwarded by the Governor-general of India to Tipú on January 16, 1799. The Sultan of Mysore replied in a letter to Selim on February 10 that "in forty years the English had successfully subverted the Mohammedan powers in the Carnatic, Bengal and Oude . . .," and concluded by asking, "What respect could a nation [England] have for the religion of the Koran who everywhere had butcher-shops open for the sale of pork?" Before arriving in India Mornington had been warned that the bodies of French troops in

¹ Wellesley: *Despatches*, i. pp. 350, 651, 688, 692. Cf. *Intercepted Corr.* i. p. 111. Auckland: *Corr.* iii. p. 425. Vorontzov: *Arkhir*, x. pp. 23, 28-30. Nelson: *Despatches*, iii. pp. 31 (Nelson to Earl Spencer, June 15, 1798), 36 *et seq.* (Nelson to Baldwin, Eng. consul at Alexandria, June 26: "I am so persuaded of the intention of the French to attempt driving us from India in concert with Tippoo Saib, that I shall never feel secure till Mangalore and all of Tippoo's coast is in our possession"), 40, 96, 97, 112 (Nelson to Lord Minto, off Rhodes, Aug. 29: "I lost not a moment in sending an officer overland to India," after the battle of the Nile); vii. p. cxlii (Nelson to Admiral Sir John Jervis, H. M. S. Theseus, June 18, 1797: ". . . Tippoo is as much our natural enemy as the French. . . .") James: *Naval History*, ii. pp. 183, 388. An account of Lieut. Duval's trip to India after the battle of Aug. 1. Buckingham: *Courts and Cabinets*, ii. p. 401. (Grenville to Buckingham, June 13, 1798): "It really looks as if Bonaparte was after all in sober truth going to Egypt: and Dundas seems to think the scheme of attacking India from thence not so impracticable as it may appear. I am still incredulous as to the latter point, though as to the former I am shaken."

the employ of native rulers must receive the most careful attention by the British. The status of the Nizâm of Haidarabâd in particular was a source of anxiety to him; the chief officers in the Nizâm's service, he wrote, "are Frenchmen of the most virulent and notorious principles of Jacobinism; and the whole corps constitutes an armed French party of great zeal, diligence and activity." When he reached India, the situation seemed to him much more serious; if the French should succeed in landing any body of troops in India, the general co-operation of all the foreign adventurers with their native masters might be dreaded by the English, and the only way to prevent a landing of French within the disaffected region would be the possession by the English of the coast of Mysore. In addition to the danger of a union of the Nizâm, Sindhia and Tipú, there was the possibility of an invasion of India by Zeman Shah from the northwest, which would receive the support of Tipú. This was an alliance of two Muslim rulers against the English, and also against the non-Muslim native states of India. There had been considerable correspondence between the two rulers, and though this was suspected by the English they did not receive the full confirmation of it till the capture of Tipú's private documents in May, 1799, put them in possession of all the facts. Col. Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, who was at that time in India, however, urged that no war with Tipú was necessary till it should appear that the French could be of aid to him, or till he definitely refused the English offers of amicable agreement. He wrote later to his brother the Governor-general, not to press Tipú into a war till an alliance had been concluded by the English with the Nizâm and the Maráthá powers. In that way the Nizâm's force of French-led troops might give way to a corresponding force under English control. This was done as regards the Nizâm, and as Tipú's attitude remained secretly hostile to the English, demands were made of him which, if granted

by him, would have effectually placed his state in a position subservient to the English. He refused and war ensued.¹

The operations of Bonaparte at Suez and along the Red Sea now receive a wider meaning. That General had concerned himself with the survey and occupation of the Nile Delta and of the Isthmus of Suez within a few months after the capture of Alexandria; and he had written to the Directory that "mistress of Egypt, France would in the end be mistress of the Indies." In December he ordered the fortification of Suez, and accompanied by the French scholars of the expedition, he explored the ancient water-courses of the Isthmus, and examined the ground which separated the Red Sea from the Mediterranean. Several small ships were secured and equipped for service on the Red Sea, a move which was hastened by the report of a courier from India announcing that Tipú Tib was about to take the field against the English. Preparations were made to secure good anchorage for vessels arriving from the Île de France, and an expedition was sent to seize Kosseir, on the Egyptian coast about a third of the distance from Suez to

¹ Torrens: *Wellesley*, i. p. 172. Wellesley: *Despatches*, i. pp. 1, 3 (Mornington to Dundas, Cape of Good Hope, Feb. 23, 1798), 61, 92 (M. to Dundas July 6), 98 (M. to Kirkpatrick, July 8, "The junction which might thus be effected between the French officers with their several corps in the respective service of the Nizâm, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo, might establish the power of France and India upon the ruin of the states of Poonah and of the Deccan"), 109, 125 (M. to Palmer, July 8), 138 (M. to Gen. Harris, July 18), 170, 171, 185 (the French force at Haiderabâd, Aug. 12), 204, 321, 413 *et seq.* (M. to Tipú, Jan. 16, 1799), 506 (Chief Justice of Bengal to Mornington, March, 1799), 710; v. pp. 14, 16 *et seq.* (Tipú to Zeman Shah, Feb. 5, 1797. Plan of co-operation of these rulers), 21 (reply to the above), 22 (Tipú to Zeman, Jan. 30, 1799), 24 (Tipú to Sultan Selim iii. Feb. 10, 1799), 36 (M. to Gen. Anker, Jan. 18, 1799). Wellington: *Supplementary Despatches*, i. pp. 52 *et seq.*, 71 *et seq.* (Memorandum on the French force at Haiderabâd), 96, 97 (French at Calicut), 110 (considerations on the war with Tipú), 127, 128 (the invasion of Zeman Shah and the northwest frontier), 152 *et seq.*, 222, 230. Mills: *Hist. of India*, vi. p. 73. An instance of the unfairness of this writer with regard to the Earl of Mornington, which Prof. Wilson corrects in a footnote. Salmond: *op cit.* p. 75. Cf. Beatson: *The War with Tippoo Sultan*, *passim*. Bignon: *Hist. de France*, i. p. 241 (comment on Pitt's Speech of Nov. 27, 1800).

Suakim. Every effort was made to develop the commerce of that region, and letters were sent to Muscat and Mecca to be forwarded to Tipú in India and to the Île de France. The one for Tipú was secretly communicated to the English by a native secretary at about the time when Mysore was attacked. Bonaparte attached great strategic importance to Kosseir, and choice of it by the Anglo-Indian Expedition in 1801 as a base of operations against the French confirms his judgment. After the return from Syria Bonaparte made still further efforts to communicate with the East, but by this time Tipú was dead and the English cruisers were patrolling the mouth of the Red Sea. It does not appear then that there was any definite plan to press on to India; in fact even if there had been, the victory of Nelson, the formation of the new coalition in Europe, and the difficulties of the situation in Egypt would have effectually prevented any decided move in that direction. On the other hand, in view of the cast of Bonaparte's mind, the political dreams of France, and the romantic and marvellous success of many soldiers of fortune in India at that very period, it is fair to believe that a continuation of the Expedition to India with the slightest possible prospect of success would have been welcomed by Bonaparte either for himself or for a subordinate, whose glory in victory would have been credited to his superior, and whose failure would not have dimmed his superior's fame. Often worthless as direct historical evidence, yet of weight in a study of the ambitions and imaginative characteristics of Bonaparte, his *Commentaries*, written at St. Helena, furnish interesting testimony on this point. The invasion of India from Egypt is worked out with detail, and the attempt is made to treat the entire Expedition to Egypt as in the nature of a preparatory move toward an ultimate destination beyond the Indus.¹

¹ Napoleon: *Corr.* Nos. 2911, 3252, 3259, 3264, 3270, 3304, 3336, 3375, 3439, 3490, 3519, 3602, 3624, 3649, 3697-3699, 3740, 3741, 3452, 3767, 3781, 3782, 3799-3810, 3820, 3821, 3824, 3830, 3835, 3842, 3855, 3900, 3901, 3910, 3913, 3934, 3944, 3949,

Whether Bonaparte planned an invasion of India or not, the effects of his invasion of Egypt were very marked in India. Indeed one of the clearest signs of the intimate relation between the Levant and India is the correspondence which was maintained so assiduously between the Earl of Elgin, the English diplomatic representative at the Porte, and the Earl of Mornington, and between the latter and Sir Sydney Smith of the English naval force operating in Syrian and Egyptian waters. It must be remembered that the English ministry could best gain the support of the country by catering to the popular fear and hatred of the French, that Bonaparte was the

3952, 3953, 4179, 4187, 4188, 4205, 4225, 4234, 4236, 4237. *Courier d'Égypte*, No. 22. Tipú was reported to have 260,000 infantry and 130,000 cavalry. Reybaud: *Mémoires*, etc. iv. pp. 216 *et seq.* *Asiatic Annual Register*, 1798. *Suppl. to State Papers*, p. 259. Bonaparte to Tipú, Jan. 26, 1799 (No. 3901). Salmond: *op. cit.*, page 14, and App. B, No. 25. A letter from Bonaparte to the Sharif of Mecca, which is not found in the *Correspondance*, asking that a letter be forwarded to Tipú. It is shown here how the English secured these letters from the Secretary to the Sharif. The letter, as it was read by the English, is as follows:—

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

LIBERTY.

EQUALITY.

Bonaparte, member of the National Convention, General-in-Chief, to the most magnificent Sultan, our greatest friend, Tippoo Saib.

Headquarters at Cairo, 7th Pluaise, 7th year of the Republic, one and indivisible.

You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England. I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your present political situation. I would wish even that you could send some clever man to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I might confer.

May the Almighty increase your power and destroy your enemies.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

A true translation.

(Signed) F. WAPPERS.

Napoléon: *Comm.* ii. pp. 184, 285, 330; iii. pp. 20 *et seq.*, 144. If these passages could be admitted as evidence, the case for India would be very strong. Cf. also, Roseberry: *Napoleon, the last Phase*, pp. 180 *et seq.*, 217 *et seq.*

bogey of English and Anglo-Indian politics, and that any measure might be made to appear wise or defensible provided it could be shown that it was destined to thwart the schemes of that leader. Mornington's ejaculation to Dundas after Tipú's death, and after the alliance with the Nizâm had broken French paramountcy in that court, is full of this feeling. He wrote, "The French influence in India, thanks be to God! is now nearly extirpated." He pleaded that at the conclusion of peace neither France nor Holland might receive any restoration of territory in India. He believed that Nelson's victory on August 1 was what saved India from an invasion by the French; and he set about the definite policy of undermining French influence with Sindhia, thereby reducing the military strength of the Maráthá leader, freeing the Peshwa at Púna from his control, and ejecting from one native court after another the various French adventurers, who to his mind represented the slightest menace to absolute English hegemony in that portion of Asia. The treaty which was negotiated on February 21, 1798, with Oudh is an earnest of this policy, and Article XV. is the forerunner of similar provisions to exclude Europeans from Indian service unless by consent of the East India company, which are to be found in every treaty or convention negotiated with any Asiatic power during the next fifteen years. This political scheme could be best followed to its completion by treating it as a complement to the struggle over the treaty of Amiens (1802-03). For the present we must notice the other directions in which this English expansion moved as a result of the war with France. Arthur Wellesley was one of the first of the English officers to advocate measures which looked beyond the mainland of India; as early as July, 1797, he wrote to his brother: "Mauritius [Île de France] ought to be taken. As long as the French have an establishment there Great Britain cannot call herself safe in India." He likewise advocated the possession of Pulo Penang Straits on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, as the future

mart of India and China, the repair shop of the East. That office is now filled by Singapore in the Straits Settlement; but the far look ahead toward China and the Philippines was characteristic of the determination of the British to allow no strategic point, no important market to escape their control. Mornington was bent on securing all Ceylon for England for the same reasons. Persia's relation to India was also within his range of view; here the fear of Bonaparte may be admitted as the direct principle of action. It had been advocated by some that Persia's weakness was Great Britain's strength; but Mornington felt that the exclusion of French influence was the great political object to be gained by a treaty with the Shah of Persia, especially in view of the possibility, as he viewed it in February, 1799, that the French might endeavor to penetrate through Persia to the Indus; another object was the creation of a hostile power to attack Zeman Shah in the rear, should he move to an invasion of India. The Red Sea, in General Stuart's words, had become an "avenue to India" and the Persian Gulf had received a new political importance. To these problems the Indian Government addressed itself. Capt. Malcolm was despatched to negotiate a treaty with the Shah and also with the Imam of Muscat. This he did in 1800-01; it was the beginning of the Persian Question with all its fluctuations. The decision to despatch an army from India to secure the evacuation of Egypt by the French is also a forerunner of future events. The success attending its operations undoubtedly contributed to develop a policy which has now become the formula of English politics and the key to the problem of Asiatic Empire.¹

¹ Wellesley: *Despatches*, i. pp. 31 (Mornington to Dundas, Feb. 28, 1798, about Ceylon), 188 (Zeman Shah), 295, 296 (M. to Dundas, Oct. 11, 1798. Bonaparte in Egypt), 322 (M. to Lord Clive, November 5, 1798. Expresses the conviction that Nelson's victory saved India), 433 (M. to Duncan, Feb. 19, 1799, Persia and Zeman Shah), 581 (M. to Gen. Harris, April 23, 1799. The reasons for attacking Tipú: 1. His adherence to the French. 2. Bonaparte's possible situation in Egypt. 3. Lack of English naval strength in the Red Sea. 4. Atti-

Such was the development of Eastern history under the stimulus and at the time of Bonaparte's Expedition to Egypt. The influence of the Expedition upon the evolution of the Eastern question *per se* is naturally even more direct; and the events on the continent, and in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, which may be considered as a part of its history, were fully as important. They are better known than those in India; it remains, therefore, only to point out the relationship between them and their effects rather than to summarize the actual happenings. The treaty of Campo Formio was in reality only a truce; the second coalition was in the germ before Bonaparte sailed for Malta. Russia had been the first con-

tinue of Zeman Shah. 5. Ditto of Sindhia. 6. The Peshwa becomes subservient to the latter), 671; vol. ii. pp. 36 (M. to Dundas, June 7, 1799. Victory over Tipú), 39 (ditto. The extirpation of the French), 40, 69 (M. to Col. Palmer, Eng. Resident at Púna, July 4, 1799. The English system), 70, 89 (M. to the Court of Directors, Aug. 3, 1799), 98, 139, 142, 205, 207, 224, 252, 299, 304, 309, 415, 438 *et seq.*, 469, 492, 505, 539, 565, 587, 633, 715; vol. v. pp. 82, 85 (Kirkpatrick to Malcolm, Dec. 10, 1779), 179 (Gen. Stuart to Dundas, Jan. 1800. He believed an invasion of India by the French from Egypt would have been practicable and successful "had the Turks been in alliance with the French, or had the enemy pushed on immediately after he reached Cairo"). Aitchison: *Treaties and Conventions*, ii. p. 102. "Treaty with Nabob Vizier Saadet Ali Khan Behauder," Feb. 21, 1798, Art. XV. The Nabob of Oudh "engages and promises that he will not entertain any European of any description in his service, nor allow any to settle in his country without the consent of the Company." Wellington: *Supplementary Despatches*, i. pp. 13 *et seq.* ("I have observed since my arrival here that he [Tipú] is a constant object of fear to the English, and whenever they want to add a little colouring to a statement, they find out that he has an army in motion. . . . They likewise say that Zemaun Shah will attack Hindoustan in the next season; but that I equally disbelieve, from a conviction of its difficulties, and of its inutility even if he should succeed." A. Wellesley to Mornington, July 12, 1797), 24 *et seq.*; vol. ii. pp. 334 *et seq.*, 346, 356 *et seq.*, 408. Mill and Wilson: *Hist. of India*, vii. p. 220. Kaye: *Life of Malcolm*, i. pp. 105 *et seq.*, 516 *et seq.* Hertslet: *Treaties with Persia*, pp. 1, 8. Eton: *Survey of Turkey*, pp. 497, 498. Curzon: *Persia*, ii. p. 435. Low: *Indian Navy*, i. p. 325. A treaty had been negotiated in August, 1798, with the Imam of Muscat directed against the French and Dutch. Brydges: *Mission to Persia*, ii. pp. 16, 177. English agents in the interior of Turkey and at Bassora were instructed to operate against French influence. Malleon: *Final French Struggles*, pp. 253 *et seq.* The Anglo-Indian Expedition to Egypt in 1801.

tinental power to feel that the Expedition was a menace to her ; in April, 1798, reports had been received at St. Petersburg which aroused the Tzar to decided action. Fearful lest an attack upon the Balkan peninsula might again raise the Polish question, he strengthened the Black Sea fleet, and made preparations to resist any attempt on the part of the French to injure Russian prestige in the southeast. An alliance was offered to the Porte in May, and in August military and naval support, to fight the French or to suppress Passwan Oglu of Widdin was proposed. It afforded a welcome opportunity to intervene in the Ottoman Empire and to resuscitate an oriental policy which consisted in alternating between friendship and war with the Porte. Great Britain co-operated with Russia to urge the Porte to join the coalition against France, to accept Russian assistance, and to permit the Russian Black Sea fleet to pass through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean. Thus there arose the anomalous situation of a Russo-Turkish armament attacking and capturing Corfu, while England, at first alone, afterwards temporarily assisted by the Russians, blockaded Malta. There was in that very situation the seed of disruption. Russia had her own ends to serve and, feared by the Turks, offensively slighted by the Austrians, and distrusted by the English, it was in the nature of events that Russia should drift away from the allies and turn toward France, who had already, in 1797, made the endeavor to win her over. The outbreak of this war of the second coalition against France, while Bonaparte was in Egypt, did the work by which that General was ready to profit, since the defeat of the French armies, and the weakness of the Directory, made for him an opportunity to secure the supreme position at home, which had been denied him in the winter of 1797-98. The failure of the attempt to placate the Porte, and the naval supremacy of England were factors which must render abortive Bonaparte's plans in Egypt. The preliminary successes of the coalition aided him in the end

by creating the situation which raised him to power. Once in control, the victories of the French armies in Italy and Germany, and the jealousy of the powers in the Mediterranean were the tools which he used to disintegrate the coalition and to secure the peace which was needed. Even in October, 1798, Nelson had warned the Porte not to let the Russian fleet approach Malta. "I hate the Russians," he wrote Capt. Ball on January 21, 1799. Malta was an apple of discord that was destined to bring war, not peace, to the courts of Europe during the coming years.

The alliance between Russia and the Porte was not durable; the tone of the parliamentary debates in England showed that all was not smooth between Great Britain and Austria, and direct antagonism to Russia was but thinly veiled; the future of the Ionian Islands was a matter in which every power was deeply interested and the question might easily create bad feeling between Austria and Russia; such was the real situation in August, 1799, when Bonaparte set sail from Egypt.¹

¹ Bailieu: *Preussen und Frankreich*, i. pp. 247, 558. Rodocanachi: *Bonaparte et les îles ioniennes*, pp. 120, 147, 170, 175-179. De Testa: *Recueil*, i. pp. 537, 539, 542, 548 *et seq.*, 553 *et seq.*, 567, 577, 586. Pallain: Talleyrand et le Directoire, pp. 244 *et seq.*, 289, 294 *et seq.*, 335 *et seq.*, 374 *et seq.*, 382 *et seq.*, 394 *et seq.* Nelson: *Despatches*, iii. pp. 145, 146, 203, 205, 224, 236, 255, 256, 297, 312, 316; iv. pp. 3, 72, 75, 77, 108; vii. p. clxxvii. Pouqueville: *Voyage en Morée*, ii. pp. 7 *et seq.* *Intercepted Corr.* i. p. 110; iii. pp. 122 *et seq.* Harcourt: *Correspondence of Rose*, i. p. 215. Tatischeff: *Paul I. et Bonaparte*, in *Nouvelle Revue*, xlvii. pp. 650 *et seq.*, 660, 664. Vivenot: *Vertrauliche Briefe*, ii. pp. 28, 29, 77, 96, 135, 156, 157, 166, 178, 189, 199, 201-203, 333, 346. Staël-Holstein: *Corr.* p. 394. Miliutin: *Gesch. des Krieger*, i. pp. 67-69, 74, 323 *et seq.*, 367; iv. pp. 164, 173; v. pp. 153, 161, 203 *et seq.* 207, 213. Wassiltchikow: *Les Razoumowski*, ii. Pt. 1, pp. 266 *et seq.*, 270 *et seq.*, 337 *et seq.* Pisani: *Les Russes à Corfou*, in *Rev. d'hist. dipl.* 1888. Vorontzov: *Arkhiv*, viii. p. 238 (Rostoptchin to S. Vorontzov, Gatchino, Aug. 25, 1799): "Elle [England] se reserve le droit de faire la paix maritime à son gré, et si elle a en vue les possessions des français et hollandais aux Indes, ne sera-t-elle pas deux fois plus riche et plus puissante après la guerre qu'elle ne l'était avant? Ayant Gibraltar et l'Empereur étant maître de Malthe après avoir détruit la marine française et espagnole, ne sera-t-elle pas la maîtresse du commerce du Levant?" Cf. pp. 188, 200, 218, 236 *et seq.*, 240-242, 252-256, 259, *et seq.*, 263, 264, 269, 287-291, 308; x. pp. 40, 62, 63, 68-70; xi. pp. 6, 12, 20, 21, 38, 39, 49, 97, 102-105, 107, 112-119, 121, 318-320; xviii. pp. 178, 179, 182,

Bonaparte had learned of the condition of affairs in Europe, and stole away, leaving Kléber in command, with orders to hold on till May in the hope of reinforcement or until he had lost fifteen hundred men by the plague. One more effort was made to arrest Turkish hostility by a letter to the Grand Vizier in which Bonaparte endeavored to persuade the Porte to negotiate with France without English mediation or interference. He returned to France claiming that the perils of his country had summoned him to her defence; his progress to Paris became that of a victor, and the "return of the Hero," who many believed had been sent to the East by his enemies that he might disappear in oblivion, changed the desertion of the army into the triumph of a pro-consul.¹

The motives for undertaking the Expedition have been analyzed; and the methods employed in it have been studied. It failed primarily because of the superiority of the English navy over that of France, and secondarily because Bonaparte was unable to overcome the passive resistance of the native population in Egypt, and because the Porte joined the coalition, which was in turn due more to the moral effect of Nelson's victory than to anything else. Had not the English navy prevented the capture of Acre it is fair to assume that Bonaparte stood more than an even chance of reducing all Syria, where the population differed from that in Egypt. It was not divided into two classes, ruler and oppressed, as in Egypt, but was instead a mingling of irreconcilable

190, 191, 196, 220-224, 233, 234, 342 *et seq.*; xxii. p. 85; xxix. pp. 279, 289, 377. Brückner: *Materialy dlya chizneopisaniya Grafa N. Panina*, ii. pp. 115, 116, 497, 498; iii. pp. 1-6, 93, 215, 233 *et seq.*, 326-328, 375, 433, 521, 638, 647; iv. p. 276.

¹ Napoléon: *Corr.* Nos. 4341, 4361, 4364, 4374, 4375, 4380-4382. *Intercepted Corr.* vol. iii. pp. 19, 171 *et seq.* De Testa: *op. cit.* vol. i. pp. 587 *et seq.* Napoléon: *Comm.* iv. p. 441. Bailieu: *op. cit.* i. pp. 206, 221 (Bericht Sandoz. Rollin, Paris, Aug. 5, 1798. Talleyrand remarks to him in a low voice: "Ce n'est pas que le Directoire serait fort affligé de l'échec qu'il [Bonaparte] pourrait recevoir; la gloire de ce général a trop retentie, et il ne serait pas fâché de la voir un peu ternie"). Boulay de la Meurthe: *op. cit.* p. 241. This seems to be the final word on the subject of the secret information which Bonaparte is alleged to have received in Egypt prior to the desertion.

elements, many of which were ready to join a victorious European leader. With Acre, the key, the "bridge-head" of Palestine, as Captain Mahan calls it, in his hands, and Syria no longer hostile, Asia Minor lay open to him, and nothing short of a European army could have stopped him. Ibrahim Pasha proved this in 1832. But Acre was not captured, and the dream of empire faded. Furthermore Bonaparte never really understood the science of sea-power, however much he desired to possess it. He attributed to India England's superiority and wealth, and based his plans for the Egyptian Expedition, as for the continental blockade, on the theory that a commercial power trading to the ends of the earth could be struck in a vital spot, even when the fighting machine of its rival was limited in its efficiency by the waves of the sea. In the very failure of the Expedition, therefore, there lay the answer to the riddle of Bonaparte's career; though he had failed once, he tried again and again to secure the same end, the ruin of England.¹ The ultimate results of the Expedition were to place the question of Egypt in the forefront of European politics, to give to England in Malta a position unequalled in the Mediterranean, to show her statesmen that India must become solely English, and to reveal the close connection between Egypt and India, between the Eastern Question and the larger problem of Asia. Bonaparte had not called the Eastern Question from the recesses of Europe; it was a serious problem under the Ancien Régime and at the time of the Revolution. His keen political insight, however, bade him make of it a stumbling-block to the alliance of his enemies; and the ambition and ideals of his chosen country, as well as his own genius, directed him to seek its solution. Touched by his hand it took the form and character which it has preserved to our day.

¹ Mahan: *Sea Power* (1793-1812), i. pp. 299, 324; vol. ii. p. 27. Beer: *Gesch. des Welthandels*, 3te Abth. i. Hälfte, p. 369. Adair: *Mission to Vienna*, p. 94.

APPENDIX I

TABLE A

TABEAU DU RÉSULTAT DES BILANS DE LA COMPAGNIE
DES INDES, 1724-40.

Dates des Bilans.	Fonds Capital.			Augmentation.			Diminutions.		
	livres.	s.	d.	livres.	s.	d.	livres.	s.	d.
15 mars, 1724	143,000,000								
21 mars, 1725	139,385,940	12	3				3,614,059	7	9
29 mars, 1726	138,360,864	13	5				1,025,075	18	10
11 juin, 1727	138,814,398	6	2	453,533	12	9			
30 avril, 1728	141,246,001	16	1	2,431,603	9	5			
30 avril, 1729	142,093,835	7	11	847,833	11	10			
29 avril, 1730	143,425,124	10	11	1,331,289	4	3			
29 avril, 1731	142,630,610	5	8				749,514	5	3
30 juin, 1731	146,380,370	5	8	3,749,760	0	0			
30 juin, 1732	135,886,602	8	8				10,493,767	17	0
30 juin, 1733	139,606,744	4	7	3,720,141	15	11			
30 juin, 1734	142,948,892	0	10	3,342,147	16	3			
30 juin, 1735	145,193,221	1	3	2,244,329	0	5			
30 juin, 1736	147,753,930	0	4	2,560,708	19	1			
30 juin, 1737	152,042,396	15	5	4,288,466	15	1			
30 juin, 1738	154,875,785	13	10	2,833,388	18	5			
30 juin, 1739	159,420,571	18	10	4,544,786	5	0			
30 juin, 1740	161,938,537	2	5	2,547,955	3	7			

These figures are from a table in Dernis: *Histoire des compagnies de commerce*, MSS. in *Arch. du Ministre de la Marine*. They are quoted by Bonnassieux: *Grandes Compagnies*, pp. 281-82. The Company borrowed over 55 million livres between 1747 and 1770, having gone into liquidation once, Nov. 18, 1764, pp. 325, 326.

TABLE B

Mémoire contre la Compagnie des Indes, p. 27.

TABLEAU DE L'IMPORTATION EN FRANCE DES MARCHANDISES DE L'INDE, DEPUIS ET COMPRIS 1725,
JUSQUES ET COMPRIS 1768.

Années.	Articles de Chine.	Articles de l'Inde.	Total.	Années communes.
De 1725 à 1736 . . .	18,961,448	99,981,948	118,943,396	De 11, 10,812,945
De 1736 à 1743 . . .	23,602,112	88,538,635	112,140,747	De 7, 16,020,106
De 1743 à 1756 . . .	41,695,947	120,855,156	162,551,103	De 13, 12,503,931
De 1756 à 1765				
Peu de retour à cause de la guerre				
1766 . . .	7,139,910	5,787,181	12,918,091	12,918,091
1767 . . .	5,055,716	10,467,779	15,523,495	15,523,495
[sic] 2768 . . .	5,838,379	15,880,975	21,719,354	21,719,354
Total de 34 années .	102,284,512	341,511,674	443,796,186	
Année commune de 34	3,008,368	10,044,461		
				13,052,799,118. 9d. $\frac{3}{4}$, ci 13,052,799,118. 9d. $\frac{3}{4}$

TABLE C

Mémoire contre la Compagnie des Indes, p. 28.TABLEAU DE L'IMPORTATION EN FRANCE DES MARCHANDISES DE L'INDE, DEPUIS ET COMPRIS 1771,
JUSQUES ET COMPRIS 1782.

ANNÉES DE PAIX.

Années.	Articles de Chine.	Articles communs de la Chine et de l'Inde.	Articles de l'Inde.	Total.	Total par six années.
1771	7,680,540	19,656	4,902,093	12,602,289	
1772	4,461,090	11,775	12,653,812	17,139,077	
1773	6,138,928	28,270	18,218,438	24,383,636	
1774	7,823,230	21,054	12,360,950	20,205,234	
1775	12,158,096	177,010	17,549,042	29,884,148	
1776	1,706,478	163,785	30,975,963	32,846,226	
Total des six années	39,979,362	421,550	99,660,298	137,061,210	ci 137,061,218
Année commune	6,663,227	70,258,68	16,110,949,134	22,843,535	

ANNÉES DE GUERRE.

1777	195,290	2,023	1,421,328	1,618,641	
1778	182,336	6,113	45,186	45,186	
1779	846,202	50,984	63,407	251,856	
1780	644	7,776	501,026	1,398,812	
1781					
1782			404,522	412,942	
Total des six années	1,234,472	66,896	2,426,069	3,727,437	ci 3,727,437
Année commune	205,745,68	11,149,68	40,134,168	621,239,10	
Total général					140,788,647
Année commune des douze					11,732,387.5

TABLE D

A similar table in Daubigny: *Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer*, p. 339, gives the cost price of goods in India and China in addition to their sale value in France as in the above tables. On this basis the gross profit was as follows:—

	India Trade.	Per cent.	China Trade.	Per cent.
1725-36	49,001,519	96 $\frac{1}{8}$	9,688,549	104 $\frac{1}{2}$
1736-43	42,824,315	93 $\frac{2}{3}$	13,822,407	141 $\frac{1}{2}$
1743-56	58,269,331	93 $\frac{1}{10}$	22,443,427	166 $\frac{2}{3}$
1757-63				
1764			2,377,186	85
1765			2,002,249	82 $\frac{1}{2}$
1766	2,716,536	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	2,973,214	71 $\frac{1}{2}$
1767	3,896,394	59 $\frac{1}{3}$	2,042,376	68
1768	5,835,060	58 $\frac{1}{12}$	2,356,488	68 $\frac{1}{2}$

APPENDIX II

TABLE A

ANGLO-EAST INDIA TRADE, 1710-1807.

Macpherson: *Indian Commerce*, pp. 419, 420, "An account of the ships employed by the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies [including China], of the merchandise and bullion exported by them, and of the merchandise imported and sold by them, since the year 1710, as far as can be ascertained from accounts already made up." The amounts are in pounds sterling. The "total exports" include Merchandise and Bullion; and the "total imports" include Company's goods, Private Trade, Neutral property, — all being given at *sale amount* in England.

Year.	Ships Sailed.	Ships Arrived.	Total Exports.	Total Imports. Sale Amounts.
1710	10		575,920	
1750	16		1,121,378	
1780	20		401,166	3,378,134
1790	25	32	1,461,488	6,035,438
1795	76	60	1,298,921	8,098,495
1800	49	53	2,304,786	10,323,452
1801	39	38	2,512,779	9,153,511
1802	52	50	3,826,750	9,628,142
1803	55	44	2,861,037	8,425,268
1804	51	54	3,759,227	8,044,392
1805	49	50	2,597,054	8,791,370
1806	46	35	2,317,594	6,938,952
1807	46	53	2,245,690	8,140,499

TABLE B

The comparison of these figures with those which are *official* is of interest. The table given below is condensed from Hansard: *Parliamentary Debates*, vii. p. xv., and has been cited by Lumbroso and others. It is "an account of the value of all imports into, and exports from Great Britain for eighteen years, ending the 5th January 1806. . . . The real value of British Produce and Manufactures Exported in as far as the same can be ascertained under the Ad Valorem Duties or computed at the average Prices Current amounted in the Year ending the 5th January 1805 to £40,349,642. And in the Year ending the 5th January 1806 to £41,068,942." The tables giving Foreign Merchandise exported have been omitted below. The significant point to be noted is the difference between the *sale value* of imports and exports as given in Macpherson's table of Indian commerce and the *official value* given by Hansard. Attention should also be called to the fact that the financial year in Hansard is one year ahead of that represented in the larger table compiled from Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, iv. Thus 1790 in Hansard is 1789 in Macpherson.

Year.	Official value of Imports.		Official value of British Produce and Manufactures Exported.
	From East Indies and China.	From all other Parts.	
1789	3,453,897	14,573,272	12,724,719
1790	3,362,545	14,458,557	13,779,506
1791	3,149,870	15,981,015	14,921,684
1792	3,698,713	15,971,069	16,810,018
1793	2,701,547	16,957,810	18,336,851
1794	3,499,023	15,757,693	13,892,268
1795	4,458,475	17,830,418	16,725,402
1796	5,760,810	16,976,079	16,338,213
1797	3,372,689	19,814,630	19,102,220
1798	3,942,384	17,071,572	16,903,103
1799	7,626,930	20,230,959	19,672,503
1800	4,284,805	22,552,626	24,084,213
1801	4,942,275	25,628,329	24,304,283
1802	5,242,441	27,371,115	25,699,809
1803	5,794,906	25,647,412	26,993,129
1804	6,348,887	21,643,577	22,252,027
1805	5,214,621	23,986,869	23,935,793
1806	(not given)	24,273,451	25,003,308

TABLE C

(Figures in pounds sterling.)

Year.	Imports to the United Kingdom.			Exports from the United Kingdom.		
	From all Parts.	From the East Indies and China.	From Turkey and the Levant.	To all Parts.	To the East Indies and China.	To Turkey and the Levant.
1783	13,122,235	1,301,495	48,983	14,681,494	701,473	42,666
1784	15,272,877	2,996,652	75,167	15,101,491	730,858	43,052
1785	16,279,419	2,703,940	146,906	16,117,168	1,153,532	82,449
1786	15,786,072	3,156,687	121,954	16,300,730	2,242,038	113,320
1787	17,804,024	3,430,868	191,949	16,869,789	1,551,209	99,772
1788	18,027,170	3,453,897	183,335	17,472,238	1,430,633	47,838
1789	17,821,102	3,359,148	223,424	19,340,548	1,957,177	136,207
1790	19,130,886	3,149,870	249,187	20,120,121	2,386,320	113,179
1791	19,669,782	3,698,713	178,388	22,731,995	2,268,769	189,291
1792	19,659,358	2,701,433	290,599	24,905,200	2,425,947	273,785
1793	19,255,116	3,498,884	184,681	20,388,828	2,719,246	45,270
1794	22,276,915	4,458,447	324,906	26,748,083	2,924,688	117,700
1795	22,736,889	5,760,795	84,299	27,123,338	2,382,530	149,938
1796	23,187,319	3,372,689	150,182	30,518,913	2,358,707	155,510
1797	21,013,956	3,942,318	104,838	28,917,010	2,280,333	23,532
1798	27,857,889	7,626,930	42,285	33,591,777	1,145,735	62,168
1799	26,837,432	4,284,805	33,091	35,991,329	2,433,994	226,078
1800	30,570,605	4,942,241	199,773	43,152,019	2,835,063	166,804

The real market value given by the Inspector General for the following items was:

Year.	Imports from Asia.	Imports from all other Parts.	Total Imports.	British Merchandise exported.	Foreign Merchandise exported.	Total Exports.
1799	8,918,248	40,083,922	49,002,170	38,942,498	11,347,692	50,290,190
1800	9,827,278	45,573,138	55,400,416	39,471,203	16,830,843	56,302,046

This table is compiled from the figures and statements to be found in Macpherson: *Annals of Commerce*, iv. pp. 40, 68, 99, 120, 137, 182, 198, 214, 231, 262, 288, 332, 370, 399, 438, 466, 491, 536. The total figures here given have been adopted by Lohmann: *Die amtliche Handelstatistik*, though he does not attempt to analyze them; he has taken them from Whitworth and Chalmers.



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VITA

The author of this dissertation was born of American parents at Beirut, Syria, Ottoman Empire, on May 21, 1874. He attended the German School of the Kaiserswerth Deaconesses in that place, and also studied under private tutors until he entered Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, New Jersey, in September, 1888. He was prepared for college there and at the Cutler School, New York City (1891-92), and entered Princeton University in September, 1892. He was graduated with the degree of A. B. (*cum laude*) in 1896. The following autumn he was enrolled as a graduate student in the School of Political Science, Columbia University, having as his major subject, European History, his first minor, United States History, and his second minor, International Law. He attended the sessions of the University of Heidelberg, Germany, during the summer semester of 1897, where his major subject was History, and his two minor, Arabic and Syriac. He returned to Columbia in October, 1897, and studied there for two years more, having substituted as his second minor, Arabic Language and History for International Law. He passed his examination, in course, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in May, 1899. He spent the year following also in New York, working in various libraries, and studying along the lines of this monograph. During the year 1900-01 he was assistant in History at Harvard University, and there prepared the final draft of this dissertation. During the two years since his examination at Columbia he has been reading Arabic and has attended, optionally, several additional courses at Columbia and Harvard.

EASTERN PROBLEMS
AT THE
CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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